KAZAKHSTAN: EUR DAS KENNEDY'S MEETING WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALMATY 000537 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CACEN (JMUDGE),DRL/PHD (PDAVIES) E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2015 TAGS: PHUM PGOV KZ POLITICAL SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: EUR DAS KENNEDY'S MEETING WITH OPPOSITION PARTIES REF: A. 04 ALMATY 4811 ¶B. ALMATY 377 ¶C. ALMATY 166 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a February 5 roundtable with Kazakhstani opposition politicians, DAS Kennedy discussed the current political environment following flawed parliamentary elections and the opposition's attempts to develop a unified campaign platform and a single presidential candidate. Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan representatives described the legal challenges facing the party and called on the USG to demonstrate its support. Representatives of the more centrist Ak Zhol party echoed DCK's call for U.S. action, and repeatedly raised the specter of growing Islamization of the Kazakhstani population. All participants confirmed the opposition's decision to boycott the GOK's recently-established National Commission on Democratization and Civil Society. One DCK representative indicated a willingness to consider participation if Galymzham Zhakiyanov were freed, however. Several participants expressed concern about the image of the U.S. in Kazakhstan, claiming that the public saw high-level contacts with the GOK as support for a corrupt regime. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) EUR DAS Laura Kennedy held a roundtable with opposition party representatives on February 5 at the Ambassador's residence in Almaty. Participants included Zharmakhan Tuyakbay, chairman of the Opposition Coordination Council; Ak Zhol co-chairman Bulat Abilov, Oraz Zhandosov, and Altynbek Sarsenbaiuly; Communist Party head Serikbolsyn Abdildin; and Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DCK) representatives Assylbek Kozhakhmetov and Tolen Tokhtasynov. -------------- Political Overview -------------- ¶2. (C) Tuyakbay, clearly now recognized as leader of the opposition following his election as chairman of the Opposition Coordination Council (OCC, ref A),kicked off the conversation with an introduction of the political parties present and an overview of the flawed parliamentary elections in September-October 2004. He informed DAS Kennedy of his own resignation as speaker of the Mazhilis and deputy chairman of President Nazarbayev's Otan party following Nazarbayev's refusal to rectify the many problems with the elections. He commented bitterly that Nazarbayev's only action had been to present former PA head Imangali Tasmagambetov (ref B) with an award and make him mayor of Almaty. Tuyakbay outlined the OCC's priorities of seeking reform, including the adoption of a new Constitution, and the peaceful transfer of power. ¶3. (C) Abdildin, at 67 the dean of the opposition movement, claimed that the opposition is stronger now than ever. He praised Tuyakbay, Zhandosov, and Sarsenbaiuly for their knowledge of government operations, and noted that the rest were successful businessmen who understood the market economy. Abdildin echoed Tuyakbay's criticism of the parliamentary elections, noting that in its history as an independent country Kazakhstan had never had an election that was transparent and free of falsifications. He stressed that the situation would never change as long as Nazarbayev was in power, as he treats the country "as his own property." Abdildin criticized the OSCE for not coming right out in its report and saying that the elections were not legitimate. He also called on the U.S. to speak out "at the highest levels." ¶4. (C) Sarsenbaiuly explained that Ak Zhol was made up of people who had been in government and taken part in the economic reforms of the early to mid-1990s. They believed that democratic reform would follow, but eventually left government when it became clear that would not happen. Sarsenbaiuly claimed that since 2001, the country had been moving backward on the political front. Right now it ranks somewhere between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, but soon it would slip to between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan due to limits on the press and political parties and the existence of political prisoners. The OCC had been formed to try to move the country back in the right direction and counteract the move toward authoritarianism and closure of the country. -------------- Unified Presidential Candidate? -------------- ¶5. (C) In response to DAS Kennedy's question about prospects for a single opposition presidential candidate, Zhandosov confirmed that it was the OCC's primary goal. Abdildin added that the opposition was developing a coordinated campaign platform, the centerpiece of which was a new Constitution. Tuyakbay indicated that reforms would focus on the protection of individual rights and freedoms, including the right to political participation and the creation of the necessary conditions. He stressed the need for a system of true checks and balances between the three branches of power, outlining a presidential-parliamentary system with a stronger prime minister than the status quo and a single-term limit for the president. He also called for the parliament to be formed exclusively through single-member district voting, rather than by party lists and presidential appointment. ¶6. (C) Abilov stated that the last elections had revealed both a crisis of ideas and of trust in the authorities. He claimed that many people did not vote because they have lost confidence in the current leaders and want an alternative. Abilov claimed that the country is held "hostage" to Kazakhgate (i.e. the Giffen trial) and the corruption of President Nazarbayev. He stressed that the opposition is realistic and does not expect "a miracle tomorrow;" they are focused on unifying in order to achieve a just Kazakhstan. (Note: On February 1, Abilov was elected chair of an OCC working group dedicated to the formation of a mass national movement of parties, NGOs, and private individuals to be called "For a Just Kazakhstan.") -------------- DCK is the Canary in the Coal Mine -------------- ¶7. (C) Kozhakhmetov gave a lengthy overview of the legal challenges facing DCK (ref C),stressing that the government's legal move against his party was a result of the fact that it could not defeat the opposition on the basis of ideology alone. He noted that DCK had always highly valued the support of the USG and international organizations, but did not sense that support was as strong now as before. (Note: This was undoubtedly a reference to the fact that we have not issued a public statement, as Kozhakhmetov had requested, on the liquidation case.) Kozhakhmetov noted that President Bush had referred to support for political dissidents in his inauguration speech, and asked what the impact would be on U.S. foreign policy. He declared that regardless of the outcome of the next appeal hearing, scheduled for February 9, the government would not be able to get rid of DCK's supporters and their beliefs. -------------- The "Islamist Threat" -------------- ¶8. (C) Zhandosov explained that the OCC was developing a unified electoral campaign based largely on the concept of fighting corruption. When in government themselves, the members of the OCC had worked to increase transparency and the openness of relations between the government and the people. They themselves had all avoided the temptation of corruption. Zhandosov noted that the investment climate in Kazakhstan had worsened because the government did not have a sense of accountability. The situation was bearable for large firms, such as Western energy companies, but very difficult for small firms. He stressed that the opposition's approach to improving the investment climate meshed well with U.S. interests and policy goals. Shifting to the political environment, Zhandosov warned that if the situation does not change, in ten years the opposition in Kazakhstan will be Islamist and anti-foreign. The presidential elections will be crucial. Echoing Kozhakhmetov's comments about the President's inaugural address, Zhandosov called for concrete action to follow. He proposed that the U.S. work with Ak Zhol to identify judges who had issued biased rulings after the parliamentary elections in order to exclude them from any U.S.-funded training. He also suggested unspecified action against media outlets that spread disinformation during the campaign. ¶9. (C) Tuyakbay quickly jumped in to clarify that the opposition was seeking the USG's "moral support" as it confronted the corrupt authorities running the country. They were not asking the U.S. to bring about the transfer of power; rather, the opposition simply wanted the U.S. to speak out when things are wrong. -------------- -------------- National Commission on Democratization and Civil Society -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) DAS Kennedy asked the roundtable participants whether the OCC's decision to boycott the new National Commission on Democratization and Civil Society, which goes by the unfortunate Russian acronym NKVD, still stood. Tokhtasynov specified that opposition parties would participate if Galymzhan Zhakiyanov were freed; the parliamentary elections were declared invalid and re-run; and there was direct dialogue with Nazarbayev. He later offered that freeing Zhakiyanov would be a good first step. Sarsenbaiuly stated that the NKVD had been created as cover for the bad elections and was only a PR move. He stressed that the opposition could not responsibly take part when nothing had been done to address election violations, when political prisoners were still being held, and when the government was attacking opposition parties and newspapers. Sarsenbaiuly then added that the USG's decision to receive a Kazakhstani official who had been involved in the sale of arms to North Korea (note: current MOD Altynbayev) at high levels cast doubt on the intentions and priorities of the U.S. -------------- U.S. Assistance to Kazakhstan, Image -------------- ¶11. (C) Tokhtasynov commented that television coverage of DAS Kennedy's February 4 press conference in Astana had been slanted, mistranslated, and had presented her comments on U.S. assistance for democratic development as an apology or justification of U.S. policy. DAS Kennedy assured the group that we stand firmly behind our policy of support for the development of a democratic process and are very open in our discussions with the GOK. However, both DAS Kennedy and the Ambassador stressed that the U.S. has made it clear it was not advocating a Rose or Orange Revolution in Kazakhstan. The task of bringing about political change rested with the opposition and the people of Kazakhstan, not the USG. Sarsenbaiuly commented that the opposition understood that the U.S. government's primary goal in the region was stability, and that the U.S. saw democratization as a necessary condition for stability. He stressed that the Nazarbayev regime could not provide long-term stability: it faced increasing Islamization, the export of narcotics, a worsening investment climate, growing corruption, and the lack of development/infrastructure. Sarsenbaiuly claimed that high-level U.S. contacts are perceived by the public as support for a corrupt regime, and called for the USG to treat the GOK as it treats the government of Belarus. Zhandosov echoed Sarsenbaiuly's comments, noting that the U.S. was seen in Kazakhstan as the friend of power rather than the friend of the people. NNNN