Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05AMMAN7273
2005-09-12 05:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

READOUT ON JORDANIAN MINISTERS' SEPT. 10 VISIT TO

Tags:  PREL EFIN IZ JO 
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120531Z Sep 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 007273 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2015
TAGS: PREL EFIN IZ JO
SUBJECT: READOUT ON JORDANIAN MINISTERS' SEPT. 10 VISIT TO
BAGHDAD

REF: AMMAN 6689

Classified By: CDA David Hale for Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 007273

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2015
TAGS: PREL EFIN IZ JO
SUBJECT: READOUT ON JORDANIAN MINISTERS' SEPT. 10 VISIT TO
BAGHDAD

REF: AMMAN 6689

Classified By: CDA David Hale for Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (U) In the first visit of a senior Arab state official
to Iraq since the fall of Saddam, Jordanian PM Adnan
Badran, accompanied by four other cabinet members,
met in Baghdad September 10 with Iraqi Vice President
Adel Abdul Mehdi and Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari.


2. (C) Jordanian Foreign Minister Farouq Kasrawi, who
accompanied the PM, gave Charge a readout September

11. Kasrawi called the visit "very positive." He said
PM Jaafari told the Jordanian visitors of his desire to
further strengthen relations. Jaafari referred to Jordan
as "Iraq's lung," and was pleased that PM Badran had
been the first Arab leader to visit; it had "cleared the
air" in the complex bilateral relationship.


3. (C) Characterizing the meetings as positive overall,
Kasrawi said the Iraqis had raised a few "irritants" in
the Jordan-Iraq relationship. Delays at the border
clearing truck traffic were a problem, for example.
(Comment: We estimate at least 40 percent of Iraq's
imports come through the Iraqi-Jordanian border
crossing point at Karama/Trebil. End Comment.) The
Jordanians replied by describing Jordanian efforts to
tighten security, while trying to expedite traffic.
Jaafari also mentioned the King's late 2004 "Shia crescent"
remark, but did not dwell on it. Jaafari expressed
concern about what he called "negative comments"
about the ITG in Jordanian mosques and in the
Jordanian press. Badran reportedly replied "you should
hear what they say about me."


4. (C) Kasrawi said Jaafari wanted to revitalize the
Jordan-Iraq joint ministerial committee, and wanted to
come himself to Amman to reciprocate the visit and
chair the next meeting. In sum, Kasrawi said the visit
was "an ice breaker, long overdue, but there will be
more."


5. (C) Kasrawi asked Charge to convey his sincere
thanks for all the logistical and security help that
Embassy Baghdad and the U.S. military provided for
this visit.


6. (C) Prime Minister Badran's spokesman Ali Al Ayed,
who accompanied the delegation, gave Polcouns a
similar readout. He commented that Jaafari "at first
frankly expressed some bitterness" over what he
described as the Arab states' "boycott" of the ITG.
Jaafari reportedly asked how Jordanian media could
describe insurgents as "martyrs"; "isn't an Iraqi child a
martyr too?" In reply to PolCouns' query, Al Ayed
said the Iraqis did not express dissatisfaction with
Jordanian efforts to intercept would-be jihadists trying
to make their way to Iraq. Al Ayed said the atmosphere
soon improved markedly, that Badran had assured
Jaafari that the Jordanian media did not represent the
GOJ view, and that he expected to see further
ministerial-level meetings soon within the framework
of the Joint Committee. These will include discussions
between finance ministers of the balance remaining
from the old Jordan-Iraq trade protocol, a meeting
between interior ministers on border security, and
discussions between planning ministers on proposals to
improve the transport and border infrastructure between
Aqaba and Baghdad.

Islamic Action Front Blasts Visit
--------------


7. (C) Jordan's Islamic Action Front (IAF) was quoted in
international media as criticizing Badran for supporting
"a fraudulent Iraqi government," a condemnation we
suspect will resonate with ordinary Jordanians, who
polls show continue to oppose the U.S. presence in Iraq
by large majorities.


8. (C) Comment: This visit, which was prominently
covered by the local media, came at the King's
direction. With Jordan's strategic interests entwined
with our own in Iraq, Jordanian officials will continue
to look for ways to help the political process there and
to reach beyond the Sunni Muslim community. They
recognize that, because of the heavy historical baggage
encumbering the bilateral relationship, Jordan will have
to continue to create opportunities to demonstrate
readiness to help the new leadership and new currents
in Iraq. End Comment.
HALE