POLISARIO "AMBASSADOR" DELIVERS ABDELAZIZ LETTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 001011

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2015
TAGS: PREL PBTS PHUM OPDC WI MO AG
SUBJECT: POLISARIO "AMBASSADOR" DELIVERS ABDELAZIZ LETTER
TO SECRETARY RICE, EXPLAINS POLISARIO POSITION ON MOROCCAN
POWS AND POLISARIO DETAINEES, ALLUDES TO "DECISIVE SUMMER"
FOR POLISARIO POSITION ON A PEACEFUL SOLUTION


Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Marc Sievers, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) DCM met with Polisario "Ambassador" to Algiers
Mohammed Beissat May 19 at Beissat's request to accept a
letter from Polisario Secretary General Abdelaziz to
Secretary Rice (original faxed to NEA/MAG) and for a readout

SIPDIS
on Abdelaziz's May 10-13 visit to the U.S. Abdelaziz's
letter not surprisingly depicts Polisario as the party
seeking a peaceful solution in the context of UNSC
resolutions, and Morocco as the intransigent party. It also
requests a meeting between Abdelaziz and the Secretary
"and/or other senior officials of the Department of State in
order to express our views on the UN peace process in the
Western Sahara." Beissat told DCM that this summer would be
critical for the Polisario's continued pursuit of a peaceful
solution. Polisario planned to send envoys to "every
member-state of the UN" in order to gauge international
support for a peaceful solution, by which he meant
international willingness to apply pressure on Morocco to
accept a referendum. If the envoys did not find such
willingness, Polisario "would need to consider other
options," he warned. DCM cautioned that Polisario would find
itself completely isolated if it abandoned the UN framework.
DCM also noted growing international insistence that
Polisario release the remaining 408 Moroccan POWs. Beissat
responded that Abdelaziz represented the moderates in the
Polisario, but without progress toward peace, he would not be
able to control the radicals much longer. On the POWs,
Beissat said they were a "useful reminder" that the Western
Sahara conflict continued. Morocco, he claimed, had provided
no accounting for the fate of 150 Polisario POWs and 600
"disappeared" civilians that the Polisario insists were
detained by Morocco in the late 1970s and '80s. Until it did
so, Polisario had no incentive to release the remaining
Moroccans. DCM insisted the POWs were a humanitarian issue
and Polisario should release them without conditions.
Beissat concluded that there needed to be international
pressure on both sides, not just on the Polisario. End
summary.

Abdelaziz Visit to U.S.
--------------


2. (C) Beissat began by describing Polisario Secretary
General Mohammed Abdelaziz's May 10-13 visit to the U.S. as
"excellent." Abdelaziz had met with "many old friends" in
Congress, including Senators Kennedy and Imhofe and
Representative Pitts, and had then gone to Houston to meet
James Baker. Abdelaziz and Baker, he said, had discussed
"all the issues" in a "very informative" meeting. Beissat
did not respond to a question about the content of the
discussions with Baker other than to say that Baker remained
a valued "source of advice." Beissat said Abdelaziz had been
"disappointed" that there had not been any response to a
request for a meeting at the State Department. Receiving
Abdelaziz "at a senior level" would be a "good step."

Appealing for U.S. Help
--------------


3. (C) DCM reviewed the state of U.S. relations with Morocco
and Algeria, noting that the U.S. had a longstanding special
relationship with Morocco which would not change, but also
had an increasingly important partnership with Algeria.
Beissat said Polisario regarded the U.S. relationship with
Morocco "as an asset, not a threat," provided that the U.S.
used the relationship to promote peace. Beissat said that
without progress toward peace, the leadership of the
Polisario was under increasing pressure from hard-liners who
wanted to push moderates such as Abdelaziz aside. A
senior-level U.S. meeting with Abdelaziz would help boost
peace. The hard-liners were arguing that Polisario had
wasted fifteen years pursuing the UN framework and had
betrayed the cause of Sahrawi self-determination. Without
progress toward peace, what arguments did the leadership have
to refute these accusations? The U.S. is the champion of
freedom and democracy in the world. Why would it not support
the democratic option in the Western Sahara, i.e. a
referendum?
Envoys to Travel to All UN Members
--------------

4. (C) Beissat said this summer would be crucial for the
Polisario. They planned to send envoys to all UN
member-states to ask them all to push for a peaceful solution
(i.e. for pressure on Morocco to accept a referendum). If
the envoys found international support, the Polisario
leadership would be able to maintain its position. If not,
he warned, they would have to "consider other options." DCM
pushed back, noting that there was international consensus in
support of the UN framework. Polisario would be completely
isolated if it tried to resume the use force. Beissat said
the Polisario had been disappointed by the latest UNSC
resolution on the Western Sahara, which he said only referred
to maintaining the ceasefire and freeing Moroccan POWs. The
resolution "smelled of the French," he claimed, and was
one-sided in its raising Moroccan concerns without reference
to the Polisario's.

Moroccan POWs and Accounting for Polisario Missing
-------------- --------------


5. (C) DCM said the Polisario should release all the
remaining 408 Moroccan POWs. This was a strictly
humanitarian issue, there was growing American sympathy for
the Moroccan prisoners, and Polisario's insistence on holding
them made Polisario (and Algeria) look bad. Beissat
responded that Polisario was willing to take the heat because
holding on to the Moroccan POWs was the only way to remind
the international community that there was still a conflict
in the Western Sahara. Both the UN Settlement Plan and the
Baker Plan had called for the release of all prisoners and
the return of refugees as soon as the date of a referendum
was set. Why did the international community not demand that
Morocco account for missing Sahrawis, if not insist that it
accept a referendum? Beissat said that in the early days of
the conflict in the late seventies and early eighties,
Morocco had captured about 150 Polisario armed men and
arrested about 600 Sahrawi civilians. Even if Morocco no
longer held any of them, it had never made any accounting for
their fate. Morocco had even ignored ICRC requests for
information, and the ICRC had undermined its neutrality by
accepting Morocco's silence. At the very least, Morocco
should provide death certificates and offer compensation to
their families. Polisario had already released thousands of
Moroccans, but had received nothing in return. DCM
reiterated that releasing the remaining prisoners would be an
important humanitarian gesture; continuing to hold them would
only further damage the Polisario's reputation.


6. (C) Beissat concluded the meeting by saying that
Polisario knew it was the weaker party, but that did not mean
it was defeated. What was needed was international pressure
on both sides in order to make progress. Polisario would
accept the outcome of a referendum, no matter what it was.
But simply giving in to Morocco was out of the question.



7. (U) Minimize considered.

ERDMAN