KAZAKHSTAN: TRUE AK ZHOL LOOKS TOWARD THE FUTURE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALMATY 004532 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN (J. MUDGE) E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2015 TAGS: KZ PGOV PREL POLITICAL SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: TRUE AK ZHOL LOOKS TOWARD THE FUTURE Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: In the wake of Nazarbayev's resounding victory in the December 4 presidential elections, leaders of the True Ak Zhol movement are focused on obtaining registration as a party, and increasing their ability to get their message out to the public through independent mass media. They are concerned that Nazarbayev's overwhelming victory, combined with what they characterized as relatively mild Western criticism of electoral violations, will lead to additional efforts to control the domestic political environment. They also believe that there are already signs that the Nazarbayev family is seeking to expand its influence following the elections. The opposition leaders described a series of events since the elections, including criminal charges against a leading opposition figure, a motion to close an independent newspaper, and the denial of True Ak Zhol's party registration, as a new crackdown on the opposition. Despite this, they expressed willingness to participate in a future Democratization Commission if jailed opposition leader Galymzhan Zhakiyanov is freed and True Ak Zhol is registered as a party. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) The Ambassador met with True Ak Zhol (TAZ) representatives Bulat Abilov, Altynbek Sarsenbaiuly, Oraz Zhandosov, and Tolegen Zhukeyev on December 28 in Almaty to discuss the recent presidential elections and the group's strategy for the future. DCM and POEC chief (notetaker) also participated. ¶3. (C) Sarsenbaiuly expressed pessimism about the future, saying that President Nazarbayev's 91% victory combined with the relatively mild criticism from Western election observers would change the domestic political situation for the worse. Sarsenbaiuly acknowledged that Nazarbayev clearly won the election, but underscored the fact that a 91% margin was simply not credible in a country where the opposition -- although constrained in its activities -- had been able to present its critique for many years. "This is not Turkmenistan," Sarsenbaiuly commented. He opined that with continued high oil prices the situation might remain stable for five or ten years, but ultimately repression would create a threat to the country's stability. ¶4. (C) Sarsenbaiuly added that Secretary Rice's visit and her comments expressing confidence in the ability of the Kazakhstani government to conduct free and fair elections had not had the intended effect. Instead, the Kazakhstani authorities had continued with strong-arm tactics such as the seizure of media during the campaign period. He also alleged that the public perceived a gap between the actual quality of the elections and the assessments of Western observers, creating the impression of double or triple standards. Sarsenbaiuly claimed that there was a coordinated effort underway by Kazakhstani authorities to argue that Nazarbayev had fulfilled his commitments to the West with regard to the elections. In reality, he said, the elections represented an overwhelming victory for the Nazarbayev family. Abilov explained that the official press had published carefully excerpted versions of Western assessments of the elections and congratulatory messages, giving the public the impression that the international community was pleased. Zhandosov interjected that the prohibition on the discussion of the Giffen case/"Kazakhgate" in the Kazakhstani media had contributed to the inaccurate public impression of Nazarbayev's relations with the West. ¶5. (C) Turning to the way ahead, Sarsenbaiuly said that "we are realists -- there is no sense in turning Kazakhstan into another Belarus," i.e. ceding it to the Russian sphere of influence. The West needs to leave Nazarbayev room to maneuver, he noted. True Ak Zhol's immediate goal is to get back to the status quo ante with regard to the level of political pluralism in the country and understanding on the part of the GOK of the need for change. Sarsenbaiuly noted with disappointment that Nazarbayev had "barely spoken" of the need for political reform during his December 15 address to the nation. (Note: The development of democracy and modernization of the political system was the third goal Nazarbayev touched on in his speech. He spoke of the need to continue reforms and to involve the majority of society in the dialogue, but did not refer to the Democratization Commission he had earlier spoken of chairing. End note.) ¶6. (C) A "new crackdown" has been underway since the December 4 elections, Sarsenbaiuly claimed. New criminal charges had been filed against Abilov on December 20, the procuracy had requested the closure of the opposition Zhuma Times newspaper, and True Ak Zhol's application for registration as a political party (pending since April) had been denied. The result of the appeal would be known in January, but Sarsenbaiuly did not think the GOK would decide it was in its interests to register a "relatively big" party like TAZ. He claimed that TAZ had provided approximately 70% of the members and resources for the For a Just Kazakhstan movement, and had demonstrated that it has good people and structures in the regions. While they expect continued significant pressure from the GOK, TAZ will keep fighting for registration. The party plans to take a constructive oppositionist line, based on Euro-Atlantic values and designed to appeal to the middle class. They were focused on expanding their ability to reach the public, including via satellite radio and television, in order to break Nazarbayev's monopoly on information. They hoped to create a station that would broadcast in Russian and Kazakh; the content would be produced in Kazakhstan and broadcast from somewhere in Europe. Sarsenbaiuly stressed that TAZ wants to reach the rural, Kazakh-speaking populace to counter the Islamic factor and possible radicalization. He urged the USG to consider supporting an independent printing press and/or a regional satellite television channel in Russian in increase the public's access to information. ¶7. (C) Abilov predicted that the post-election period would bring a strengthening of the Nazarbayev family in both the economic and political arenas. Nazarbayev's nephew Kairat Satybaldy had recently announced the formation of a green political party, which Abilov claimed was actually a front for an Islamic party. He added that presidential son-in-law Timur Kulibayev was also planning to create his own party based on the Atameken (Motherland) union of entrepreneurs and employers, founded in March 2005. ¶8. (C) Zhandosov noted that the delay in releasing imprisoned DCK leader Galymzhan Zhakiyanov, who had expected to be paroled on December 24, was worrisome. Sarsenbaiuly said that the opposition was now concerned that Zhakiyanov would not be released at all. The Ambassador noted that the USG was also concerned and had raised the issue with the GOK. ¶9. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question, Sarsenbaiuly said that TAZ would be willing to participate in a future Democratization Commission if Zhakiyanov were freed and TAZ received registration as a party. He agrees with Nazarbayev's statements that dialogue is necessary in order to move forward with political reform. Abilov commented that they are concerned that the commission will be purely "decorative," designed only to convince the West that action is being taken. The Ambassador pointed out that regardless of the GOK's intent, if a forum is created then the participants will have the opportunity to give the debate substance. Abilov said that he thinks Nazarbayev feels extreme pressure from the pending Kazakhgate case and will not allow the further development of opposition parties or the independent media while the case is underway. Sarsenbaiuly added that the opposition had even offered to drop all public discussion of Kazakhgate in return for progress on political reform, because they realize it is the main impediment to progress. ¶10. (C) When asked about the impact of political developments on the country's internal cohesiveness, Sarsenbaiuly said that disparities between regions were getting worse because the GOK had failed to address fundamental problems. The fact that Tuyakbay had received the highest percentages in the oil-producing regions in the west was proof of discontent in the regions. The problem was solvable, but required an improved transportation system and reform of the political system, including the Constitution. The government also needed to support the resettlement of workers from high-unemployment areas to places with labor shortages. Abilov observed that the current government had taken an over-simplified approach to the question of national unity, by focusing only on the language question. ORDWAY NNNN