GAZA WITHDRAWAL - WHAT'S AT STAKE FOR JORDAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 006407

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL IS JO
SUBJECT: GAZA WITHDRAWAL - WHAT'S AT STAKE FOR JORDAN

REF: A. AMMAN 05918


B. AMMAN 05737

C. AMMAN 05230

D. AMMAN 05065

Classified By: CDA DAVID HALE. REASON 1.4 (B)


1. (C) Senior Jordanian officials continue to do their part
to promote a smooth Gaza withdrawal. In statements following
his meetings with Abu Mazen, Quartet envoy Wolfensohn, and
Israeli Defense Minister Mofaz, the King stressed the
importance of supporting Abu Mazen to consolidate control of
Gaza, and of strong Israeli-Palestinian coordination. Prime
Minister Badran has repeated Jordan's offer to train
Palestinian security elements. In public and in private,
Jordanian officials also express hope that a successful Gaza
withdrawal will lead to future progress in the West Bank, and
to a two-state solution. They hold this view because of the
way final status issues impact and distort Jordan's internal
political dynamic, among a population that is over 60 percent
Palestinian by origin.


2. (C) There is pessimism and skepticism here inside
government, and even more outside. We often hear the
withdrawal plan dismissed, by both East and West Bankers, as
a scheme to "turn Gaza into the world's biggest prison."
Many columnists here predict chaos will surround Gaza
withdrawal, and that the Israeli government will use any
disorder as a pretext to halt further progress toward a
two-state solution. Several members of parliament have told
poloff that while they would like to hope for the best, they
are "expecting the worst": a pullout surrounded by violence
and Israeli actions against Palestinians. In this context,
Jordanian opinion leaders have welcomed senior USG statements
on the need for continued progress after Gaza.

Gaza's Link to Reform in Jordan


3. (C) This all factors into the struggle between Jordanian
reformers and traditionalists because the reform debate is
entwined with the tensions between Jordanian-Palestinians and
the ascendant East Banker minority. If reformers here can
credibly point to a successful Gaza withdrawal as a step
toward a two-state solution, the advocates of political and
economic liberalization will be better insulated from charges
that their reforms would hand power to the Palestinian
majority. However, in the event developments in Gaza are
perceived here as further delaying the establishment of a
real Palestinian state, East Bank traditionalists will dig in
further, convinced that they need to maintain their grip on
power if Jordan itself is to avoid becoming, by default, the
Palestinian state. Radical Islamists, too, would likely find
a more responsive audience among Jordan's Palestinian
majority.

The Next Step: Royal Commission Reports


4. (C) The next steps for reform in Jordan will be the
release of the reports of two royal commissions ) one on
"the national agenda," the other on implementation of the
King's plan to devolve some power to three new regional
governments (ref C). Originally slated for early September,
before the King's visit to the U.S., we are now hearing that
the reports may not be finalized by then. Any
recommendations in the reports for political changes that
might empower Jordanian-Palestinians will be loudly opposed
in the anti-reform chamber of deputies, which is feeling its
oats after forcing the government to sack several ministers
who were seen as too reformist (and too Palestinian.) A
post-Gaza stalemate would likely make East Bank
parliamentarians even more recalcitrant.


5. (C) With so much at stake inside Jordan, we expect the
GOJ to continue to highlight publicly its efforts to support
a successful disengagement. King Abdullah will also keep
Israeli-Palestinian issues at the top of his agenda when he
visits the U.S. in September.
HALE