Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05AMMAN6689
2005-08-18 13:30:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

UPDATE ON CURRENT JORDAN-IRAQ RELATIONS

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER IZ JO 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

181330Z Aug 05
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 006689 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER IZ JO
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON CURRENT JORDAN-IRAQ RELATIONS

REF: A. AMMAN 3231


B. AMMAN 6160

C. AMMAN 5806

D. AMMAN 5456

E. AMMAN 5510

F. AMMAN 3963

G. AMMAN 6568

H. AMMAN 6240

I. AMMAN 6118

J. AMMAN 6538

Classified By: CDA David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

-------
SUMMARY
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 006689

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER IZ JO
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON CURRENT JORDAN-IRAQ RELATIONS

REF: A. AMMAN 3231


B. AMMAN 6160

C. AMMAN 5806

D. AMMAN 5456

E. AMMAN 5510

F. AMMAN 3963

G. AMMAN 6568

H. AMMAN 6240

I. AMMAN 6118

J. AMMAN 6538

Classified By: CDA David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Official Jordanian-Iraqi relations remain strong
despite GOJ fears that insurgent violence may cross the
border, and tensions related to Ahmad Chalabi. The GOJ has
worked hard to smooth over the King,s December public
warnings of a "Shi,a Crescent", as well as the diplomatic
row sparked by reports that a Jordanian was the March 1
Hillah suicide bomber. The GOJ provides important support
for the U.S. effort in Iraq. Jordan plans to send its
designated Ambassador to Baghdad as soon as security
arrangements permit. Senior Iraqi clerics and politicians
attended July's international Islamic conference in Amman.
The GOJ continues to engage Ayatollah SISTANI and Sunni
tribal leaders. END SUMMARY.

--------------
ENGAGING A NEW NEIGHBOR
--------------


2. (C) The relationship with Iraq has always been one of
Jordan,s most important. The GOJ views it as a priority to
establish strong relations with the emerging new Iraq. GOJ
support for operation Iraqi Freedom was outstanding, and
Amman had a close relationship with Iyad Allawi. However,
tensions spiked in December 2004 after King Abdullah,
reflecting widespread Sunni apprehensions over the impending
Iraqi elections, warned of an emerging "Shi,a crescent"
during a Western television interview. Hard feelings in Iraq
toward Jordan were again enflamed by press reports in March
2005 that a Jordanian family had celebrated the "martyrdom"
of their son, Ra,ed al-Banna, who allegedly carried out a
suicide bombing in Hillah. Crowds attempted to sack the
Jordanian mission in Baghdad, and both governments recalled
their ranking diplomats. A sudden spotlight on Jordanian
media articles supportive of the so-called "noble Iraqi
resistance" compounded the row. King Abdullah, who was on an

official visit to the U.S. at the time, ordered the Jordanian
Charge back to Baghdad. The King,s unhappiness with the
mishandling of this incident contributed to the dismissal of
PM Faysal al Fayez and FM Hani Al Mulki shortly thereafter.
The GOJ launched a media campaign highlighting Jordan,s
efforts to train Iraqi security forces and secure the
Jordan-Iraq border. At the same time the King called on
Jordanian media to end its use of positive terms in
describing insurgent attacks and to report responsibly on
Iraqi issues. His meeting with a delegation of visiting
Iraqi journalists in April produced some positive coverage in
Iraq (ref A).

--------------
A CONSISTENT MESSAGE
--------------


3. (C) The King and senior GOJ officials now stress support
for the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) and the ongoing
political process there. The GOJ continues to host senior
ITG figures for meetings in Amman, as well as the Jordan
International Police Training Center, instruction for Iraqi
soldiers and pilots at Jordanian military facilities, and
training provided to many Iraqi civilian government
employees. The GOJ has designated an Ambassador for its
mission in Iraq (retired General Ahmad Salameh al-Lozi) and
on August 15, the cabinet agreed to send him to Baghdad as
soon as arrangements for his security are completed. (NOTE:
FM Kasrawi told Charge that he would like to send one or two
other Jordanian diplomats to Baghdad, but needed assurances
on their safety as well. END NOTE.) The GOJ would prefer for
al-Lozi to be in Baghdad prior to the start of the UN General
Assembly in September, but he may have to present his
credentials and return to Amman if sufficient security
measures are not in place by then (ref B-C).


4. (C) In another potential boost to Jordan-Iraq relations,
the GOJ is still hoping to make good on Prime Minister
Badran's stated intention to travel to Baghdad (ref E). The
daily newspaper Al Ghad reported on August 16 that "Badran
plans to visit Baghdad soon to hold bilateral discussions
with Iraqi officials" (ref B).

--------------
ENDING SECTARIAN VIOLENCE
--------------


5. (C) On July 4-5, in an effort to unite senior Islamic
religious leaders, including Shi,as and Sunnis from Iraq,
against terrorism and religious extremism, the King sponsored
(through the al-Bayt Foundation) an international Islamic
conference in Amman. Conference participants issued a final
statement that forbids Muslims from declaring as apostates
followers of any of the eight schools of Islamic
jurisprudence. Additionally, the agreed statement limited
the issuance of religious edicts (or fatwas) to qualified
Mulim scholars of the eight schools (ref D). Through this
conference, King Abdullah hoped to contain Sunni/Shi,a
violence in Iraq by depriving terrorists of religious cover
through the issuance of their own fatwas. Furthermore, it
was another chance for the GOJ to extend an olive branch to
the Iraqi Shi,as. The King intends to capitalize on the
momentum of the Islamic conference -- including a fatwa by
Ayatollah SISTANI supportive of the final statement -- by
inviting Islamic leaders one tier down to follow-up meetings
that would, among other things, declare as forbidden the use
of violence against other Muslims. This plan complements GOJ
engagement with Iraqi Sunni tribal leaders, as well as
communications with SISTANI, on a possible conference in
Jordan of Iraqi leaders, secular and religious, with the
objective of combating sectarian violence (ref E).

--------------
GROWING ECONOMIC TIES
--------------


6. (C) The Jordanian and Iraqi economic relationship, which
was vital to Jordan under Saddam, is reviving. To facilitate
expanding bilateral trade, King Abdullah is pushing for a
joint border facility at the Karama-Trebil crossing. This
proposal (which the King highlighted during a May visit to
the border) includes technical assistance and capacity
building for Iraqis, a shared software system allowing for
more rapid information exchange, and improved infrastructure
and equipment upgrades. Once this project receives funding
and if it proves successful, it could serve as a model for
other border crossings.


7. (U) An estimated 400,000 Iraqis are now living in Jordan.
The rich among them have driven the real estate market in
fashionable West Amman through the roof. Iraqi capital is an
important component of the recent strong performance of the
Amman bourse and of the Jordanian economy as a whole (ref F).

-------------- --------------
OUTSTANDING ISSUES: Security, Chalabi, the Insurgency
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Fears that violence will spread into Jordan are on
everyone,s mind here. Many fret that continuing attacks on
Shi,a civilians will lead to Shi,a militias being unleashed
against Iraq,s Sunnis in a Balkan-style ethnic war,
prompting large refugee flows into Jordan. (Ironically, it
is this fear that leads the more thoughtful critics of U.S.
policy here to condemn the U.S. intervention in Iraq while at
the same time warning against a premature exit.) The
Jordanian security services are also concerned that the
GOJ,s support for the U.S. effort in Iraq will prompt
insurgents to strike here (ref G).


9. (S/NF) There are periodically rumors in Iraq that members
of Saddam's family living in Jordan, as well as alleged
former regime officials in exile here, are actively aiding
insurgent forces in Iraq through financial contributions
and/or operational planning. However, the Jordanian General
Intelligence Directorate (GID) keeps Saddam,s relatives here
under close watch, and shares details on this coverage
through intel channels. The GOJ remains ready to expel or
take any other requested action against Iraqis accused of
wrongdoing (ref H).


10. (C) The struggle between Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister
Ahmad Chalabi and the GOJ over his conviction in absentia on
bank fraud continues, with Chalabi upping the ante by filing
a related lawsuit in the U.S. against the GOJ (ref I-J).
Chalabi is insisting on reversal of the Jordanian verdict and
a statement of his innocence; some in the GOJ claim Chalabi
is seeking to undermine Jordanian-Iraqi relations to ratchet
up the pressure. (A few GOJ contacts claimed Chalabi paid to
bus in the demonstrators who attacked the Jordanian mission
in Baghdad in April, though they never produced any proof for
this accusation.) A committee at the Royal Court is working
to resolve Chalabi's dispute with Jordan, but their work has
been complicated by Chalabi's legal action in the U.S.


11. (C) Conclusion: The GOJ cast its lot with the U.S.
effort in Iraq, and recognizes that Jordan could not afford a
coalition. failure there. Iraq will remain one of Jordan,s
most important relationships in the region. The GOJ, and
increasingly other levels of Jordanian society, have realized
that Jordan cannot afford to be on poor terms with whatever
new order emerges to the east.
HALE