DEMARCHE DELIVERED: PERFORMANCE OF JORDAN'S

S E C R E T AMMAN 006686

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2015
TAGS: PREL MARR KPKO HA JO UNSC
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: PERFORMANCE OF JORDAN'S
CONTINGENT IN HAITI

REF: STATE 143382

Classified By: CDA David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. This is an action request. Please see paragraph 7.


2. (S) Summary. Defense Attache met August 16 with senior
Jordan Armed Forces (JAF) officials to deliver reftel
demarche regarding Jordan's battalion in Haiti. The
Jordanians admitted leadership failures and identified key
areas of improved training to address our concerns. End
Summary.


3. (S) DATT met on August 16 with Brigadier General (BG)
Falah Audah, Director of Operations, and BG Mohammad Suleiman
al-Raud, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and
Training, to discuss the performance of the Jordanian
military contingent in the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti.
Audah and al-Raud readily acknowledged that leadership
failures had contributed to the substandard performance of
the Jordanian battalion in Haiti. They then identified
several key areas of improved training that are being
implemented to ensure that the new unit sent to Haiti, and
all subsequent units, are better prepared to conduct
operations. These include:

- Emphasis on Peace Enforcement Operations vs. Peace Keeping
Operations. This will allow JAF to elevate its operations
capabilities to higher threat missions covered under UN
Chapter 7. Most of JAF's previous experience has been in
lower threat Chapter 6 missions.

- Remedial training for all weapons crews.

- Training in hostile checkpoint procedures.

- Training in conduct of operations in urban areas (MOUT),
conducted by Jordanian Special Operations Forces troops.

- Search and Rescue.

- Rules of Engagement.

- Improvised Explosive Device identification.

- Marksmanship.

- Patrolling.


4. (S) According to Audah and al-Raud, JAF had been asked to
provide a colonel to join the UN staff in Haiti, to act as a
sector commander. Instead, JAF is sending a brigadier
general, Mahmud Adjaji, who will have the added
responsibility of commanding the Jordanian units. JAF's
General Headquarters (GHQ) is also establishing a Directorate
level, BG-led organization within GHQ to oversee several
facets of JAF's missions - peacekeeping, making preparations,
training, and deployments. King Abdullah has approved this
organizational change.


5. (S) To enhance the capabilities of Jordan's Haiti
battalion, GHQ plans to send three or four UH-1 Huey
helicopters with the next rotation of troops. JAF officers
believe this will help them to identify, anticipate, and
interdict gang and criminal activities. The next Jordanian
battalion is currently in training. Unlike its predecessors,
this group of soldiers is training away from their
home-stations, so as to minimize distractions from their
families.


6. (S) GHQ has also changed the method of forming
peace-keeping operations (PKO) units. Previously, individuals
were pulled from different units to form a composite PKO
unit. Now GHQ has directed each division to form one company,
train them in PKO responsibilities, and provide this unit for
future PKO missions. The hope is that this change will
instill more chain of command discipline in the units.


7. (S) Action Request. DATT informed the Jordanian officers
that their suggestions were important first steps, but ones
which needed to be executed immediately and reflected in
improved performance in the field. Post suggests that the UN
provide another assessment of JAF's PKO performance in one
month, to determine whether further intervention is necessary.
HALE