TRADITIONALISTS CONTINUE THEIR OPPOSITION TO NEW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 003252 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2015 TAGS: PGOV KDEM KISL JO SUBJECT: TRADITIONALISTS CONTINUE THEIR OPPOSITION TO NEW CABINET; IAF SUPPORT MAY BE CRITICAL FOR VOTE OF CONFIDENCE REF: A. AMMAN 2973 ¶B. AMMAN 2969 Classified By: CDA David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Despite overtures by the King and PM Badran, traditionalists in parliament have not withdrawn their opposition to the new cabinet. The GOJ is considering the addition to two new ministers from the south to address complaints of geographic inequity, but Finance Minister Bassem Awadallah remains the focus of the East Bank MPs' opposition. Their anger is focused on the "foreign" nature of the economic team -- too western-oriented, too Palestinian, and too closely associated with U.S. policy objectives. In fact, there are pervasive rumors in parliament and elsewhere that the new cabinet was selected under U.S. pressure, or even by a U.S. hand. The Islamic Action Front (IAF) -- which has a good back channel to the current PM through his brother -- has so far refrained from criticizing the new cabinet and held a reportedly friendly meeting with Badran to discuss Islamist concerns. If the 43 "traditionalists" who have pledged to withhold their confidence in the new government remain firm, the IAF's 21 potential votes will determine whether this King's cabinet survives its first confidence vote when parliament reconvenes in coming months. They may expect to extract more than dialogue and friendly meetings as the price of their votes. This situation will squeeze the politically inexperienced Prime Minister, who must also answer to a King determined to cut the Islamists down to size before the country launches the next phase of political liberalization initiatives. The IAF may calculate that they should protect Badran now, help sustain the reform process, and then reap the rewards of a more open political environment in future -- a type of long term political calculation rare in this parliament, but a hallmark of the IAF. Meanwhile, the government has sped up the timeline for the work of the "national agenda" commission, which will now report in July its conclusions on comprehensive reform and enhanced attention to the needs of Jordanians in all sectors. End Summary. -------------- TURNING ON THE CHARM -------------- ¶2. (C) In response to the vocal complaints of loyalist, East Banker MPs about the new cabinet and the lack of parliamentary input in the selection process (refs A and B), both King Abdullah and PM Adnan Badran have sought to placate these important constituents. The King met on April 12 with Senate President Zeid Rifai, Lower House Speaker Abdul Hadi Majali and key members of parliament to listen to their concerns and, as reported in the press, to promise that MPs would be kept abreast of government decisions and plans (in fact, the King told Charge weeks ago, when he first started to formulate his thinking on a new cabinet, that he planned to hold this meeting with MPs, in order to gain their support or at least neutrality on his reform agenda). "The government cannot work alone ... the people's representatives have a great responsibility of backing government plans to achieve development," the King later said in a public statement. ¶3. (C) PM Badran has also reached out to critics of the new government. Over the last week he has met several times with groups of MPs from different parliamentary blocs, as well as with nationalist political party leaders. According to press reports, Badran stressed the need for a national consensus on political reform and related legislation, including the poorly-received draft political parties law. Interior Minister Yarvas told Charge recently, without much conviction, that "the spirit of dialogue" would characterize the government's approach to the opposition, including in handling key democratization legislation now with parliament, such as laws to encourage political party formation and to restructure professional associations. ¶4. (C) While damage control efforts by the King and Badran have temporarily quelled public criticism, traditionalist forces have not withdrawn their opposition to the new cabinet. MP Abdul Al-Maayteh (East Banker, Kerak) told reporters the day following the King's meeting with MPs that the 34 deputies who publicly pledged to withhold their votes of confidence in the government (ref B) had not changed their stance. (NOTE: As of April 25, 43 MPs have signed this pledge. END NOTE.) Maayteh added, however, that the MPs realized the government "needs sufficient time" to respond to their complaints. MP Abdullah al-Jazi (East Banker, Southern Badia) told poloff April 18 that Speaker Majali had been "surprisingly frank" in expressing the concerns of East Bank loyalists to the King. Al-Jazi confirmed that the group of traditionalist MPs had not softened their two key demands -- inclusion of ministers from the south in the cabinet, and removal of Finance Minister Bassem Awadallah. When asked which of the two was the priority, al-Jazi replied, "Awadallah." ¶5. (C) In separate meetings on April 24, MPs Atef Tarawneh (East Banker, Kerak) and Jamal Dmour (East Banker, Kerak) bemoaned the new cabinet to poloff. Tarawneh complained that after "losing" his constituents by backing tax and price hikes in 2004, he and his East Bank colleagues had now "lost the government." He said that only removal of Awadallah could persuade him and his colleagues to withdraw their opposition to the new cabinet; even "financial incentives" would not persuade him to change his mind. Dmour was similarly bitter over parliament's non-role in shaping Badran's government and the selection of Awadallah as Finance Minister. "How could they choose someone who has offended us so deeply?" he asked. While both MPs claimed to be pro-reform, they made clear that they did not support changes that would increase political power (or representation in parliament) of Jordanians of Palestinian origin. "I cannot accept being a stranger in my own country," commented Tarawneh. -------------- MADE IN THE USA? -------------- ¶6. (C) According to multiple MP contacts, there is a widespread (and widely believed) rumor in parliament that the cabinet was selected under strong U.S. pressure, or at least approved in advance by the U.S. Another rumor has it that the King did not want Awadallah in the cabinet, but that the U.S. forced his inclusion. Several MPs have urged the Embassy to issue a public statement denying U.S. involvement in the cabinet selection process to dispel accusations of American meddling. These rumors are not confined to parliament, but are nearly omnipresent. On April 19, for example, Amal Sabbagh, Secretary General of the Jordanian National Commission for Women, repeated this misinformation to poloff, noting that the timing of the cabinet change (soon after the King's visit to Washington) and Awadallah's current trip to the U.S. had convinced many Jordanians that the rumors were true. (Note: Awadallah, newly appointed as Finance Minister, was in Washington for the Spring World Bank/IMF meetings and to meet a long-standing commitment to testify before the SFRC on education reform in the Middle East.) She also made clear her disdain for Awadallah, saying that while he was portrayed as a reformist, his "paternalistic attitude" in dealing with NGOs proved otherwise. -------------- ISLAMISTS STANDING BACK FROM FRAY -------------- ¶7. (SBU) While some of the King's loyal backers are leading the charge against the cabinet, the IAF -- normally the leading critic of recent Jordanian cabinets -- is taking a more neutral, if not supportive, stance. Describing their April 17 meeting with PM Badran as "positive," IAF MPs told reporters that they felt the government was "serious" about tackling issues of citizen concern. MP Ali Abul Sukkar (West Banker, Zarqa) stated, "There was a general feeling of relief following the meeting with Badran, where we sensed his responsiveness to the issues we put before him." According to the press, the IAF MPs presented Badran with a memo calling on the GOJ to amend the current electoral and public assembly laws, as well as scrap draft legislation submitted by the former cabinet on political parties and the professional associations. It further urged the government to reject any increases in prices or taxes. In response, Badran reiterated his government's commitment to reform, while also mentioning that he was considering the addition of two ministers from the south to his cabinet. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) Opposition to the new government from loyalist East Bankers continues to defy expectations. In a break from past practice, traditionalist MPs have remained staunchly against the cabinet even after overtures from the King and PM. Contacts within this camp emphasize to us that they remain very loyal to King Abdullah, but complain that the King is getting "bad advice" and that his inner circle is out of touch with the desires of "real" Jordanians. This kind of talk is not-too-subtle code that expresses these East Bankers' loathing for Palestinian Jordanians like Awadallah. ¶9. (C) The IAF's reaction to the government reflects their calculation that they have little to lose, and possibly much to gain, from a government serious about reform -- and are in a position to make or break Badran's vote of confidence. With 43 "traditionalists" pledged to withhold their confidence, the IAF's 21 potential votes will determine whether it can survive a confidence vote, due when the King reconvenes the house into an extraordinary session, expected by June. The unanswered question is what price they will extract for support. They have a good back channel to the Prime Minister through his brother, Mudar Badran, who led the only Jordanian government with IAF/Muslim Brotherhood members in it, in 1990-91. Political commentators here believe that the PM is using that back channel to keep the peace with the IAF. However, he is undoubtedly going to be squeezed between the Islamists' expectations of rewards for support and the King's desire to dilute their dominance of organized politics -- a dilution he deems necessary if he is going to prevent them from crowding out moderates once sustained democratization initiatives get underway this Fall. However, the IAF may be playing the game with a longer view in perspective: contacts within Islamist circles report that the IAF is convinced that greater public freedoms and a more representative parliament will increase their political influence and corresponding ability to shape government policy. They may be prepared, therefore, to protect Badran and avoid the temptation of extracting a high price today, in anticipation of rewards to come in a more open political environment. ¶10. (U) Minimize considered. Please visit Embassy Amman's classified web site at http://www.state.sgov/p/nea/amman/ or access the site through the Department of State's SIPRNET home page. HALE