OUTREACH TO SUNNIS OUTSIDE IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 004598 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2015 TAGS: PREL KDEM IZ JO SUBJECT: OUTREACH TO SUNNIS OUTSIDE IRAQ REF: A. BAGHDAD 02319 ¶B. STATE 99829 ¶C. BAGHDAD 02188 ¶D. AMMAN 3963 Classified By: CDA David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Post will continue its ongoing interagency efforts (ref D) to maintain and expand contacts with appropriate Sunni Arab Iraqis living in and transiting Jordan, keeping in mind the need to isolate supporters of the insurgency. We will also carry on our efforts to urge these contacts to participate peacefully in the political process and to encourage others in the Iraqi Sunni community to do the same. ¶2. (C) There needs to be continued close coordination between all USG elements working on engaging the Iraqi community in Jordan. Post (and Embassy Baghdad) should be kept informed of any element of the USG traveling to Jordan for talks with Iraqis in order to facilitate our outreach efforts and to ensure appropriate coordination with the Jordanian government. GOJ Outreach ¶3. (C) The GOJ also views itself as having an important interest in encouraging the integration of Sunni Arabs into Iraqi political life. The GOJ has also engaged with Iraqi Sunni leaders here to urge them to join the political and electoral process. Jordan, for example, made several efforts before the January elections to generate momentum toward a conference of Sunni figures to help bring about their rapprochement with the Iraqi government. We can expect the GOJ to continue to promote Sunni integration, though its influence in Iraq seems to have shrunken considerably since the advent of the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG). This process is an ongoing one. ITG holds the key ¶4. (C) Post's dialogue with Iraqi contacts, or that of the GOJ, cannot be a substitute for serious negotiations on Sunni Arab inclusion in the ongoing formation of the Iraqi state, carried on with an ITG partner who can deliver real inducements. Such negotiations should be conducted directly with the ITG, rather than through U.S. officials. (NOTE: In contrast to efforts undertaken by former IIG PM Allawi, there appears to be no/no organized effort by the ITG in Jordan to engage a broad range of Sunni notables, although figures purporting to represent certain factions within the ITG (especially Dawa),and/or Ayatollah Sistani, are frequent visitors here and have reportedly been in touch with some Sunnis. END NOTE.) ¶5. (C) With this point in mind, we agree with Embassy Baghdad (ref A) that it would not be advisable to regularly bring ITG representatives into meetings with our Iraqi contacts. These individuals are capable of talking to the ITG through their own contacts, but some choose not to do so. Others claim they have already signaled willingness to engage in discussions, but have been rebuffed. ¶6. (C) In our view, a more effective approach would be to facilitate political conversations among Iraqis by continuing to cajole our contacts to talk to ITG elements, and by providing names and telephone numbers of key Sunnis here to validate ITG representatives who express interest in meeting them. In addition, if cases arise in which we sense a contact would welcome our facilitating a meeting with ITG officials, we will of course do so, in coordination with Embassy Baghdad. Please visit Embassy Amman's classified web site at http://www.state.sgov/p/nea/amman/ or access the site through the Department of State's SIPRNET home page. HALE