OPPONENTS OF REFORM ALREADY BALKING AT JORDAN'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 002973

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2010
TAGS: PREL EAID ECON IZ JO
SUBJECT: OPPONENTS OF REFORM ALREADY BALKING AT JORDAN'S
NEW CABINET

REF: A. AMMAN 2890


B. AMMAN 2851

Classified By: Charge David Hale, Reasons, 1.4 (B) & (D)


1. (C) Summary. Public opposition to the new cabinet from
southern tribesmen in parliament comes as no surprise ) they
loathe the Palestinian reformists who are the stars in the
new government ) but has rattled PM Badran and some of the
targets of this attack. The cabinet brings together an
exceptionally strong economic team, much needed to accelerate
Jordan's economic reform effort. Badran stressed to Charge
his commitment to significant political reform in the year
ahead, but is seeking safety nets and deliverables to
insulate some sectors of society from economic shocks coming
from reform. On the foreign policy front, FM Qasrawi has
shifted from his predecessor's strident tone, extending olive
branches to Arab neighbors. End summary.


2. (C) The King's hand-picked reform cabinet reached the
three-day mark on April 12. Significant ) but predictable
) resistance from southern tribesmen in parliament has
rattled the cabinet team. Prime Minister Badran and four key
economic ministers ) water, industry and trade, planning,
and finance ) all expressed to Charge in the last twenty
four hours their concern about the public stand of these 35
traditionalist MPs against the new government. Finance
Minister Awadallah privately accused GID Chief Saad Khayr of
stoking the opposition fires against a reform government that
is not to his liking. The southerners' complaints focus on
the lack of consultation on formation of the government, the
absence of any significant southerner in the cabinet, and
their impression that the economic team is "out of touch"
with the average Jordanian. Cabinet members privately retort
that part of the reform process is a move away from
cumbersome geographic balance in the cabinet in favor of
decentralization-to-come. As for the economic team, they are
exceptionally dynamic private sector leaders, and
predominantly Palestinian ) anathema on both counts to East
Bank tribesmen. The fact that opposition in parliament comes
from the loyal parliamentary backbone of the outgoing Fayez
cabinet (and not the Islamic Action Front) would confirm that
the Badran government (and the King by extension) is seen as
firmly committed to a path of reform that will remove the
political tools which keep these backward anti-reformists in
place.


3. (C) The cabinet team is debating internally how to
respond. The King convened a representative sample of
parliamentary leaders on April 12 to emphasize his commitment
to reform and expectation of support. (He had planned this
move weeks earlier.) According to Awadallah, PM Badran
wants to stick to their initial plan of calling the recessed
parliament into emergency session in June, for a confidence
vote and continued work on pending legislation. But Badran,
adding up potential opposition of 35 southerners and 20
Islamists, told Charge he needs "deliverables" by then to win
support. Awadallah argues it would be better to convene
parliament now and get a quick confirmation derived from MPs'
loyalty to the King, rather than risk facing the House with
meager results to show in a few months' time. As he will
advocate in an upcoming visit to Washington, the government
will put in place a comprehensive three year plan for pension
reform, ending subsidies, reducing debt service burdens, and
accelerating privatization (septel). Judging from Charge's
initial meetings with the economic team, the will and
executive capacity exists to accomplish these goals, perhaps
for the first time in Jordan. Less evident are the political
skills which will be needed to handle parliamanent. Deputy
Prime Minister el-Tal will be the point man for dealing with
the House, but alone he may lack the necessary heft.
Jordanian officials will continue to seek foreign assistance
as "insulation" to meet unfounded capital expenditure needs,
a phasing out of fuel subsidies, and a possible modest
increase in low-end wages.


4. (C) Most ministers we have met so far remain optimistic
about the team they have joined, describing the initial
cabinet session as showing the members' sense of cohesion and
focus on reform. PM Badran reiterated to Charge that
significant political reforms would be carried out in the
year ahead. However, of the seven ministerial committees
formed, none is exclusively given the mandate to work on
democratization.


5. (C) On the foreign policy front, new Foreign Minister
Qasrawi has begun to work on Jordan's Arab relations, damaged
by his strident predecessor. In press interviews, he has
discussed his plans to travel to Baghdad soon to work on that
relationship (Mulki had also intended to visit Iraq upon
formation of a transitional government) and made conciliatory
statements about other neighbors. Badran also announced he
would travel soon to Arab states "to clear the atmosphere."


6. (C) Comment: East Banker resistance to the
Palestinian-flavored, reform-oriented cabinet came as no
surprise, as socio-economic and political reforms threaten to
dilute their power and deprive them of their traditional
tools to exercise control. More surprising has been
criticism from liberals, some of whom have openly challenged
the way the cabinet was formed behind closed palace doors.
The ongoing debate highlights some of the dilemmas this
reformist king faces: on the one hand, reforms undermine his
loyal base of support before any organized reform
constituency exists to replace it as a bulwark against
extremists; on the other hand, the absence of a truly
representative parliament and a strong grassroots
democratization movement compels the King to continue to
direct the reform process from above, a situation he readily
acknowledges privately is incapable of sustaining true
reform. However, if the national agenda and decentralization
commissions deliver, the regime has a credible plan to a)
obtain "buy in" to comprehensive reforms from a broad
spectrum of society and b) initiate more "bottom up" reforms.
As Jordan maneuvers through this difficult process, at a
time of regional turmoil, its leaders deserve our continued
encouragement and support. Baghdad minimize considered.


HALE