Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05AMMAN9553
2005-12-11 16:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Amman
Cable title:
IRAQ SUNNI OUTREACH: AMMAN MEETING WITH MUTLAK
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 009553
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2015
TAGS: PREL KDEM IZ JO
SUBJECT: IRAQ SUNNI OUTREACH: AMMAN MEETING WITH MUTLAK
LIST CANDIDATE ALI AL-SAJRI
Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION DANIEL RUBINSTEIN, REASONS: 1.4
(B &D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 009553
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2015
TAGS: PREL KDEM IZ JO
SUBJECT: IRAQ SUNNI OUTREACH: AMMAN MEETING WITH MUTLAK
LIST CANDIDATE ALI AL-SAJRI
Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION DANIEL RUBINSTEIN, REASONS: 1.4
(B &D)
1. (C) "Sons of United Iraq Movement" Secretary General Ali
Sajri told emboff December 1 he is confident that he and
others from his party list in Salal ad-Din will be elected in
this week's election in Iraq. Sajri, who heads Saleh
Mutlak,s National Assembly candidate list in the Salah
ad-Din Governorate, noted that while he is currently running
with Mutlak, he later plans to join up with Adnan Dulaimi
after the election, and ultimately join a coalition with Iyad
Allawi. Sajri said that he will press Mutlak to do the same,
but will join with Allawi "whatever Saleh does." Al-Sajri
asked that we press Iraq,s nationalist/democratic political
leadership, especially Sunnis, to stop attacking each other
and recognize the need for cooperation and unity. Sajri
claimed that even if an Allawi-led coalition takes control,
he himself would demand no position in the next government.
Calls for "Two-Track" Approach to Sunni Outreach
--------------
2. (C) Sajri praised the outcome of the recent Arab League
reconciliation conference in Cairo. He argued that we and
others supporting a democratic Iraq should continue outreach
efforts to Harith al-Dhari and his associates, but stressed
that the Sunni nationalist bloc is highly fragmented; several
Sunni insurgent groups are not under the control of any of
the current group of Sunni leaders. Sajri urged that we
pursue a two-track approach to Sunni outreach, continuing to
work with al-Dhari and his ilk, while separately expanding
political contacts and talks with more local figures within
the individual governorates. "The key is reaching the
people," he added.
Need for Political Attention to "Pro-Iraq" Southerners
--------------
3. (C) Sajri pled that greater attention be paid by Allawi,
Sunni nationalists, and the USG to "pro-Iraq" forces in the
south. He cited Nasiriyyah as one area where he believed a
large number of Sh,ia could be won over to vote for Allawi
or similar candidates. He related a meeting he recently
attended with several Nasiriyyah Sh,ia tribal figures whom
he claimed openly complained about the "Iranian occupation,"
and quoted one tribal Sheikh as bemoaning that "an Eastern
wind is carrying us, whether we agree or not."
Skeptical of Masha,an al-Jabouri
--------------
4. (C) Sajri was skeptical of his fellow Salah ad-Din native
Masha,an al-Jabouri, and especially the latter's claim to
control a 21,000-man local militia, under Iraqi MOD aegis.
Sajri claimed that Jabouri,s payroll is packed with
non-members, and that many of its cadres complain that their
salaries are not being paid. Sajri also alleged that
Jabouri,s militia is heavily engaged in black market
activities. Note: al-Jabouri openly boasted to Emboff in
Amman last August that he has put many ghost soldiers,
including young children of Imams, on his
infrastructure-protection militia payroll, as part of a
larger political co-optation strategy. End Note.
Bio Background
--------------
5. (C) Sajri, a Sunni arab, was born near Beiji in 1969; his
father, a sheikh of the Albu Sagar and part of the Janabi
clan, was executed by Saddam,s regime in 1982. Sajri
subsequently fled to Jordan, where he is a successful
businessman and cigarette manufacturer. Although opposed to
Saddam, Sajri apparently was not involved with the political
opposition before the war. Al-Sajri expressed appreciation
for U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Khalilzad,s activities,
observing that he "is working in the right way." Al-Sajri
left Amman on December 2 for a week of politicking in Iraq,
but expressed willingness to meet again after his return.
For political and security reasons he expressed reservations
about meeting with USG representatives in Iraq, but promised
to revisit this issue "after the election."
6. (C) Sajri claims to be personally pro-Western, but
according to Emboff Iraqi contact Husam Ghazali (strictly
protect),Sajri's brother joined the insurgency and was
killed in 2004 Note: Ghazalee, a long time friend of Sajri,
added that Sajri was not close to this brother and considered
him a "fool" for joining the insurgency. End Note. Sajri,s
tribal ties, recent local business activities, and family
links to the insurgency have made him well known in the
Tikrit and Beiji areas, according to Ghazali.
7. (C) EMBASSY Baghdad Comment: It is important to note that
expats like Sajri have an uncertain political weight in Iraq,
and have generally not faired very well in elections. End
Embassy Baghdad Comment.
8. (U) This cable was cleared by EMBASSY Baghdad.
HALE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2015
TAGS: PREL KDEM IZ JO
SUBJECT: IRAQ SUNNI OUTREACH: AMMAN MEETING WITH MUTLAK
LIST CANDIDATE ALI AL-SAJRI
Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION DANIEL RUBINSTEIN, REASONS: 1.4
(B &D)
1. (C) "Sons of United Iraq Movement" Secretary General Ali
Sajri told emboff December 1 he is confident that he and
others from his party list in Salal ad-Din will be elected in
this week's election in Iraq. Sajri, who heads Saleh
Mutlak,s National Assembly candidate list in the Salah
ad-Din Governorate, noted that while he is currently running
with Mutlak, he later plans to join up with Adnan Dulaimi
after the election, and ultimately join a coalition with Iyad
Allawi. Sajri said that he will press Mutlak to do the same,
but will join with Allawi "whatever Saleh does." Al-Sajri
asked that we press Iraq,s nationalist/democratic political
leadership, especially Sunnis, to stop attacking each other
and recognize the need for cooperation and unity. Sajri
claimed that even if an Allawi-led coalition takes control,
he himself would demand no position in the next government.
Calls for "Two-Track" Approach to Sunni Outreach
--------------
2. (C) Sajri praised the outcome of the recent Arab League
reconciliation conference in Cairo. He argued that we and
others supporting a democratic Iraq should continue outreach
efforts to Harith al-Dhari and his associates, but stressed
that the Sunni nationalist bloc is highly fragmented; several
Sunni insurgent groups are not under the control of any of
the current group of Sunni leaders. Sajri urged that we
pursue a two-track approach to Sunni outreach, continuing to
work with al-Dhari and his ilk, while separately expanding
political contacts and talks with more local figures within
the individual governorates. "The key is reaching the
people," he added.
Need for Political Attention to "Pro-Iraq" Southerners
--------------
3. (C) Sajri pled that greater attention be paid by Allawi,
Sunni nationalists, and the USG to "pro-Iraq" forces in the
south. He cited Nasiriyyah as one area where he believed a
large number of Sh,ia could be won over to vote for Allawi
or similar candidates. He related a meeting he recently
attended with several Nasiriyyah Sh,ia tribal figures whom
he claimed openly complained about the "Iranian occupation,"
and quoted one tribal Sheikh as bemoaning that "an Eastern
wind is carrying us, whether we agree or not."
Skeptical of Masha,an al-Jabouri
--------------
4. (C) Sajri was skeptical of his fellow Salah ad-Din native
Masha,an al-Jabouri, and especially the latter's claim to
control a 21,000-man local militia, under Iraqi MOD aegis.
Sajri claimed that Jabouri,s payroll is packed with
non-members, and that many of its cadres complain that their
salaries are not being paid. Sajri also alleged that
Jabouri,s militia is heavily engaged in black market
activities. Note: al-Jabouri openly boasted to Emboff in
Amman last August that he has put many ghost soldiers,
including young children of Imams, on his
infrastructure-protection militia payroll, as part of a
larger political co-optation strategy. End Note.
Bio Background
--------------
5. (C) Sajri, a Sunni arab, was born near Beiji in 1969; his
father, a sheikh of the Albu Sagar and part of the Janabi
clan, was executed by Saddam,s regime in 1982. Sajri
subsequently fled to Jordan, where he is a successful
businessman and cigarette manufacturer. Although opposed to
Saddam, Sajri apparently was not involved with the political
opposition before the war. Al-Sajri expressed appreciation
for U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Khalilzad,s activities,
observing that he "is working in the right way." Al-Sajri
left Amman on December 2 for a week of politicking in Iraq,
but expressed willingness to meet again after his return.
For political and security reasons he expressed reservations
about meeting with USG representatives in Iraq, but promised
to revisit this issue "after the election."
6. (C) Sajri claims to be personally pro-Western, but
according to Emboff Iraqi contact Husam Ghazali (strictly
protect),Sajri's brother joined the insurgency and was
killed in 2004 Note: Ghazalee, a long time friend of Sajri,
added that Sajri was not close to this brother and considered
him a "fool" for joining the insurgency. End Note. Sajri,s
tribal ties, recent local business activities, and family
links to the insurgency have made him well known in the
Tikrit and Beiji areas, according to Ghazali.
7. (C) EMBASSY Baghdad Comment: It is important to note that
expats like Sajri have an uncertain political weight in Iraq,
and have generally not faired very well in elections. End
Embassy Baghdad Comment.
8. (U) This cable was cleared by EMBASSY Baghdad.
HALE