AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD'S MEETING WITH JORDANIAN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 007997

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV JO IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD'S MEETING WITH JORDANIAN
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR


Classified By: DAVID HALE, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, REASONS: 1.4 (B &D)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) In his meeting with Jordan's National Security
Advisor Sa'ad Kheir, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Khalilzad
emphasized recent efforts made to deal with Sunni Arab
concerns over the draft Constitution, and asked for Jordanian
help in encouraging prominent Sunni Arabs to support the
Constitution and to focus on the constitutional referendum as
a way station to the December election. Kheir agreed that
the general election is crucial and promised increased
Jordanian efforts to encourage Sunni Arab turnout. Khalilzad
noted that Sunnis and other Iraqis need help in developing an
effective cross-sectarian leadership that can put Iraq firmly
on the road to stability, unity, and prosperity. Kheir made
several allegations regarding Iranian infiltration and
expansion into Iraq; Khalilzad acknowledged the problem, but
stressed the importance of not playing Iran's game of
promoting sectarian confrontation that would push Iraqi Sh'ia
into Iran's arms. Khalilzad reiterated that the best
response to Iran is to encourage the growth of responsible
Iraqi nationalist and cross-sectarian political movements and
leaders. Kheir agreed, and promised stepped-up Jordanian
efforts to construct with us a more activist policy. End
Summary.

Moving Sunni Arabs Forward
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2. (C) U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad and Charge
met with Sa'ad Kheir, Jordanian National Security Advisor, in
Amman on October 3. Kheir endorsed the need for broad-based
Sunni Arab participation in the December elections and
engagement in the overall political process. He added that
this view is now widely accepted among Iraqi Sunnis, marking
"a real step forward." However, he noted that many Sunni
Arabs remain unhappy with the new draft Constitution.
Ambassador Khalilzad observed that most Iraqi Sunni Arabs are
not familiar with what is really in the Constitution -
especially after the most recent revisions, which explicitly
addressed Sunni Arab concerns over federalism, Iraq's Arab
identity, and qualifications for citizenship.


3. (C) Khalilzad also stressed that Sunni Arabs can't keep
"moving the goal posts" on what they need to make the current
text acceptable, citing Sunni Arab backpedaling after
obtaining requested concessions on federalism as an example.
Major Sunni figures need to recognize that the Constitution
is a largely positive, compromise document that can be
amended, and is an acceptable basis for moving forward.
Khalilzad noted that public articulation of these points by
prominent Sunnis will help us and them gain further
concessions on revising the text of the draft Constitution
from the Sh,ia and Kurdish leadership.


4. (C) Kheir agreed that Sunni Arabs need to look past the
upcoming constitutional plebiscite and focus on the December
elections. He said that King Abdullah has decided to host a
conference in Amman in late October designed to bring
together Iraqi Sunni Arab, Kurdish, Turkomen, and Shi'a
leaders to assist them in forming a unified, democratic, and
nationalist approach to Iraq,s future.

Containing Iranian Influence
--------------


5. (C) Kheir expressed great concern about extensive Iranian
infiltration of and rising influence in Iraq. He claimed
that southern Iraq is becoming an Iranian colony, and alleged
that key Iraqi government figures, including Prime Minister
Jafari and Minister of Interior Bayan Jabr, are "Iranian
agents." He was particularly emphatic in denouncing Jabr as
an Iranian loyalist. More worrisome, Kheir asserted that
Iranian infiltration runs from top to bottom in the Iraqi
bureaucracy and security forces. He also alleged that the
Iranians have positioned sleeper cells throughout the country
and are using large-scale "charitable donations" as a tool
for building massive front organizations. All these efforts
are designed to ensure that Iran gains a powerful grip over
Iraq regardless of the outcome of the December 2005
elections.


6. (C) Kheir asserted that, while Western observers
frequently stress the doctrinal/political differences between
Iraqi and Iranian Sh,ia, the reality is that "in any
confrontation with Sunnis, all the Sh,ia (Iranian and Arab)
will stick together." Khalilzad argued that the vast
majority of Iraqi Sh,ia remain nationalistic and will side
with Iraqi Sunnis in any conflict they perceive as "Iraq
against Iran." To avoid playing into Iranian hands, we and
Sunni Arabs (both in Iraq and in neighboring countries) need
to be very careful not to fall into the trap of acting as if
"all Sh,ia are pro-Iran." Khalilzad highlighted the need to
make a sharp distinction in political strategy and in public
and private statements between Iraqi Sh,ia in general and
those few who are truly loyal to Iran. To do otherwise will
simply push the Iraqi Sh,ia into Iranian arms.


7. (S) Khalilzad noted that one of the best ways to begin
containing Iran's aggressive strategy, and ultimately roll it
back, is through encouraging the formation and success of
moderate, cross-sectarian movements. Unfortunately, he
observed, many recent Sunni Arab practices in Iraq, including
the January 2005 election boycott and toleration or support
for the insurgency, have actively facilitated the Iranian
agenda. Kheir agreed, offering as "proof" Jordanian
intelligence information that Iran is providing funds and
arms to Zarqawi and the Iraqi "insurgents." Khalilzad urged
the GOJ to help wake the Sunnis up to the reality of how they
are being manipulated, and to their true interest in
participating in the political process.

HALE