Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05AMMAN2556
2005-03-28 15:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

POLISH CONTINGENT TO WITHDRAW FROM JORDAN'S POLICE

Tags:  PREL ASEC MOPS KCRM IZ JO 
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281540Z Mar 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 002556 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2015
TAGS: PREL ASEC MOPS KCRM IZ JO
SUBJECT: POLISH CONTINGENT TO WITHDRAW FROM JORDAN'S POLICE
TRAINING CENTER

REF: A. 04 AMMAN 10035


B. 04 AMMAN 9678

Classified By: CDA David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 002556 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2015 TAGS: PREL ASEC MOPS KCRM IZ JO SUBJECT: POLISH CONTINGENT TO WITHDRAW FROM JORDAN'S POLICE TRAINING CENTER REF: A. 04 AMMAN 10035 ¶B. 04 AMMAN 9678 Classified By: CDA David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (U) This is an action request; please see paragraph 4. ¶2. (C) Despite earlier indications that the Polish contingent at the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC) would remain in place (refs),the Polish contingent commander at JIPTC and the Polish Ambassador in Amman have informed us that the GOP has informed them the trainers will return to Poland. The ambassador (protect) told Charge on March 24 that he believed financial constraints were the main impetus for the decision. He said a second U.S. intervention with the GOP in Warsaw could lead to a reversal of this decision, as occurred last year. ¶3. (C) Given the high quality of the Polish instructors and the fact that the other JIPTC contingents (particularly those from other "emerging democracies" in Eastern Europe) look to the Polish contingent as a "lead element" at JIPTC, a pullout of the Polish force could have significant negative ramifications on the training program. In addition, following on the Secretary's recent travels in Europe and the demonstrated coalition successes in Iraqi police training at JIPTC, the withdrawal of a key partner in the program could send the wrong signal to other governments closely watching coalition activities. ¶4. (C) Action Request: We recommend engagement with the GOP to determine whether it is possible to reverse this decision. Failing this, Polish government statements of support for the coalition training effort underway at JIPTC might soften the blow. ¶5. (U) Minimize considered. Please visit Embassy Amman's classified web site at http://www.state.sgov/p/nea/amman/ or access the site through the Department of State's SIPRNET home page. HALE

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