IRAQ: TURKS TRYING TO CHANGE A LOSING GAME

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001484 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2025 TAGS: PREL PGOV ELTN ETRD TU IZ SUBJECT: IRAQ: TURKS TRYING TO CHANGE A LOSING GAME REF: A. 04 ANKARA 6615 ¶B. ANKARA 1211 ¶C. ANKARA 1071 ¶D. BAGHDAD 923 ¶E. USADO ANKARA IIR DTG 281402Z FEB 05 ¶F. ANKARA 1283 ¶G. ANKARA 1230 Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Turkey's leadership and policy establishment appears to be grasping for a new and more constructive policy direction on Iraq, in part (we believe) based on the desire to limit the weight Iraq puts on the U.S.-Turkish relationship, in part also due to the Turks' post-election evaluation that they have been pursuing a losing strategy on Iraq. We believe the Turks will now try to focus on Iraq as a whole and to support the ITG (when it emerges),and will resist their inclination to look at Iraq as a collection of northern Iraq-centered problems (federalism cum Kurdish separatism, Kirkuk, Turkmen, PKK) as it does now. We have a small but discernible window of opportunity to work with the Turks on Iraq, but we fear bad news from Iraq could close this window, so we should capitalize on this opportunity quickly and strengthen the GOT's willingness to stand up to the pressure. End summary. Turks Seek to Change a Losing Game -------------- ¶2. (C) While the GOT has not formally announced a new Iraq policy, we have picked up indications publicly and privately that it is struggling to form one. Just before and after Iraq's Jan. 30 elections, MFA statements were lukewarm at best and took particular pains to cite at length Turkish concerns about Sunni non-participation and what the Turks viewed as Kurdish manipulation of events on the ground in Kirkuk, including allegations that the Kurds sought to disenfranchise and intimidate the region's Turkmen. Erdogan was particularly unhelpful, at one point criticizing the election as "undemocratic." ¶3. (C) Yet following the Feb. 13 announcement of the election results--and despite their obvious disappointment with the performance of Iraq's Turkmen overall and especially the Ankara-supported Iraq Turkmen Front (ref b)--MFA issued a somewhat warmer statement supporting the transition to democracy in Iraq and a separate statement praising the UIA's choice for PM, Ibrahim Ja'afari, as a "senior politician whom we know well." In a stunning revision of history, FonMin Gul said in a March 1 interview that it was Turkey who had propped up a wobbly Arab world and the U.S. by insisting that elections in Iraq go forward on Jan. 30 as planned. We were also surprised when in a recent interview Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) U/S Atasagun showed subtlety and flexibility in analysis, including on the eventuality of a Kurdish state. ¶4. (C) On Feb. 24, a civilian and military delegation led by GOT Special Envoy for Iraq Amb. Osman Koruturk traveled to northern Iraq to meet PUK leader Jalal Talabani (usually Talabani comes here) (ref c). Koruturk carried a letter from PM Erdogan to Talabani in which--according to the Ankara PUK rep Bahros Galali--Erdogan offered Turkey's support for a federal system for Iraq (previously many Turks saw federalism as merely a step on the way to the establishment of an independent Kurdish state). The press here (and, to us, Galali) portrayed the trip positively and spun Koruturk's mission as Turkey lending its support to Talabani in his bid to become President of Iraq. The Turks have often complained to us about Kurds being given too much influence in Baghdad, but we are not hearing such complaints now from Ankara. Indeed, MFA DG For the Middle East Oguz Celikkol told the DCM March 10 that part of the intention behind the Koruturk mission was to dispel reports that Turkey objected to Talabani becoming President. Looking at the Kurds from a National Perspective -------------- --- ¶5. (C) We believe the Turks see the Kurds as a balance against possible UIA moves to impose both Sharia law and Shia hegemony into the Iraqi political system, and they have also recognized the importance of Kurdish buy-in (as shown by Turkish Ambassador Cevikoz's March 2 conversation with Ambassador Negroponte--ref d). Yet even as the Turks want the Kurds to be part of the Baghdad policy nucleus, they are concerned that Ja'afari may be forced to make too many concessions on Kirkuk and maintaining the peshmerga, still hot-button issues here. DCM emphasized to Celikkol in their March 10 conversation that there are other communities and political forces in Iraq who take Kirkuk seriously, not just the Kurds, and that we do not believe these forces will easily concede to Kirkuk's becoming part of the KRA. Celikkol understood the point. At the same meeting, MFA Department Head for Iraq Avni Botsali said that U.S. and Turkish policies on Iraq "are coming together," and repeated with emphasis that a U.S. failure in Iraq would also be a failure for the West, including Turkey. Turkish Leaders (Finally) Talk About the Importance of Working With Us on Iraq -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) According to press reports, at the Feb. 25 meeting of the National Security Council (which includes the PM as well as key ministers and military leaders),the GOT evaluated both its Iraq policy and the U.S. relationship and assigned PM Erdogan to work on improving the U.S.'s public image in Turkey--an image pummeled in recent months by outrageous allegations against the U.S., usually centered on Iraq, by journalists and politicians inside and outside the government. Instrumental in turning the government around was a series of senior visits in the first six weeks of the year, culminating in the Secretary's visit Feb. 5-6. Indeed, even the day before the Feb. 25 NSC meeting, Erdogan (discussing U.S. policy in Iraq) commented that "There could be differences in our ways of taking an approach to various regional issues and events. Nevertheless, the rich historical background of the ties between the two countries and their multifaceted character...are sufficient to ensure that our friendship and cooperation continue with greater vigor." This is not the kind of line we have heard from GOT leaders for some time indeed. ¶7. (S) The military also appears to be shifting to a more positive position on Iraq. TGS was well out in front of the civilian leadership in standing up for the relationship despite policy differences on Iraq, best illustrated by Deputy CHOD Basbug's Jan. 26 press briefing, in which, while laying out Turkish concerns, he did so judiciously and accompanied by repeated emphasis on the importance of relations with the U.S. and on not reducing them to a single issue. Some military sources have indicated that TGS is revising its view that the U.S. is failing in Iraq and that the country is in imminent danger of disintegrating. These sources tell us that TGS is drafting a paper saying that the U.S. is succeeding and therefore Turkey should support us and the Iraqis (see ref e). While Embassy has its doubts that the report is correct, our recent contacts with the military indicate they are also thinking of Iraq as a larger issue than the usual Turkish concerns. When PolMilCouns met with TGS J3 Plans and Operations Chief Maj Gen Eroz on March 9, Eroz never once raised the PKK/Kongra-Gel or the Turkmen. This seems to be a contrast to his harsh assessment after Jan. 11 trilateral talks on PKK/Kongra-Gel that they had accomplished nothing. Comment: Can They Take the High Road? -------------- ¶8. (C) The positive shift in Ankara's approach toward Iraq is, thus, the result of realizing its previous approach failed and a desire to prevent a further slide in U.S.-Turkey relations. While we believe the Turks are now making a renewed effort to be helpful on Iraq and in supporting our relationship, we are not convinced that the policy apparatus or the leadership has either the discipline or the political courage to stay on course if events in Iraq bring the standard Turkish bogeymen back to life. Injudicious statements by Kurds on Kirkuk or Kurdish independence, new allegations of oppression of Turkmen, an uptick in PKK attacks in Turkey (a normal occurrence in the spring),or a major CF anti-insurgent operation could each by themselves be enough to inspire the Turkish press to renew its blatant misreporting and airing of grievances. The proof of the pudding will come when Erdogan or Gul face the microphones and have to decide whether to pander to Turkish public opinion or be real leaders. Their past record does not give us strong reason for optimism. ¶9. (C) Comment, cont.: Thus, if we have issues where we can press forward--issues such as helping with reconstruction, the second border gate (ref f),encouraging Iraqi-Turkish dialogue on water issues (ref g),more contributions to NATO Training Mission-Iraq or training police, or simply pushing the Turks to show more leadership in supporting the ITG and democratization in Iraq--we should move smartly before this window of opportunity might slam shut. Deepening their engagement with us on Iraq may strengthen their will to stand up to the critical press and for our relationship. End comment. ¶10. (U) Iraq posts minimize considered. EDELMAN