IRAQ: AMMAN COALITION TALKS AMONG SUNNIS AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 009963 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ JO SUBJECT: IRAQ: AMMAN COALITION TALKS AMONG SUNNIS AND SECULARS REF: A. BAGHDAD 5078 ¶B. AMMAN 9553 Classified By: DANIEL RUBINSTEIN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION, REASONS: 1.4 (B &D) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Senior Iraqi Sunni and secular politicians including Iyad Allawi and Adnan Dulaime met in Amman on December 25 and 26, and agreed to form an &Iraqi National Alliance8 coalition to compete with the Shi,ite Islamist "555" coalition in forming a new government. The immediate goal of the new alliance, which includes members of Saleh Mutlak,s list, is to consolidate with the Kurdish coalition, and build upon that to attract defections from 555. While deciding to reject a parliamentary boycott or other extreme measures &for now,8 these options were reportedly left on the table should the current track fail. The new coalition sent a delegation to Cairo on December 27 to lobby both the GOE and the Arab League. End Summary. Allawi/Sunni Groups Hold Amman &Unity8 Meeting -------------- ¶2. (C) Adnan Dulaime, Iyad Allawi, and other Iraqi POLITICAL figures from the Sunni and secular blocs held POLITICAL strategy meetings in Amman on December 25 and 26. According to Allawi's cousin and Amman-based advisor Ja'afar Al-Taie (strictly protect),Dulaime and Allawi agreed to form a joint "parliamentary alliance," to be called the &Iraqi National Alliance.8 Altaie said that Allawi cleared the air early on by making it clear that he wanted to build a strong Secular/Sunni/Kurdish (SSK) coalition, whether or not he ultimately becomes Prime Minister. Al-Taie noted that Dulaime's &Tawafuq8 coalition leaders Khalaf al-Ayan and Nasir al-Ani, and Mutlak party members Ali al-Sajri and Hasan Zalian, also attended (see para #13 below for a partial list of attendees). ¶3. (C) Husam Ghazallee (strictly protect),an Iraqi moderate nationalist who also attended most of the meetings, separately told Emboff that Adnan Dulaime vetoed an Allawi-proposed public announcement of the new "Iraqi National Alliance" for now. According to Ghazallee, Dulaime argued that it would be better to wait until after the Kurds have been formally approached about joining it, and their position clarified. Ghazallee said Dulaime stressed that that the Kurds need to be invited to take part in the formation of it - not just be asked to join ex post facto. Ghazallee said that Ghazi Yawwar commented that in general the Kurds &want to be with us,8 but are very practical, and will go with 555 "if they think we are not truly united." Winning Over the Kurds -------------- ¶4. (C) Al-Taie said that Iraqi Minister of Planning Barham Saleh also participated in the December 25 discussions, officially to lend his personal support, unofficially as the representative of the Talabani wing of the Kurdish coalition, which Al-Taie described as the Kurdish faction most resistant to joining a notional SSK alliance. Al-Taie characterized Saleh,s participation as &ten-faced,8 adding &he is the Kurdish leader I like the most and trust the least.8 Al-Taie described Saleh as acting as if he were independent of the other Kurdish leadership, claiming on the one hand that &I will never again serve a Kurdish/UIA coalition,8 while on the other advising that Allawi and the Sunni groups &give Talabani everything he wants, and then hope for the best.8 ¶5. (C) Al-Taie asserted that Allawi is confident that Mustafa Barzani (unlike Talabani) already supports formation of this alliance. Al-Taie told Emboff that, at Allawi,s request, he repeatedly briefed Barzani by telephone as the discussions progressed. According to Al-Taie, Barzani commented that the USG will need to intervene to bring about an SSK coalition. In this context, Al-Taie said Barzani argued the USG should simultaneously: -- encourage Turkey to cultivate a &friendlier8 relationship with the Kurdish leadership, and elicit some kind of public Turkish pledge not to interfere with Kurdish autonomy; -- reduce Talabani,s wiggle room by making a clear-cut statement to him that the U.S. wants something radically different from the current Kurdish/UIA coalition, and expects him to cooperate in achieving it; -- do something public to give the Sunni/Secular coalition a morale boost. And Reaching Out to Other Factions -------------- ¶6. (C) In addition to joining with the Kurds, Al-Taie said that the National Alliance group also expects to get Misha'an al-Jabouri's three seats and Mithal al-Aluisi,s seat into the coalition, as well as the three or four anticipated Christian and Turkoman party seats. Note: Misha,an al-Jabouri was not at the group meeting, but met with Allawi separately after arriving in Amman late on December 26. End Note. Ghazallee claimed that Allawi said that his Chief of Staff Ibrahim al-Janabi has even received some overtures from the al-Sadr splinter group &Risaliyoon,8 which apparently won two seats, about their joining up with Allawi. Ghazallee said that Allawi, Dulaime, and others at the meeting also expressed hope that Fadila and maybe part of Dawa could eventually be brought into the coalition, leading Ghazi Yawwar to ask skeptically why anyone thought these groups would be willing to "get off a winning horse." Fear and Loathing of 555 -------------- ¶7. (C) Al-Taie stressed that, while open to talks with some current 555 components, Allawi said flatly that he cannot negotiate with 555,s leadership per se because "they want me dead and are still trying to kill me.8 Al-Taie added that Dulaime personally &loathes8 the 555 leadership, and said that Dulaime argued that experience shows that 555 will never honor the spirit of any POLITICAL agreement they enter into. Having made these points, Al-Taie opined that Allawi and Dulaime,s apprehension does not rule out other National Alliance contacts with 555, as &private talks are the Iraqi way.8 Political Participation: Just One Option? -------------- ¶8. (C) Despite the generally constructive POLITICAL discussions outlined above, A-Ttaie emphasized that the assembled group, including Allawi, was deeply perturbed by what they believe was massive Iran-backed election intimidation and fraud, especially in Baghdad and the South, which he said Allawi personally feels cost his party at least ten seats. In this context, Al-Taie said that Allawi told the group that &the POLITICAL effort by itself has failed in the face of Iranian expansionism,8 but needs to be continued &as one among several tracks.8 ¶9. (C) Al-Taie said that the group debated other options, including mobilizing massive protests, supporting the insurgency, withdrawing completely from the POLITICAL process, and/or splitting the country into three pieces. According to Al-Taie, only Barham Saleh directly opposed the stepped-up insurgency/protest option, with Dulaime arguing in favor of stepped-up unrest as the only way &to attract U.S. and UN attention.8 Al-Taie said that Allawi did not reject these arguments, but tacitly supported a statement by Adnan Pachachi emphasizing that aggressively challenging election fraud while forming a powerful parliamentary alliance remains the best way forward. Al-Taie said that the final consensus was that &for now,8 the POLITICAL track should be actively pursued, with the probability of revisiting the other options as matters progress. ¶10. (C) Al-Taie claimed to be the only one of Allawi's advisors who, before the election, resisted "delirious optimism" that led Allawi's entourage to predict big wins in Baghdad and Basra. He said that the seculars and Sunnis have been shocked by the outcome and need help in recovering. Al-Taie warned that the new group will need USG handholding to avoid degenerating. He stressed that a sympathetic hearing and encouragement from Ambassador Khalilzad on working together cooperatively would be a great tonic that will raise morale and help move things forward. He warned that many Iraqi POLITICAL figures (though not he) still believe that, if it wants to, the USG can simply wave its hand and make anything happen. Lobbying the Arab League -------------- ¶11. (C) Both Al-Taie and Ghazallee said that the idea to send a &National Alliance8 delegation to Cairo to meet with the Arab League and the GOE (Ref A) was Allawi's. Ghazallee said the delegation included Ali Sajri (Mutlak list); Khalaf al-Ayan (Tawafuqq); Izzat Shabander (Allawi advisor); and Nasir al-Ani (Islamic Party/Tawafuq). Altaie claimed that the purpose of the delegation was not to bask in Arab nationalism, but to &call the Arabs' bluff8 on their readiness to be helpful "if asked,8 and to silence U.S. critics, who say that that the Iraqis have not pressed for greater Arab assistance in stabilizing the country. Absent From the Table ) Hassani, Mutlak, and Hashemi -------------- ¶12. (C) Emboff asked Al-Taie and Ghazalee why Hachem al-Hassani, Saleh Mutlak, and Tariq Hashemi, all originally announced as part of the projected unity meeting, did not attend. Al-Taie said that Mutlak was left in Iraq to work on organizing election protests, partly as a strategy to keep him out of the coalition process until it is a fait accompli. He described Mutlak as a loose cannon better left out of sensitive discussions, and opined that Mutlak ultimately has no alternative to the newly-formed coalition. Nonetheless, he acknowledged nervousness about what Mutlak may ultimately do, and observed that Mutlak commands the POLITICAL loyalty of only about half of the ten or so members of his list who have apparently been elected. Al-Taie said that RELATIONS between Hassani and Allawi deteriorated during the campaign, as Allawi objected to Hassani,s refusal to campaign in Iraq. Al-Taie claimed that Hassani appears to believe that a renewed 555/Kurdish coalition is inevitable, and is currently focusing on obtaining a good position for himself in that eventuality. Al-Taie did not comment on Hashemi,s non-attendance, but Ghazallee said that Hashemi substituted al-Ani for himself at the last minute, and claimed that there is some nervousness about Hashemi,s ultimate intentions. ¶13. (C) Key Amman meeting attendees: Iyad Allawi Adnan Dulaime Khalaf al-Ayan Barham Saleh (one day only) Adnan Pachachi Gazi Yawwar ) Vice President Nasir al-Ani ) Islamic Party #2 Hasan Zaidan (ex-General with Ba,athist ties - his son is #1 in Mutlak's list in Ninewa) Ali Sajri (#1 on Mutlak,s List in Salah ad-Din ) apparently elected) ¶14. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Baghdad. Hale