GWOT ASSESSMENT: POST FEEDBACK

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 002023

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER TU
SUBJECT: GWOT ASSESSMENT: POST FEEDBACK

REF: ANKARA 005116

(U) Classified Secret by Ambassador Eric Edelman for E.O.
12958 Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (S/NF) Summary. There is significant US-Turkish
cooperation in the GWOT. Better coordination among Turkish
intelligence and the various security services could improve
Turkish leaders, understanding of the threat and
effectiveness in cooperation with us. The Turkish National
Police provides excellent protection for U.S. diplomatic and
military facilities. The GOT,s counterterror (CT) finance
regime, however, lacks sufficient legal authority and is weak
on enforcement. The CT finance regime would benefit from
additional pressure from FATF, the relevant UN committees,
and higher level USG engagement. The lack of visible U.S.
action against the PKK/Kongra-Gel in Iraq has not yet had a
significant negative impact on US-Turkish CT cooperation; but
continued U.S. inaction could eventually lead to
deterioration in the ability or willingness of Turkish
officials to cooperate with the USG. End Summary.


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SUCCESSES: STRONG US-TURKISH COOPERATION
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2. (S/NF) We have good relations with and receive significant
cooperation on antiterrorism from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the Turkish National Police (TNP),the National
Intelligence Organization (MIT),and other Turkish agencies.
TNP provides excellent protection for U.S. diplomatic and
military facilities throughout Turkey. In addition to
sharing intelligence information on various groups operating
in Turkey, the TNP and the MIT are conducting aggressive
counterterrorist campaigns and have detained numerous
suspected terrorists in scores of raids, disrupting these
groups before terrorist acts could be carried out. TNP was
extremely active and aggressive in monitoring and, in some
cases, proactively detaining suspected terrorists prior to
the June 2004 POTUS visit and NATO Summit in Istanbul.
Interagency cooperation among Turkish services suffers from
philosophical differences or turf battles, and a systemic
weakness of analysis and coordination. The weak analysis
causes Turkish services and politicians to underestimate the
degree they are targets and the importance of transit and
support networks for international terror. The Turks are
also very reticent about sharing information on their own
citizens.


3. (U) Turkey remains a good ally in the Global War on
Terrorism (GWOT). Turkey agreed to assume command of the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan
for a second time. It will command ISAF VII from February to
August 2005, contributing up to 1,600 troops. The US and
Turkish militaries are also cooperating in the training of
Georgian and Azerbaijani security forces.


4. (U) Turkey permits the transport to Iraq of humanitarian
goods; contributes humanitarian goods and services; and sells
vital material such as fuel, food, and water to U.S. forces
in Iraq. They also allow the use of Incirlik Air Base for
U.S. tankers to refuel aircraft on support missions for both
Operational Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF). The GOT also allowed Incirlik to be used for
the outbound rotation of US troops returning from Iraq.
Turkey, moreover, is active in Iraqi reconstruction efforts,
including the provision of electricity and the training of
Iraqi diplomats, as well as contributing to the NATO training
mission for Iraqi security forces.


5. (C) Turkish officials provide excellent assistance
regarding the VISA VIPER program. Every month the Embassy
receives the names of about 200 suspected Turkish terrorists
from the Turkish authorities. Most are domestic
PKK/Kongra-Gel or leftist terrorists, but we have begun to
see Al-Qaida affiliated suspects on these lists.


6. (C) The Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program has been
very successful in providing training to our Turkish
partners. Turkish officials are eager participants in ATA
training programs and, according to reports we have received,
Turks are among the best students in these classes.


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MISCELLANEOUS CHALLENGES
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7. (S/NF) One impediment to greater cooperation with the GOT
is the perception among Turkish leaders and the public that
the USG is more focused on "their terrorists" (e.g. Al-Qaida
and Hezbollah) than on Turkish concerns regarding "our
terrorists" (e.g. DHKP-C and PKK/Kongra-Gel). Turkish
security and intelligence officials tend to be more focused
and cooperative on terrorism issues directly related to
Turkish security concerns than on other terrorism problems.
Since 9-11 and especially since the November 2003 Istanbul
bombings, there has been greater understanding and
cooperation from Turkish officials at the working level
regarding the threat posed to Turkey by terrorists linked to
Al-Qaida, but problems persist.


8. (S/NF) The Turks are not always transparent in their
cooperation with the USG. Although the Turks are good at
sharing information, they have been willing to engage in
joint operations against counterterrorism targets
sporadically, deciding to approach a target based on
capabilities and requirements. The GOT responds to our
requests, but sometimes significant periods of time may go by
before we are informed about any progress on a specific
counterterrorism issue.


9. (S/NF) Standards regarding the implementation of the Leahy
Amendment as applied to State/INL law enforcement training
funding continue to prevent some forms of useful cooperation.
Because the GOT is unwilling to accept standard language in
an agreement, funds for Turkey were cut. According to
agencies here with regional responsibilities, other U.S.
missions in the region have an easier time gaining access to
training funds for security officials, despite Turkey,s
human rights record being equivalent or better.


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THE TERROR FINANCE CHALLENGE
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10. (SBU) In compliance with UN Security Resolution 1373,
Turkey has ratified all United Nations conventions on
combating terrorism. However, Turkey has acted (by Council
of Ministers decrees) to freeze the assets only of those
terrorist organizations, persons, and entities designated
pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 1267 (relating to
Taliban and Al-Qaida),because Turkish law does not currently
permit it to freeze the assets of other such organizations,
persons, and entities. Turkish efforts to seize the assets
of those who fund terrorist organizations have been further
hampered by limited political will, weak technical capacity
and limited cooperation between agencies.


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THE LONG TERM CHALLENGE: THE PKK ISSUE
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11. (S/NF) The PKK/Kongra-Gel has stepped up its terror
campaign in Turkey since revoking its "unilateral" ceasefire
on 1 June 2004. Turkish policymakers remind us regularly
that President Bush told their leaders during his June 2004
visit here that we remained committed to take action to
prevent the PKK from continuing its safehaven in Iraq, and
they are waiting impatiently. Our continued inaction against
the PKK in Iraq, even non-military measures, especially as
the organization steps up its attacks against this NATO ally,
gives those who oppose our overall policy in the region a
wedge issue in their effort to move Turkish policy away from
a western orientation.


12. (S/NF) The lack of visible U.S. military or political
action against the PKK/Kongra-Gel has also significantly
contributed to the anti-American political environment in
Turkey. Turkish newspapers and television programs are
filled with conspiracy theories asserting that the U.S. is
supporting the PKK; promoting an independent "Kurdistan" in
northern Iraq (which, the theory goes, will inevitably expand
to include southeast Turkey); and pursuing a foreign policy
designed to weaken the Turkish Republic. Although we do not
believe that the lack of U.S. action against PKK has
negatively impacted US-Turkish CT cooperation so far,
continued U.S. inaction could eventually lead to a
significant deterioration in the ability or willingness of
Turkish officials to cooperate with the U.S.


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POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
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13. (C) A number of steps could be taken to improve
U.S.-Turkish cooperation in the GWOT. The GOT could use more
assistance in acquiring technical equipment, including
computers. The Turks would also benefit from training
programs focused on computer networking, computer forensics,
and maritime security.


14. (C) With regards to the GOT,s counterterror finance
regime, the GOT,s plans to criminalize terror finance;
define terrorism in accordance with international standards;
and streamline its financial intelligence unit, the Financial
Crimes Investigative Board (MASAK),are important steps
towards strengthening the regime. The USG, along with the
FATF, Egmont, the UN, and the EU, should continue to look for
ways to keep the pressure on the GOT to follow through with
its proposed reforms.

15. (C) Furthermore, the USG should continue its
long-standing engagement with the GOT with training in
counterterror finance as well as pursue high level engagement
on policy. Such engagement might be useful in order to raise
the profile of this issue at senior levels of the GOT and
give the bureaucrats, work a top-down push to speed up
enactment of legal reforms.


16. (C) Another area that can be used as leverage is
Turkey,s upcoming review by the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) at the end of 2005/beginning of 2006. The GOT is much
more likely to take action if it is getting pressure from
other sources, in addition to US pressure. MASAK seems to
put great store in improving its image in FATF. US
representatives to FATF could raise the issue and seek ways
for FATF to engage with Turkey prior to the upcoming review.
In addition, the GOT, especially the MFA, are sensitive to
meeting their obligations to the UN. The US could look into
the possibility of a visit by the 1373 or 1267 committee that
could help focus the GOT,s attention on this issue.


17. (C) Additionally, in Post's opinion, the GOT's weak
anti-terrorist finance regime could benefit largely from more
training in investigating and prosecuting financial crimes.
The MASAK could benefit from more training on effective FIU
operating procedures, including analytical training.


18. (S/NF) We also need to pursue specific nonmilitary steps
(reftel) against the PKK that can both weaken this terrorist
organization and prove to the Turks that we take our
counterterrorism rhetoric and commitments seriously. For the
present in Iraq, now that the Iraqi Transitional Government
(ITG) is being formed we need to reinvigorate our trilateral
process. The authorities in the Kurdistan Region, moreover,
should be pressed to at a minimum shut down PKK/Kongra-Gel
offices outside the mountains; act against the PKK's
resupply, movement, and recruitment efforts; and prevent the
expansion of PKK facilities near the Turkish border.


19. (C) Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) efforts to
intensify focus and cooperation against PKK/Konga-Gel
logistics and capabilities outside Iraq would build the
GOT,s confidence in the USG,s commitment against the PKK
and weaken the terrorist organization by drying up its
funding streams and disrupting its operations. The USG,
moreover, should encourage a GOT-hosted or joint
U.S.-GOT-hosted multilateral conference on European PKK
activities. The PKK is involved in a number of criminal
activities in Europe (including drug running and extortion),
but the GOT has had only limited success in convincing
European countries to close down PKK-connected media outlets,
front parties, and fund-raising organizations. In many
cases, the Turks lack the information needed to pursue a
legal case against these PKK-connected groups in European
courts. An anti-PKK conference would assist our NATO ally in
its fight against the PKK; aid U.S. public diplomacy efforts
in Turkey; and provide a forum to showcase
U.S.-European-Turkish cooperation in the GWOT.
EDELMAN