KAZAKHSTAN: TAZHIN ON ZHAKIYANOV, ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALMATY 004076 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CACEN J. MUDGE E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2015 TAGS: KZ PGOV PHUM PREL SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: TAZHIN ON ZHAKIYANOV, ELECTIONS REF: A. ALMATY 3924 ¶B. ALMATY 4029 Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: President Nazarbayev's chief political strategist told the Ambassador on November 4 that he was confident of Nazarbayev's convincing lead in the presidential race, and even somewhat surprised that the opposition had not made a stronger showing to date. Deputy Presidential Administration Head Marat Tazhin said that Nazarbayev has enjoyed consistent ratings of 69-75% since July. In contrast, For a Just Kazakhstan candidate Zharmakhan Tuyakbay and Ak Zhol candidate Alikhan Baymenov were polling at the most 12% and 6% respectively nationwide. Tazhin indicated that certain regional leaders had been reprimanded for interfering in opposition campaign events, but maintained that overall Tuyakbay and Baymenov have been able to campaign freely and get their message out in the press. He indicated that the implementation of democratic reforms after the election would depend in large part on which camp within the government came out on top. Tazhin hinted that Nazarbayev's October 24 statement regarding his willingness to work with the opposition after the elections had created the basis for cooperation with opposition leaders. Tazhin also reported that the decision had been made to free jailed opposition leader Galymzhan Zhakiyanov. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) The Ambassador met with Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Marat Tazhin in Astana on November 4 to discuss the political environment in the run-up to December 4 presidential elections. -------------- Zhakiyanov to Be Freed -------------- ¶3. (C) Tazhin opened the conversation by informing the Ambassador that opposition leader Galymzhan Zhakiyanov would be freed. Tazhin explained that the judicial process would take another three to four weeks, but the fundamental decision to free him had been made. He commented that U.S. interventions had had an impact on the GOK's decision, which he contrasted with the handling of the Khodorkovskiy case in Russia and described as an example of Kazakhstan's capacity for modernization. (Note: On November 2, the administration of the "settlement colony" in Shiderty where Zhakiyanov is being held formally recommended him for release. A court must now act on the recommendation. Zhakiyanov's wife Karlygash told POEC chief on November 2 that she is confident that the court will ratify the colony administration's recommendation. End note.) -------------- Presidential Campaign "Boring" -------------- ¶4. (C) When asked by the Ambassador how the campaign was progressing, Tazhin exclaimed that it was "boring." He had expected more changes in the popularity ratings of the candidates after the campaign began. Instead, Nazarbayev's rating had remained stable; Tazhin attributed this to the positive economic situation, the effect of Nazarbayev's February 1 address to the nation, the impact of unrest in Kyrgyzstan and Andijon, and the increase in Nazarbayev's domestic and international activity. Tazhin added that Nazarbayev's October 24 statement regarding his willingness to work with the opposition after the election if they behave responsibly during the campaign had also had the desired positive effect. ¶5. (C) Tazhin commented that the opposition candidates have been able to campaign nationwide and get their message out to the public. Newspapers that support FJK candidate Zharmakhan Tuyakbay have a weekly print run of 700,000-940,000 copies. The Ambassador noted that there have been many problems with seizures and interference with the delivery of opposition papers. Tazhin minimized the issue, claiming that delivery problems resulted from the opposition papers' use of unreliable distributors. He said that these papers were now negotiating an agreement with KazPost that would improve distribution. (Note: Opposition representatives have told us in the past that papers sent via KazPost often do not reach their destination. End note.) Tazhin questioned the wisdom of the opposition's strategy of holding meetings with 300-400 people at a time in cities around the country, rather than doing larger events that would reach a wider audience. He also commented that Tuyakbay and Baymenov were not purchasing many television ads. -------------- Tuyakbay Polling 10-12% -------------- ¶6. (C) Turning back to Tuyakbay, Tazhin noted that he has significant financial resources. He claimed that opposition media frequently violates electoral law by running "propaganda" in support of Tuyakbay that is not paid for by the campaign. Tazhin noted with irritation that the same people then criticize the official media for reporting on Nazarbayev. Polls commissioned by the Presidential Administration show that Tuyakbay's nationwide rating has increased from 5% to 10-12%. In Almaty, Tuyakbay is polling about 15%. Tazhin predicted that Tuyakbay could reach 17-20% if he campaigns well. He is hindered by his relative lack of charisma and "overly serious" demeanor. -------------- Baymenov at 6% -------------- ¶7. (C) Baymenov is polling around 6% nationwide, according to Tazhin, and about 8% in Almaty. He has the benefit of a nationwide, albeit weak, party structure and an experienced campaign team. The PA had done a psychological focus group on Baymenov, which revealed that he is also helped by his youth, his mastery of the Kazakh language, his openness to change, and his warmth and genuine enjoyment of contact with the public. Baymenov is hindered, according to Tazhin, by his lack of financial resources and newspapers. Tazhin predicted that Baymenov could raise his rating with a good campaign and strong showing in the televised debate the CEC is organizing November 17. -------------- Nazarbayev Steady Since July -------------- ¶8. (C) Returning to Nazarbayev's own polling data, Tazhin reported that the president had been polling in the 69-75% range nationwide since July. His rating in Almaty, which Tazhin described as "the most politicized" area of the country, was 56-58%. Russians and other Slavs strongly support Nazarbayev, according to Tazhin, because they were scared by the March events in Kyrgyzstan and see Nazarbayev as a guarantor of stability. Tazhin predicted that undecided voters would break predominantly toward Nazarbayev. One expert group he convened told him that he was underestimating to what degree external stress could impact voters' decision-making, for example the likelihood that instability in other countries could make voters shy away from change. Tazhin pointed out that Nazarbayev received 79% in the last presidential election in 1999, which was a time of economic crisis. (Comment: It was also not a contested election. End comment.) Tazhin expressed bewilderment as to why the opposition "insisted" on elections this year, with the economy strong and Nazarbayev in excellent health. -------------- Role of the Akims -------------- ¶9. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question about the role of the akims in the upcoming election, Tazhin remarked that regional leaders are actually offended because Astana has sent such strong signals about the need for accurate voter lists, the prohibition of the use of administrative resources to influence results or procedures, and the requirement to send voting results to Astana quickly. Tazhin affirmed that the procedural situation will be "different this time" compared to the 2004 parliamentary elections. -------------- Problems with the Campaign -------------- ¶10. (C) The Ambassador informed Tazhin that the Embassy had received many reports of problems with opposition campaign events in the regions, primarily with agitators occupying space reserved for campaign events or attempting to disrupt them in other ways. This had happened in a long list of cities around the country. Tazhin minimized the problem, acknowledging that there had been "anecdotal events" in a few places like Semipalatinsk in northeast Kazakhstan. He conceded that some akims were believed to have been involved in the incidents, and said that the PA had called them afterwards to chastise them. Tazhin noted that it was a positive thing that none of the candidates had encountered physical violence. (Note: Likely a reference to the attacks on Tuyakbay in Ust-Kamenogorsk and Shymkent in the spring. End note.) ¶11. (C) The Ambassador asked about the two seizures of opposition newspaper Svoboda Slova (Ref A). Tazhin claimed that the seizures had been order by the city procurator because the paper ran articles insulting the honor and dignity of President Nazarbayev. Tazhin said that such articles were having a significant negative public impact, and he agreed fully with the seizure orders. He asserted that Kazakhstani authorities would do the same if any other candidate were similarly insulted. Tazhin once again contrasted the GOK's approach to that of the opposition, remarking that authorities "had not attacked the opposition despite the fact that several of them have been involved in criminal affairs." Tazhin said that former Nazarbayev ally-turned-outspoken opposition activist Zamanbek Nurkadilov had broken the law by alleging that Nazarbayev was behind the murder of Turgut Ozal. He claimed that Tuyakbay's son lives in Boston in a house purchased with bribes from James Giffen. Tazhin added that Baymenov has "problems" with his relatives as well, but did not offer any details. He alleged that while akim of Pavlodar oblast, Galymzhan Zhakiyanov had stolen several businesses, even going so far as to order that medical care be withheld from a heart attack victim until he signed over his company. -------------- After the Elections -------------- ¶12. (C) Tazhin observed that the real question was not who would win the presidential elections, given Nazarbayev's consistently high ratings, but which camp within the current government would come out on top -- the conservatives or the modernizers. The Ambassador commented that the program of democratic reforms that Tazhin had outlined during his meeting with USOSCE Ambassador Finley (Ref B) was impressive. Tazhin agreed that a real plan existed, but cautioned that it would be necessary to see how it was implemented. In his view, it was already "a bit late" for such reforms. He informed the Ambassador that local akims, even those known to be conservative, were generally in favor of direct elections. Tazhin pointed out that without giving local leaders more control over the budget, however, it would be pointless to implement direct elections. Of the 28 local akims elected in the recent experimental elections, he noted, many had already resigned because they were not able to govern effectively without such authority. ¶13. (C) Summing up the conversation, Tazhin told the Ambassador that he was "calm" about the elections. If the voting was conducted in a procedurally clean way and the opposition received the expected amount of votes, there would be a basis for future work. ORDWAY NNNN