STATUS OF TERRORISM ONE MONTH AFTER PASSAGE OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 002222 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2015 TAGS: PGOV PTER AG SUBJECT: STATUS OF TERRORISM ONE MONTH AFTER PASSAGE OF CHARTER ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, for reasons 1.4(c) and (d). SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT -------------- ¶1. (C) One month after the favorable September 29 referendum on the Charter for National Peace and National Reconciliation -- which offered a broad but partial amnesty for those involved in the violence of the 1990s -- monthly civilian deaths, military deaths and causalities, and terrorist surrenders have all increased. Reported terrorist deaths in October reached 53, considerably higher than the monthly average of 24 over the past six months and 10 over the past twelve months. Based on press reporting, September and October, when the focus was on the referendum vote, respectively saw 10 and 13 civilian deaths, more than double the monthly average for the year. With the exception of April, when there were 26 civilian deaths (most of them in one grim attack),eight out of the last twelve months saw only zero to five civilian deaths. In terms of military/security force deaths, September saw 28 (the highest number of such deaths over the previous twelve months) and October saw 25 (higher than the monthly average). We conclude from these trends that: 1) hard-core terrorists have stepped up attacks presumably to demonstrate they will not be cowed or coopted by the partial amnesty offer; 2) the military and security forces continue to press the campaign against terrorist remnants with some success and to sustain substantially more terrorist-related casualties than civilians; and 3) the partial amnesty offer is having a positive effect on terrorist surrenders but apparently little effect on the terrorist hard-core, at least for now. (End summary and comment) HISTORY OF TERRORISM -------------- ¶2. (C) Algeria's "dark decade" began in 1991 after the constitution was amended allowing the formation and legalization of political parties, other than the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN). The militant Islamic Salvation Front (FIS),whose program included the creation of an Iranian-styled theocratic state was formed and won a solid majority of the vote in the first stage of the national legislative elections in December 1991. Most observers believe the vote was mainly a protest vote against the ruling political and military elite rather than a sign of broad support for creating an Islamic state. In early 1992, the government responded to the perceived Islamic militant threat posed by the FIS by dissolving the National People's Assembly, canceling the second round of elections, outlawing the FIS, and declaring a state of emergency. These actions set off a ten-year cycle of turmoil and violence which saw the assassination of the Algerian President, increasingly random acts of violence committed against police, military and civilians, and ever increasingly lethal responses from Algerian security forces trying to quell the unrest. 3) (C) In a 2002 speech to the International Conference on Terrorism held in Algiers, General Major A. Maiza, First Regional Military Commander, said that at the high point of terrorist violence in 1994, there were over 27,000 terrorists active in Algeria. During the late 1990's and continuing to today, the Algerian security services and military have inflicted serious damage to Algerian terrorist groups, nearly dismantling the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and significantly reducing the operational effectiveness of the GIA splinter group and now primary terror group threat, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). President Bouteflika's 1999 Civil Concord plan was a key step toward uniting the country, and an estimated 6,000 terrorists laid down their arms in response. After last month's successful vote on the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, Interior Minister Yazid Zerhouni officially estimated that approximately 1,000 active terrorists still operated in the country - 840 GSPC, 100 Dhamat Houmet Daawa Salafia (DHDS),and 40 GIA. IMPROVING SITUATION -------------- ¶4. (C) Though Algerians still live under a state of emergency evidenced by the ubiquitous security presence throughout the country, the overall security situation has vastly improved. Analysts at the African Union Counter-Terrorism Center (AUCT) informed the Embassy that Algeria no longer views terrorist violence as a threat to national security. However, it remains a serious domestic issue and an ongoing threat to public safety. Most of the larger Algerian cities, such as Algiers, Oran and Constantine, have not experienced significant terrorist attacks for over a year. Terrorism still is a limited problem in the more rugged and rural regions, where small scale terrorist attacks and military action against the GSPC remain somewhat commonplace. TERRORIST FIGURES -------------- ¶5. (C) Since October 2004, 251 terrorists, 99 civilians and 186 military and security forces have been killed in terrorist related violence. Over this same time frame, 263 terrorists have been captured. October 2005 was a particularly deadly month with 53 terrorists, 19 civilians and 25 military and security forces killed. This upswing in violence, also seen in August and September, is most likely the negative response by GSPC and other elements to Bouteflika's national reconciliation. In order to show that the GSPC is more resolute than ever in continuing its struggle, the GSPC in particular has increased the lethality of its operations due to a shift from classic ambush tactics to increased use of road-side improvised explosive devices (IED). Since the announcement of the national reconciliation, around 25 terrorists have laid down their arms. After the introduction of the laws implementing the national reconciliation later this year, many more terrorists are expected to do the same. We expect the figure of 1,000 terrorists cited by Zerhouni to decrease. However, those remaining will be the most hardened and dangerous terrorists and the least likely to give up without a fight. It is a paradox that as Algeria makes progress on the security front, spikes in violence occur because fewer and fewer "moderate" elements who might lay down their arms remain in the fight. ¶6. (C) The following figures represent the monthly totals of killed terrorists, civilians and military/security forces from October 2004 to present: MONTH Terrorists Civilians Mil/Security OCT 16 17 8 NOV 7 4 12 DEC 17 4 3 JAN 16 5 18 FEB 20 0 13 MAR 11 0 4 APR 9 26 13 MAY 25 2 19 JUN 8 3 25 JUL 33 2 12 AUG 27 7 6 SEP 9 10 28 OCT 53 19 25 ERDMAN