Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ALMATY3454
2005-10-04 14:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
US Office Almaty
Cable title:  

KAZAKHSTAN: SHKOLNIK ON CANWFZ, CWC, INDIA

Tags:  PREL CW KNNP KZ PARM POLITICAL 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ALMATY 003454 

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN, NP/PTR ROLIVER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2015
TAGS: PREL CW KNNP KZ PARM POLITICAL
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: SHKOLNIK ON CANWFZ, CWC, INDIA
STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

REF: A. STATE 40787

B. STATE 166864

Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALMATY 003454 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN, NP/PTR ROLIVER E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2015 TAGS: PREL CW KNNP KZ PARM POLITICAL SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: SHKOLNIK ON CANWFZ, CWC, INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP REF: A. STATE 40787 ¶B. STATE 166864 Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassador Ordway met with Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Vladimir Shkolnik on September 27 in Astana. Shkolnik assured the Ambassador that there will not/not be a signing ceremony for the proposed Central Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (CANWFZ) Treaty in the near term, and certainly not coincident with the visits of T and Codel Issa to Ust-Kamenogorsk on October 8. In a wide-ranging discussion, the Ambassador also raised the issues of CWC compliance and the nuclear energy component of the U.S. - India partnership. End Summary. -------------- CANWFZ Not Ready For Signature -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador conveyed U.S. concern over reports that the five Central Asian states might sign the CANWFZ in Semipalatinsk at the same time that NTI was organizing a large international event October 8 in nearby Ust-Kamenogorsk, which will be attended by U/S Joseph and other senior U.S. officials. The Ambassador told Shkolnik that the U.s., in agreement with the UK and France, objects to the CANWFZ because it leaves open the possibility of outside countries' nuclear weapons being stationed on the soil of the ostensibly denuclearized zone. The Ambassador stressed that if a signing ceremony took place in association with the U.S.-attended event, the Embassy would be required to issue public statements distancing the U.S. from the treaty. ¶3. (C) Shkolnik assured the Ambassador that the treaty is not close to being signed and noted that he had not even seen the draft. He added that what he knew of the treaty is that it was being pushed by Tashkent, and further stated that he personally found it to be a misguided idea. In a separate meeting with Foreign Minister Tokayev, he said that there was still a dispute among the parties about the level at which it would be signed, with Kazakhstan insisting on Foreign Ministers, and Uzbekistan on Presidents. Moreover, Kazakhstan wanted to have consultations with the P-3 as they had requested on Article 12. He urged that Ambassador Bolton personally and quickly address the C-5 ambassadors in New York on this issue. -------------- CWC Compliance -------------- ¶4. (C) Ambassador also inquired about the CWC compliance issues that were put to Kazakhstan in a March 14 demarche (Ref A). Shkolnik responded by saying that the OPCW was putting Kazakhstan in an untenable position. He said that during his trip to The Hague earlier this month, he told the OPCW that it would be impossible for Kazakhstan to fill out the questionnaire that OPCW required. Kazakhstan has no specialists familiar with the chemical weapons, and no one who was associated with the production previously done at the Pavlodar facility. In order answer OPCW's questions, he would have to send specialists to Russia to obtain the information. Shkolnik said that to do so would amount to proliferation of knowledge about how to produce chemical weapons to Kazakhstan, which did now currently have that knowledge. -------------- Nuclear Suppliers' Group and India -------------- ¶5. (C) Ambassador also delivered Ref B points on cooperation with India's civil nuclear industry in light of that country's commitment to certain nonproliferation safeguards. Shkolnik's immediate response was one of doubt. Shkolnik questioned how providing nuclear fuel to India for civilian use would serve any nonproliferation goals. Any external fuel supplied for civilian purposes would free up an equivalent amount of domestically produced fuel for military purposes, thus undermining our nonproliferation goals. He noted that Kazakhstan has in the past refused to sell India uranium for that exact reason. Shkolnik said that he would ask the head of Kazakhstan's nuclear regulatory agency, Timur Zhantikin, to discuss this issue with U.S. experts at the IAEA in October. ORDWAY NNNN

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