IRAQI SUNNI FERMENT IN AMMAN: A TALE OF THREE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 007709 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ JO SUBJECT: IRAQI SUNNI FERMENT IN AMMAN: A TALE OF THREE MEETINGS REF: A. AMMAN 7602 ¶B. BAGHDAD 3948 Classified By: DAVID HALE, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, REASONS: 1.4 (B &D) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Several meetings of Iraq Sunni Arab personalities about political involvement and the new Constitution took place in Amman between September 21-25. These included Ambassador to Iraq Khalilzad,s September 21 meeting with tribal leaders (ref a); a hastily-organized "Anbar Conference" dominated by anti-Constitutionalists Abdul Latif Humayum and Saleh Mutlak; a more informal series of meetings between Anbar figures and other Iraqi Sunnis in and out of government; and an effort by several Amman-based Iraqi Sunnis to redirect the thrust of the Anbar conference into more positive channels focusing on the December elections. Amman remains an active locus of Iraqi Sunni political activity; continued efforts at effective Sunni outreach here and elsewhere in the region retain their worth. End Summary. First Meeting: "Lessons" From Khalilzad Roundtable -------------- ¶2. (C) Feedback continues to flow in from Sunni Arab participants in the September 21 roundtable in Amman with Ambassador Khalilzad (ref a). Sheikh Tariq al-Abdallah from the Fallujah area called the meeting "more than perfect." He explained that unlike some previous discussions, the meeting was open, animated, and "practical," and crystallized several points. He took away two main messages from the meeting: "we (the U.S. and Sunni Arabs) are friends, but many third parties are pushing us to be enemies," and "Sunni Arabs need to focus on the December election." Abdullah Khorbit, the political face of the al-Khorbit clan from Ramadi, also strongly praised the meeting, noting its geographic balance, and the regional importance of many of the Sunni Arab attendees. He said that the chief message he took away from the meeting is: "it's up to us now." ¶3. (C) Khorbit noted that he understood from Ambassador Khalilzad that the U.S. will guarantee Iraq's independence and unity, but will not determine how well Iraq is governed, or by whom. "If we Sunnis want to influence this, we must vote," Khorbit asserted, adding that instead of trying to defeat the Constitution, Sunni Arabs need to organize voter turnout and ensure that there are enough polling places. He said he has read the Constitution, and has no major problems with it. Khorbit recommended that the draft Constitution be widely distributed in Anbar, but reiterated his conclusion that "everything of importance depends on controlling the next government." On the other hand, Talal al-Gaaod stressed to Emboff that, while appreciating the dialogue and strongly warming to Ambassador Khalilzad, many of those who attended the meeting remain uneasy about the depth of the U.S. commitment to maintaining Iraq's unity, and expressed concern that the U.S. is effectively advocating what appears to them to be a bad constitution. Al-Gaaod argued that the U.S. should more clearly articulate its commitment to Iraqi unity, and confine its constitution-related activities to distributing copies and ensuring security and fairness in the coming October plebiscite. Second Meeting: Anbar Conference -------------- ¶4. (C) A second meeting dealing with Sunni Arab political challenges was held in Amman on September 22-23, with some organizational cooperation from the Jordanian government. Approximately 200 Anbar-origin Iraqis, including tribal figures, businessmen, and prior regime political personalities and their relatives, attended the meeting intermittently. According to several sources, the meeting did not attract more than cameo participation from key Anbar personalities. Figures such as Majid al-Suliman, Tarik al-Abdallah, and Sheik Sabah al-Sharqi did not attend; neither did any member of the al-Khorbit clan. Talal al-Gaaod claimed that he attended the first two hours of the conference only, and that "only because of strong pressure from the Jordanians." A group of Iraqi Sunni politicians and ministers (including Minister of State Sa,ad al-Hardani and National Assembly Speaker Hachem al-Hassani) came to Amman for the meeting, but opted not to attend, holding forth instead in a series of informal meetings at a local hotel. ¶5. (C) According to al-Abdallah and al-Khorbit, many of those who came from Anbar were confused about the goal of the conference and its organizers (the expressed intent of the conference organizers was to help integrate disaffected Anbaris into the Iraq political process). However, Khorbit noted that many of the attendees were Anbaris currently living in Syria and Jordan, and called the gathering largely a conglomeration of "out-of-hopers." Note: A Ramadi-origin Embassy contact, Mohammed al-Hamdi (strictly protect), attended the conference and estimated that 40 percent of attendees were migrs. Anbar-origin Iraqi tycoon Talal al-Gaaod claimed that he warned the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate (GID) that this would be the case, and that the conference was insufficiently prepared. On the other hand, Al-Gaaod observed that the conference had promoted "some useful dialogue" among attendees. A Forum for Ex-Ba,athis? -------------- ¶6. (C) According to Embassy contacts and press reports, Humayum called for Sunni Arabs to get involved in the political process, and to turn out in force to defeat the Constitution, which he said "divides Iraq and separates it from its Arab identity." He also called for formation of an Anbar-based "national reconciliation committee," before forming one at the national level. In addition to Humayum,s oratory, the conference was notable for a speech by "National Dialogue" member Saleh Mutlak, in which he called on all Sunni Arabs to actively oppose the Constitution - not only by voting against it (as "they will steal this from us"),but by signing a petition rejecting it and empowering Mutlak as their spokesman (ref b). Embassy contact al-Hamdi claimed to have recognized several prominent former Ba,athis, including ex-Ambassadors and senior ministry officials, and speculated that the purpose of the conclave was to galvanize Ba,athis to re-enter the political process through a neo-Ba,athist political movement chaired in Anbar by Humayum (see paragraph below for list of prominent attendees named by al-Hamdi). Al-Hamdi believes that this group will seek a coalition with other political parties in Anbar, and try to manipulate it behind the scenes. Mischief from Mutlak -------------- ¶7. (C) Although Humayum reportedly dominated organization of the conference (e.g., controlling delegate seating and much of the agenda and media access),most Embassy sources depict him as a widely despised figure, who up to now has had virtually no political following. However, as al-Hamdi observed, "he has (access to) guns". Most of our contacts dismiss his sudden re-emergence as a transparent effort to promote himself and restore his family to political influence. (Note: Mutlak and Humayum appear to be the only big names that actively participated in the conference. While there remains widespread apprehension among Anbaris about the Constitution, we understand that Mutlak got nowhere with his petition idea, which he also marketed at a large Amman social gathering that included many Sunni Arab leaders from around Iraq, including several who had attended the meeting with Ambassador Khalilzad. An Iraqi source present told Emboff that Mutlak got little traction, and further undermined himself by his flattering response to an American who phoned him halfway through his presentation. A copy of Mutlak,s petition text has been sent to Embassy Baghdad's political section as well as to NEA. End Note.) Some Sunnis Move to Repair the Damage -------------- ¶9. (C) In an effort to offset the negative, occasionally pro-insurgent thrust reflected in media coverage of the Humayum conference and to stress the need for Sunni Arabs to focus on the December elections, Tariq al-Abdallah, Akram Zankana (Kurdish, but with Anbar contacts),and other Sunni figures met with Fallujah and Ramadi members of the conference committee (not Humayum) on September 24 and September 25 to hammer out a revised "final communiqu" from the conference to be released to the press. As a result, al-Abdallah and others succeeded in softening the communiqu's message on the Constitution from "hell, no!" to "yes, if", and revising a statement that "resistance is legitimate" to "resistance is a natural reaction to occupying forces.") Al-Abdallah said that he and the others drew on the points made by Ambassador Khalilzad and others on the critical importance to Sunni Arabs of mobilizing for the December election rather than on defeating the Constitution. (Original and revised texts of the conference communiqu sent to Embassy Baghdad and NEA). Third Meeting: Dialogue with Sunni Government Officials -------------- ¶10. (C) As noted above, several Iraqi Sunni officials snubbed the Anbar conference but held informal talks (together and separately) with a variety of prominent Iraqi Sunnis in Amman, including many current Anbar residents. According to Abdullah Khorbit who attended some of the discussions, the government officials were asked to help Anbaris escape from under the "three rocks," represented by the insurgents, Coalition forces, and the (Sh,ia/Kurdish-dominated) Iraqi National Guard. ¶11. (C) Khorbit reported that several prominent Anbar clerics showed up, and were asked by some present if they could deliver a strong fatwa against suicide bombings and Zarqawi. He said the clerics agreed that such activities are wrong, but did not agree to issue a fatwa. He related that the clerics were abashed when some of those present asserted that Sunni Imams enjoy the heightened influence they have achieved as a result of the current instability, and therefore have no incentive to calm things down. Khorbit added that "in peacetime we ignore the Imams and drink alcohol, and they know that." Khorbit noted that the general thrust of the Anbar residents who joined these informal discussions was that Anbaris are sick of violence and chaos and want to get to the final election. Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) Amman continues to witness significant Iraqi political activity, and with the coming plebiscite and elections this activity appears to be intensifying, making it an important venue for USG Sunni outreach programs. The recent outreach meeting with Ambassador Khalilzad has had an appreciable ripple effect in encouraging more Iraqi Sunni Arab figures to think about the future politically, and to work actively to focus themselves and others on the December elections. ¶13. (C) Prominent Anbar Conference attendees named by al-Hamdi - - (comments are his): Ahmed al-Kubaisi - Cleric now living in Dubai. Focused on election participation. Sadiq Mutlak - brother of Saleh Musdif al-Gaaod - cousin of Talal, but has bad relations with him. Brother of former Anbar Governor Fassal al-Gaaod. Close to Humayum.) Tha'er al-Ani Ammash al-Obeidi Adullah Shawiash al-Issawi Saleh al-Noman Thafer al-Obeidi - encourages Islamic jihadists and promotes suicide missions Mazin al-Aloisi - Former Head of Engineering at Presidential Palace Taha Ahmed al Daoud - Saddamist Ambassador to London Barza'k Mujil Narjis al-Gaaod - cousin and associate of Fassal al-Gaaod. Claimed that "the resistance has an important role to play" in future negotiations HALE