KAZAKHSTAN: U.S. OFFICIALS PRESS FOR FREE AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALMATY 004029 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/RPM AND EUR/CACEN (MUDGE) E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL KZ POLITICAL SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: U.S. OFFICIALS PRESS FOR FREE AND FAIR ELECTION, DEMOCRATIC REFORMS Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway for reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (U) This is a joint Embassy Almaty-USOSCE cable. ¶2. (C) Summary: USOSCE Ambassador Finley and Ambassador Ordway met with opposition, civil society and youth group representatives and government officials October 25-28 to discuss progress on democratic reforms, the upcoming presidential election, and Kazakhstan's bid for the 2009 OSCE chairmanship. We heard complaints about pre-electoral crackdowns on opposition papers and the stifling government control of the media, and concerns that local authorities will falsify votes in favor of President Nazarbayev to curry favor. Government officials took on board our message that the U.S. will be watching closely developments pre-and post-December, and that a free and fair election, including equitable media access for candidates, is a good first step in a series of sustained democratic reforms needed for Kazakhstan to prove that it deserves to hold the OSCE chair in the future. End summary. Media Access Still a Problem for Opposition -------------- ¶3. (C) USOSCE Ambassador Finley traveled to Kazakhstan October 25-28 to meet with representatives from the GOKZ and with members of opposition parties, youth groups and local NGOs. She was accompanied to her meetings by Ambassador Ordway and poloffs from USOSCE, Embassy Almaty and the Embassy Branch Office in Astana. During the visit, we were informed that the election commission officials continued to order the confiscation of the opposition newspaper "Svoboda Slova." (Comment: The first confiscation order, October 19, alleged that the paper had insulted President Nazarbayev by depicting him as a dictator and had engaged in "active campaigning" before the campaign period officially started October 25, by prominently featuring opposition candidates. End comment.) Zharmakhan Tuyakbay, the opposition candidate representing "For a Just Kazakhstan," told the Ambassador that the opposition still has only minimal coverage in both the state-owned and private media, and that the OSCE can help further the democratization process in Kazakhstan by maintaining a spotlight on the GOK in the run-up to the election. Tuyakbay commented that the presence of the OSCE election monitors will help to exert continued pressure on President Nazarbayev to run a cleaner election. Opposition "Ak Zhol" party leader Alikhan Baymenov also told us that the new electronic voting system being implemented in some voting stations may be problematic as some voters are being intimidated into using the new and unfamiliar system by being told "We'll know if you didn't use it." Youth groups and NGOs also complained to us about harassment by the authorities for unauthorized gatherings. (Comment: In fact, one of our interlocutors was late to our meeting because she had just been arrested and charged for this offense, but was released after paying a fine. End comment.) Keeping the Akims Under Control -------------- ¶4. (C) In addition to securing access to the media for opposition candidates, a top concern of the opposition and of youth groups and NGOs in particular is the penchant of local authorities ("akims") to prove their loyalty to President Nazarbayev by delivering up as many votes as possible, whether through the use of administrative resources or fraud. The akims reportedly compete amongst themselves to produce the most votes in favor of Nazarbayev, and are difficult to control, we were told. ¶5. (C) The opposition, youth group and NGO reps were sheepish when asked if they thought the election would be free and fair, adding that the final numbers would show just how much latitude the akims had been given. Baymenov declared that if the election were really free and fair, there would be a run-off between Nazarbayev (who he estimated would receive 40% of the vote) and Baymenov (with an estimated 30-35%). Everyone agreed that a voting percentage for Nazarbayev much beyond 65% would mean that the akims had "over-fulfilled" the plan, and expressed hope that the ODIHR election monitors' presence would help to prevent the more blatant election fraud. (Comment: Post believes 65-75% is a realistic range, given polling data. End comment.) Clean Election, Democratic Reforms Needed before CiO -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) The view from official Astana was, predictably, rosier, as GOK reps described their government's democratization strategy and outlined how far the country has progressed since gaining independence 15 years ago. Ambassador Finley delivered to our interlocutors the message that the U.S. will be watching for a free and fair presidential election, which includes the pre-December period. It is important for the GOK to even the media playing field for all presidential candidates: resorting to measures such as confiscating issues of "Svoboda Slova" only sends a message of desperation and fear on the part of the government. The GOK is in a strong position to run a clean election, and the local akims should receive a clear message from President Nazarbayev that vote tampering will not be tolerated. While President Nazarbayev has implemented significant economic reforms, political reforms are equally important and Kazakhstan needs to demonstrate a sustained commitment to democratic principles if it wants to be a serious candidate for the OSCE chairmanship in the future. The international community wants Kazakhstan to succeed, but it is premature to discuss the CiO question now, particularly given the reform-heavy agenda for the December OSCE ministerial in Ljubljana. FM Tokayev on the CiO Bid -------------- ¶7. (C) FM Tokayev said he understood our message about the CiO bid, adding that the bid is tied to a strong desire by Kazakhstan to be associated with European values and institutions. Kazakhstan has concerns about regional security, given its geographic location between Russia and China, and "problem areas" to the south, and realizes that democracy is its future. Repeating a message that we have heard in Vienna, Tokayev said that holding the CiO seat would encourage Kazakhstan to continue on its path of democratic reform. (Comment: Our message in Astana as well as in Vienna continues to be that the CiO cannot be used as an inducement to meet OSCE commitments; there must be a proven track record on those commitments before a CiO bid can even be considered. End comment.) When pressed by Ambassador Finley, Tokayev admitted that there would be no serious backlash if Kazakhstan did not succeed in its bid for the CiO for 2009, but underscored that it would create frustration and would be seen as a lack of confidence in Kazakhstan by the international community. Nevertheless, even with a failed CiO bid, the GOKZ will continue with democratic reforms (although Tokayev added that a stint as the CiO could help Kazakhstan to speed up the pace of those reforms). The GOK's Democratization Strategy -------------- ¶8. (C) Presidential Administration Head Dzhaksybekov asserted that economic reform in Kazakhstan has been a necessary precursor to political reform. While there has been significant progress on the democratization front -- with an elected president and parliament, an independent judiciary, independent newspapers -- the GOK wants to deepen reforms. Presidential Administration Deputy Tazhin added that Nazarbayev's democratization strategy includes further enhancing the authority of parliament; increasing political party activity and using a mix of proportional and direct election representation; encouraging NGO activity (he estimated that only 1,500 of the 5,000 NGOs are currently active); strengthening public control of local government institutions and fighting regional corruption; and developing independent mass media, including public television. Regarding the current election, Dzhaksybekov said that the government targets the opposition only when it violates election laws (such as campaigning prior to the official start of the campaign, or holding unauthorized rallies). Tazhin added that the opposition shouldn't complain about lack of access to the media, since the opposition print media circulation is estimated at 770,000 daily, while official papers have a circulation of 200,000. As for government-controlled television channels, he said that they will provide equitable access to all presidential candidates during the campaign period. While Tazhin acknowledged that the Rose and Orange revolutions contained positive elements, Kazakhstan does not seek a "forced change" of the elite. Kazakhstan's electoral environment, with a registered and competitive opposition, is more favorable than that of Russia or Uzbekistan, he concluded. Steps to Ensure a Free and Fair Election -------------- ¶9. (C) Security Council Chairman Utemuratov, who told us he maintains close contact and friendships with opposition leaders, said that the GOK understood Secretary Rice's message that the U.S. is a strategic partner and that Kazakhstan should hold a free and fair election. Utemuratov said that President Nazarbayev instructed him to tour the electoral regions and meet with akims to deliver the message that the GOK is committed to holding an election that meets international standards and that falsifications of vote counts will be severely punished. "The President doesn't need 98% of the vote. The opposition is estimating he will get 65%, and that is enough," Utemuratov said. Utemuratov added that he told opposition parties to go to the akims directly to ask what instructions they have received from the GOK. Central Election Commission Chairman Zhumabekov reiterated Utemuratov's points. After two regions had reportedly denied access to premises by opposition candidates, Zhumabekov said the CEC would be sending letters that day to remind the akims of the rules on equitable access. While Zhumabekov acknowledged that there had been flaws in the September 2004 parliamentary elections, he saw no major trouble ahead for the December election and underscored the CEC's commitment to cooperate fully with ODIHR's election monitors ("We see them as partners in this process," he said.) The CEC is also involved in monitoring candidate campaign accounts (there is a cap of $2 million on campaign spending) and equitable media access for candidates. Regarding the concerns expressed to us by NGOs about the electronic voting system, Zhumabekov said that there will be e-voting in 15% of the precincts but added that all voters will still have the option to use a paper ballot if desired. ¶10. (C) Utemuratov admitted that there is still much progress to be made on democratic reforms. President Nazarbayev understands that he must share power with other branches of government, he said. However, as Senate Chairman Abykayev told us, political reform cannot catch up with economic reform overnight. This election will be a test of the country's maturity, Abykayev concluded. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) While our GOK interlocutors said all the right things about the need to ensure an election that meets international standards and to continue on the path of democratic reform, it is clear that President Nazarbayev's approach to pursuing democratic principles is rooted in the local context. Nevertheless, in terms of proving that Kazakstan is on a serious path to democratic reform, the GOK appears to recognize that a lot is riding on this election and the progress it makes toward meeting its OSCE commitments in the next 12-14 months. While GOK reps continue to insist that chairing the OSCE in 2009 will represent a critical vote of support by the international community for progress made and provide backing for future steps forward, we have been clear that promises of democratic reform must be matched by demonstrated, sustained results. ORDWAY ORDWAY NNNN