KAZAKHSTAN: TRUE AK ZHOL LOOKS TOWARD THE FUTURE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALMATY 004532

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN (J. MUDGE)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2015
TAGS: KZ PGOV PREL POLITICAL
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: TRUE AK ZHOL LOOKS TOWARD THE FUTURE


Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary: In the wake of Nazarbayev's resounding
victory in the December 4 presidential elections, leaders of
the True Ak Zhol movement are focused on obtaining
registration as a party, and increasing their ability to get
their message out to the public through independent mass
media. They are concerned that Nazarbayev's overwhelming
victory, combined with what they characterized as relatively
mild Western criticism of electoral violations, will lead to
additional efforts to control the domestic political
environment. They also believe that there are already signs
that the Nazarbayev family is seeking to expand its influence
following the elections. The opposition leaders described a
series of events since the elections, including criminal
charges against a leading opposition figure, a motion to
close an independent newspaper, and the denial of True Ak
Zhol's party registration, as a new crackdown on the
opposition. Despite this, they expressed willingness to
participate in a future Democratization Commission if jailed
opposition leader Galymzhan Zhakiyanov is freed and True Ak
Zhol is registered as a party. End summary.


2. (SBU) The Ambassador met with True Ak Zhol (TAZ)
representatives Bulat Abilov, Altynbek Sarsenbaiuly, Oraz
Zhandosov, and Tolegen Zhukeyev on December 28 in Almaty to
discuss the recent presidential elections and the group's
strategy for the future. DCM and POEC chief (notetaker) also
participated.


3. (C) Sarsenbaiuly expressed pessimism about the future,
saying that President Nazarbayev's 91% victory combined with
the relatively mild criticism from Western election observers
would change the domestic political situation for the worse.
Sarsenbaiuly acknowledged that Nazarbayev clearly won the
election, but underscored the fact that a 91% margin was
simply not credible in a country where the opposition --
although constrained in its activities -- had been able to
present its critique for many years. "This is not
Turkmenistan," Sarsenbaiuly commented. He opined that with
continued high oil prices the situation might remain stable
for five or ten years, but ultimately repression would create
a threat to the country's stability.


4. (C) Sarsenbaiuly added that Secretary Rice's visit and her
comments expressing confidence in the ability of the
Kazakhstani government to conduct free and fair elections had
not had the intended effect. Instead, the Kazakhstani
authorities had continued with strong-arm tactics such as the
seizure of media during the campaign period. He also alleged
that the public perceived a gap between the actual quality of
the elections and the assessments of Western observers,
creating the impression of double or triple standards.
Sarsenbaiuly claimed that there was a coordinated effort
underway by Kazakhstani authorities to argue that Nazarbayev
had fulfilled his commitments to the West with regard to the
elections. In reality, he said, the elections represented an
overwhelming victory for the Nazarbayev family. Abilov
explained that the official press had published carefully
excerpted versions of Western assessments of the elections
and congratulatory messages, giving the public the impression
that the international community was pleased. Zhandosov
interjected that the prohibition on the discussion of the
Giffen case/"Kazakhgate" in the Kazakhstani media had
contributed to the inaccurate public impression of
Nazarbayev's relations with the West.


5. (C) Turning to the way ahead, Sarsenbaiuly said that "we
are realists -- there is no sense in turning Kazakhstan into
another Belarus," i.e. ceding it to the Russian sphere of
influence. The West needs to leave Nazarbayev room to
maneuver, he noted. True Ak Zhol's immediate goal is to get
back to the status quo ante with regard to the level of
political pluralism in the country and understanding on the
part of the GOK of the need for change. Sarsenbaiuly noted
with disappointment that Nazarbayev had "barely spoken" of
the need for political reform during his December 15 address
to the nation. (Note: The development of democracy and
modernization of the political system was the third goal
Nazarbayev touched on in his speech. He spoke of the need to
continue reforms and to involve the majority of society in
the dialogue, but did not refer to the Democratization
Commission he had earlier spoken of chairing. End note.)


6. (C) A "new crackdown" has been underway since the December
4 elections, Sarsenbaiuly claimed. New criminal charges had
been filed against Abilov on December 20, the procuracy had
requested the closure of the opposition Zhuma Times
newspaper, and True Ak Zhol's application for registration as
a political party (pending since April) had been denied. The
result of the appeal would be known in January, but
Sarsenbaiuly did not think the GOK would decide it was in its

interests to register a "relatively big" party like TAZ. He
claimed that TAZ had provided approximately 70% of the
members and resources for the For a Just Kazakhstan movement,
and had demonstrated that it has good people and structures
in the regions. While they expect continued significant
pressure from the GOK, TAZ will keep fighting for
registration. The party plans to take a constructive
oppositionist line, based on Euro-Atlantic values and
designed to appeal to the middle class. They were focused on
expanding their ability to reach the public, including via
satellite radio and television, in order to break
Nazarbayev's monopoly on information. They hoped to create a
station that would broadcast in Russian and Kazakh; the
content would be produced in Kazakhstan and broadcast from
somewhere in Europe. Sarsenbaiuly stressed that TAZ wants to
reach the rural, Kazakh-speaking populace to counter the
Islamic factor and possible radicalization. He urged the USG
to consider supporting an independent printing press and/or a
regional satellite television channel in Russian in increase
the public's access to information.


7. (C) Abilov predicted that the post-election period would
bring a strengthening of the Nazarbayev family in both the
economic and political arenas. Nazarbayev's nephew Kairat
Satybaldy had recently announced the formation of a green
political party, which Abilov claimed was actually a front
for an Islamic party. He added that presidential son-in-law
Timur Kulibayev was also planning to create his own party
based on the Atameken (Motherland) union of entrepreneurs and
employers, founded in March 2005.


8. (C) Zhandosov noted that the delay in releasing imprisoned
DCK leader Galymzhan Zhakiyanov, who had expected to be
paroled on December 24, was worrisome. Sarsenbaiuly said
that the opposition was now concerned that Zhakiyanov would
not be released at all. The Ambassador noted that the USG
was also concerned and had raised the issue with the GOK.


9. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question, Sarsenbaiuly
said that TAZ would be willing to participate in a future
Democratization Commission if Zhakiyanov were freed and TAZ
received registration as a party. He agrees with
Nazarbayev's statements that dialogue is necessary in order
to move forward with political reform. Abilov commented that
they are concerned that the commission will be purely
"decorative," designed only to convince the West that action
is being taken. The Ambassador pointed out that regardless
of the GOK's intent, if a forum is created then the
participants will have the opportunity to give the debate
substance. Abilov said that he thinks Nazarbayev feels
extreme pressure from the pending Kazakhgate case and will
not allow the further development of opposition parties or
the independent media while the case is underway.
Sarsenbaiuly added that the opposition had even offered to
drop all public discussion of Kazakhgate in return for
progress on political reform, because they realize it is the
main impediment to progress.


10. (C) When asked about the impact of political developments
on the country's internal cohesiveness, Sarsenbaiuly said
that disparities between regions were getting worse because
the GOK had failed to address fundamental problems. The fact
that Tuyakbay had received the highest percentages in the
oil-producing regions in the west was proof of discontent in
the regions. The problem was solvable, but required an
improved transportation system and reform of the political
system, including the Constitution. The government also
needed to support the resettlement of workers from
high-unemployment areas to places with labor shortages.
Abilov observed that the current government had taken an
over-simplified approach to the question of national unity,
by focusing only on the language question.
ORDWAY


NNNN