NEITHER "MODERATE" NOR EXTREMIST: TURKISH ISLAM IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 002030

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS TU
SUBJECT: NEITHER "MODERATE" NOR EXTREMIST: TURKISH ISLAM IN
A STALE, POSITIVIST BIND

REF: A. ANKARA 001511


B. ANKARA 001935

POLCOUNS John Kunstadter; E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary. Many in the West seek to promote Turkey as a
"model" of "moderate Islam." The reality is very different.
Islam in Turkey is stale and ingrown, straightjacketed by
state control on the one hand and by narrow-minded lodge and
brotherhood interpretations on the other. Although the
Turkish State professes to be "religiously neutral," it is in
practice attached to the Hanafi-Sunni Islamic tradition and
views other traditions and faiths with malign neglect or
outright hostility. End Summary.


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HOME OF "MODERATE ISLAM"?
--------------


2. (C) Many in the West seek to portray Turkey as a "model"
of "moderate" Islam. Many Turkish religious scholars and
officials trumpet Turkish Islam by claiming that the Hanafi
school of Sunni Islam mixed with Sufi and (according to the
the more progressive commentators) Turkish shamanistic
traditions has created a more open and tolerant version of
Islam. Turkish officials also invariably point to the
Ottoman Empire's acceptance of Sephardic Jews expelled from
Spain in 1492 and the fact that a handful of Turkish
diplomats saved dozens of Jews from the Nazis during World
War Two.


3. (C) They fail to mention, however, that also in the
1940's, the Turkish government enacted discriminatory tax
laws against Christians and Jews, seizing their businesses,
and forcing may to choose to emigrate. While large numbers
of Jews and Christians lived under carefully circumscribed
conditions as subjects of the Ottoman Empire, only a small
number of Christians and Jews (in Turkish parlance
"non-Muslims", a word equivalent to "non-Turk") remain in
Turkey today.


4. (U) PM Erdogan opened a world religions tourist exhibit
in Antalya in 2004 in an attempt to prove ruling AKP's
religious tolerance and ecumenical vision. In a 2004 visit
to Washington DC, State Minister Aydin spoke about the
importance of religious freedom and toleration. In March
2005, during a visit to Israel, Justice Minister Cemil Cicek
lauded the "long history of friendship between the Turkish
and the Jewish peoples."


5. (C) Unfortunately, the reality is very different from the
image senior Turkish leaders and officials try to portray.
Turkish Islam remains trapped in a stale Sunni line, with no
critical thinking, a reluctance to re-embrace ictihad
(precedence and adaptation),a reluctance to treat women as
equals, and suspicion, indeed bigotry, toward other
religions, especially Protestant Christianity.


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TURKISH SECULARISM (LAICISM) AND THE DIYANET
--------------


6. (C) Turkey is often described as a "secular" country, but
the English word "secular" is misleading. The Turks use the
word "laiklik" -- from the French word "laicism" -- to
describe their system. The hallmark of the Turkish system is
state control of religion, not the separation of church (or
mosque) and state or religious freedom.


7. (U) The Directorate of Religious Affairs (or Diyanet) was
established by Ataturk in 1924, five months after the
Republic was declared. It replaced the Sharia and
Foundations Ministry of the Ottoman period. The Turkish
state attempts to control all aspects of religion: it is
responsible for appointing religious officials (e.g., muftis)
and imams; pays their salaries; writes the sermons delivered
on Fridays; sets the curriculum for religious instruction in
the public schools; bans private Koran courses; forbids
private religious discussion groups; interferes with other
religious groups; outlaws proselytizing and missionary work;
and limits free speech by restricting the level of religious
discourse and the questioning of the laic system in public
life.


8. (C) A wide group of Turkish theology professors, muftis,
and imams defended the Diyanet structure and functions in
recent conversations with us. They asseted that the Diyanet
is a natural part of the Turkish and Ottoman tradition and
claimed that it is accepted by the public. Diyanet officials
and others pointed to the average citizen's ignorance of
Islamic tenants and the dangers posed by extremist
ideologies. Diyanet Deputy Chairman Mehmet Gormez asserted
to us that the Diyanet is needed properly to instruct the
people about their religion.


9. (C) Juxtaposed with the Turkish system, Gormez even
suggested that David Koresh -- the Branch Davidian leader who
was killed during a standoff with the U.S. federal agents in
1993 near Waco, Texas -- was a result of a lack of
state-sponsored religious instruction or control in the U.S.


10. (C) Via the Diyanet, the State closely oversees religious
officials and preachers throughout the country. District
muftis oversee local Diyanet property and the local imams.
Provincial muftis oversee their district subordinates and, in
turn, report to Diyanet headquarters. Muammer Turan, the
mufti of Ankara's Altindag district, revealed the level of
state control -- even paranoia -- in the management of
regional officers of Diyanet which itself remains under
suspicion by other elements of the State. Turan noted that
district muftis submit their reports to the local subgovernor
(or kaymakam). The kaymakam submits his reports to the
governor and the governor, in turn, passes the report to the
provincial mufti.


11. (C) Turan also noted that the governor or subgovernor --
not the district mufti -- picks which imam delivers the
official sermon each Friday at the local mosque. Diyanet
headquarters faxes or emails the weekly Friday sermon (hutbe)
to the local mosques, a measure instituted in 1997 at the
behest of the National Security Council as part of the
military's efforts to clamp down on Islamic political
activism. This practice, however, may be fraying. Ismail
Cosar, the chief imam at Ankara's main (Kocatepe) mosque told
us that he only uses the Diyanet-provided sermon as a rough
guide and usually writes his own. Cosar claimed that imams
at other large, well-know mosques have similar freedom.


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REPRESSION AND INEQUALITY IN THE DIYANET SYSTEM
-------------- --


12. (C) Diyanet head Bardakoglu has claimed that all Muslim
sects are represented equally in the Religious Affairs
Directorate under the umbrella of an "Islamic
supra-identity." In practice, however, the Turkish state and
the Diyanet system give preference to the Hanafi-school Sunni
tradition held by most Turks, to the exclusion of minority
traditions, sects, or faiths. Moreover, the Diyanet is
riddled by factionalism, with various brotherhoods and lodges
vying for control.


13. (U) All Turkish citizens are required to contribute taxes
for Hanafi-Sunni religious instruction in schools, the upkeep
of Sunni mosques, and the salaries of Sunni imams, but the
Diyanet does not provide any financial resources for other
religious denominations in Turkey, such as Alevis (heterodox,
semi-Muslim religious communities),Christians, or Jews.


14. (C) The Turkish state, moreover, actively discourages
other groups by restricting their houses of worship; limiting
their ability to teach their religion; and -- in the case of
Christian groups -- actively campaigning against their
missionaries (Refs A and B). Atila Erdem (strictly protect),
Secretary General of the Alevi Bektasi Institution's Union

SIPDIS
Federation, has told us that the government hinders their
efforts to construct new houses of worship and it forces
their children to take the mandatory Hanafi-Sunni Islam
classes at public schools. Erdem decried claims by some
officials that Aleviism is an Islamic sect and thus under the
Diyanet's purview. Erdem claimed the state should not be
involved in religion and argued that the Diyanet should be
abolished. (Note: There are several stands of Alevism in
Anatolia; some Alevis call themselves Muslims, other do not
or are not so perceived. End Note.)


15. (C) As in general throughout the Muslim world, women in
Turkey cannot serve as imams or muftis. There are no women
in leadership positions in the Diyanet or the ostensibly
autonomous Diyanet Foundation, the largest and richest
foundation in Turkey. There is, however, a separate Diyanet
Foundation's Women's Auxiliary Board. This board, however,
gets no support -- financial or otherwise -- from the
Diyanet, according to Ayse Sucu, the president of the Diyanet
Foundation's Women's Auxiliary Board. The Women's Auxiliary
Board has limited funds, a limited staff, and maintains
offices in only a handful of provinces.


16. (C) Sucu stated that many male Turkish leaders -- she
mentioned State Minister Mehmet Aydin and Diyanet Chief Ali
Bardakoglu by name -- present themselves as progressive,
modern, and supportive of women's issues, but they have
failed to lift a finger to advance women's causes once in
power. She also noted that the Women's Auxiliary Board could
be more effective in its women's literacy and other campaigns
if it received limited support from the state. She lamented
the poor condition of women's religious education by noting
that many Turkish women believe that the Koran forbids them
from leaving their house -- even to visit their own mother --
without their husband's permission.


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A STALE, POSITIVISTIC THEOLOGY
--------------


17. (C) Turkish theology professors and Diyanet officials
believe that they are on the cutting edge of Islamic
theological scholarship, but their ideas are stale,
positivistic, muddled, and, in some cases, surprisingly close
to relativism. The central political-religious question for
pious Turks is how to reconcile their religious faith with
support for a laic state. Unfortunately, the Turkish
religious establishment (i.e. the Diyanet and university
theology departments) is unable to provide a cogent answer to
this crucial question. Two Muftis told us, separately, that
religion has four elements -- faith, religious practice,
ethics, and politics -- but Islam is composed of only the
first three of these four elements. The muftis, however,
were unable to provide us with a theological basis for this
spiritually unpersuasive sociological assertion.


18. (C) Turkish theologians tend to focus on esoteric issues
and provide conventional answers to important questions. One
Ankara University theology professor told us that textual
interpretations of the Koran must adapt to the times, but he
was unable to provide any theological grounding for his
assertion. In a separate meeting, a group of theology
professors claimed that they believed that no one knows the
"truth" and that their subjective theological preferences
lacked objective grounding. In other words, they saw their
progressive/laic interpretations of Islam as not rooted in
"revealed religious truth", but in their own subjective
ideological preferences.


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THE ROLE OF TARIKATS
--------------


19. (C) Ataturk attempted to ban tarikats (brotherhoods) and
cemaats (lodges) in the mid-1920's but merely drove them
underground. While both tarikats (brotherhoods) and cemaats
(lodges) work on the principle of strict obedience to the
leader (sheykh or hoca),tarikats, such as the various
streams of Naksibendis or the Suleymancis, focus on group
rituals, although they also foster business ties. Cemaats,
such as the Fethullah Gulen lodge, focus as much on social
and economic activity as on following the teachings and
Koranic interpretations of their leaders. In general
tarikats have not sought political power, but any party
wishing to perform well in an election will solicit the
support of various tarikats. The Gulen cemaat has
concentrated (with marked success) on building up a worldwide
network of schools and Turkey-wide network of business and
journalists/writers associations. It has also infiltrated
hundreds of adherents into the national police, judiciary,
and Sayistay (GAO equivalent) and also has made inroads into
the AKP government, but more recently has signaled its
dissatisfaction with the way Erdogan has tried to govern and
appears to be distancing itself from him.


20. (C) Comment. Despite Turkey's image as a
Western-oriented, modern, and democratic society, on
questions of religion it is still a male-dominated, top-down,
and authoritarian society.


21. (C) The Kemalist establishment has little respect for
religious faith; displays no tolerance for more than a token
level religious diversity; and fears the general piety of the
Turkish public. The Diyanet system created by Ataturk
reveals the deep tensions and contradictions within Turkish
political society -- an alienated and nominally pro-Western
secular elite represses the religious views of the majority
of the population while simultaneously trying to create a
Turkish nation out of a diverse ethno-religious community
united mainly (but incompletely) by its Islamic faith.


22. (C) AKP seeks to represent the yearning of the relatively
pious Sunni majority for freedom from the Kemalist elite, but
is terminally affected by the narrow world-views of the
various lodges and brotherhoods competing for influence in
the party. Moreover, AKP MPs who are former Diyanet
officials suffer from ignorance and bigotry against other
religions and AKP's "liberalism" does not extend to other
ethno-religious groups or women's rights, in the sense
Western Europe or the U.S. accept them, other than the right
to wear a headscarf. End Comment.
EDELMAN