OUTREACH TO SUNNIS OUTSIDE IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 004598

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2015
TAGS: PREL KDEM IZ JO
SUBJECT: OUTREACH TO SUNNIS OUTSIDE IRAQ

REF: A. BAGHDAD 02319


B. STATE 99829

C. BAGHDAD 02188

D. AMMAN 3963

Classified By: CDA David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Post will continue its ongoing interagency efforts
(ref D) to maintain and expand contacts with appropriate
Sunni Arab Iraqis living in and transiting Jordan, keeping in
mind the need to isolate supporters of the insurgency. We
will also carry on our efforts to urge these contacts to
participate peacefully in the political process and to
encourage others in the Iraqi Sunni community to do the same.


2. (C) There needs to be continued close coordination
between all USG elements working on engaging the Iraqi
community in Jordan. Post (and Embassy Baghdad) should be
kept informed of any element of the USG traveling to Jordan
for talks with Iraqis in order to facilitate our outreach
efforts and to ensure appropriate coordination with the
Jordanian government.

GOJ Outreach


3. (C) The GOJ also views itself as having an important
interest in encouraging the integration of Sunni Arabs into
Iraqi political life. The GOJ has also engaged with Iraqi
Sunni leaders here to urge them to join the political and
electoral process. Jordan, for example, made several efforts
before the January elections to generate momentum toward a
conference of Sunni figures to help bring about their
rapprochement with the Iraqi government. We can expect the
GOJ to continue to promote Sunni integration, though its
influence in Iraq seems to have shrunken considerably since
the advent of the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG). This
process is an ongoing one.

ITG holds the key


4. (C) Post's dialogue with Iraqi contacts, or that of the
GOJ, cannot be a substitute for serious negotiations on Sunni
Arab inclusion in the ongoing formation of the Iraqi state,
carried on with an ITG partner who can deliver real
inducements. Such negotiations should be conducted directly
with the ITG, rather than through U.S. officials. (NOTE: In
contrast to efforts undertaken by former IIG PM Allawi, there
appears to be no/no organized effort by the ITG in Jordan to
engage a broad range of Sunni notables, although figures
purporting to represent certain factions within the ITG
(especially Dawa),and/or Ayatollah Sistani, are frequent
visitors here and have reportedly been in touch with some
Sunnis. END NOTE.)


5. (C) With this point in mind, we agree with Embassy
Baghdad (ref A) that it would not be advisable to regularly
bring ITG representatives into meetings with our Iraqi
contacts. These individuals are capable of talking to the
ITG through their own contacts, but some choose not to do so.
Others claim they have already signaled willingness to
engage in discussions, but have been rebuffed.


6. (C) In our view, a more effective approach would be to
facilitate political conversations among Iraqis by continuing
to cajole our contacts to talk to ITG elements, and by
providing names and telephone numbers of key Sunnis here to
validate ITG representatives who express interest in meeting
them. In addition, if cases arise in which we sense a contact
would welcome our facilitating a meeting with ITG officials,
we will of course do so, in coordination with Embassy Baghdad.

Please visit Embassy Amman's classified web site at
http://www.state.sgov/p/nea/amman/ or access the site through
the Department of State's SIPRNET home page.
HALE