JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES DETAIN, RELEASE JOURNALIST

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 002218

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2015
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL IZ JO
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES DETAIN, RELEASE JOURNALIST
OVER SUICIDE BOMBER STORY

REF: A. AMMAN 2131

B. BAGHDAD 1125

C. BAGHDAD 1138

Classified By: CDA Christopher Henzel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Post contacts confirm that Jordanian authorities --
reportedly on the orders of Interior Minister Samir Habashneh
-- detained for questioning and later released a reporter for
Arabic daily al-Ghad on March 14 on suspicion that he
fabricated the story that a Jordanian citizen, Raed Mansour
al-Banna, had carried out a suicide bombing in Iraq on March
1 (ref A). Two al-Ghad editors were also interrogated in the
case. Meanwhile, al-Banna's family -- possibly after being
approached by Jordanian security services -- issued a
statement claiming that they had not held a "martyrdom
celebration" as reported in al-Ghad, and denying that their
son was responsible for the Hilla bombing (saying that he had
in fact died in Mosul). The family also denounced the
killing of innocent Iraqis.


2. (C) Against the backdrop of reports that angry Iraqis
attacked the Jordanian embassy in Baghdad on March 14 in
response to the al-Ghad story (refs B and C),GOJ officials
issued public statements emphasizing Jordan's strong stance
against terrorism and declaring support for Iraq's security
and its people. Members of Jordan's Lower House of
Parliament on March 15 issued a statement criticizing the
embassy attack and denying any Jordanian responsibility for
the Hilla bombing.


3. (C) Comment: With the King and his key advisors out of
the country, and PM Fayez reportedly ill, the GOJ response to
this controversy has been disjointed. King Abdullah learned
of the arrest while en route to Washington on March 15.
Abdullah told DCM Hale -- who was traveling with the King --
that he was appalled at Habashneh's move, and ordered the
reporter released. There was considerable back-and-forth
between the traveling party and GID Chief Khayr (in
Washington) and Prime Minister al-Fayez (in Amman) to repair
what Palace officials regarded as gross mismanagement of this
matter by the government. This chapter may have tipped the
balance against al-Fayez, whose performance has been a source
of dismay to the King, but who has benefited from the King's
loyalty toward favorites even after they have become
liabilities. Maneuvering among the King's top aides in
Washington to accelerate Fayez's departure is transparent,
with speculation of a successor running from GID Chief Khayr
to Foreign Minister al-Mulki. If the King does move to
change PMs, he may wait until Fayez approaches the two-year
anniversary mark in the Fall. Meanwhile, he is likely to
continue the trend of working around the Prime Minister, with
Royal Court Minister al-Rifai and Khayr becoming de facto
heads of government. This degree of royal intervention in
governmental affairs cuts against the King's long-term
ambition for reform, but until he dispenses with Fayez, he
does not have many other options.


4. (U) Minimize considered.

Please visit Embassy Amman's classified web site at
http://www.state.sgov/p/nea/amman/ or access the site through
the Department of State's SIPRNET home page.
HENZEL