C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 004234

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO, AF/SPG, AF/RSA AND EUR/RPM.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2015
TAGS: PREL KPKO MARR SU AU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: AU TELLS SACEUR NATO ASSISTANCE
EXCELLENT; FRANK DISCUSSION NEEDED ON AMIS

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. VICKI HUDDLESTON. REASON: 1.4 (B)
AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: The African Union (AU) Commission views its
collaboration with NATO on Darfur as "excellent" and welcomes
discussion on how to expand NATO assistance in areas such as
training, Commissioner for Peace and Security Amb. Said
Djinnit told SACEUR Gen. Jones December 16. Amb. Djinnit
would welcome the opportunity to visit NATO. He noted that,
based on positive Darfur experience, the AU has invited NATO
to work with it on the African Standby Force effort (ASF).
On the future of AMIS, Amb. Djinnit said that the AU would
likely prefer to retain the military mission if AU
organizational capacity and partner funding prerequisites are
in place. AMIS is a test of the AU's new policy of
"non-indifference", putting AU credibility and institutional
relevance at risk if it fails. While AU leadership remains
undecided, Amb. Djinnit seeks a frank discussion with
partners on the way forward. End summary.


2. (U) Also present at the meeting were Amb. Huddleston,
EUCOM J5 MG Gration, EUCOM Polad Amb. Yates, NATO J5 BG
Porter, NATO SMLO Col. Hirata, NATO Military Assistant Col.
Mirr, other members of the SACEUR's delegation, NATO Civilian
Liaison Officer Rye and Poloff (notetaker). In addition to
Amb. Djinnit, the AU was represented by members of the Darfur
Integrated Task Force (DITF), members of the Peace Support
Operations Division (PSOD), and various conflict "focal
points."

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EXCELLENT START TO AU-NATO RELATIONS
--------------


2. (C) Gen. Jones expressed hope that NATO assistance to the
AU for Darfur has added value. He said that NATO is changing
its culture and capacities to be a more proactivie
institution and that there is political support among NATO
member states to do more. Amb. Djinnit responded that the AU
Commission views its collaboration with NATO as "excellent."
Despite initial doubts due to the unprecedented nature of

cooperation with NATO, Djinnit said that the AU was pleased
with the level of cooperation with NATO.


3. (C) Amb. Djinnit said that NATO coordination with the EU
to provide strategic lift for Darfur is an example of the
spirit of AMIS partnership. He characterized NATO training
assistance as "promising" and said that NATO should
strengthen and deepen its training partnership with the AU.
NATO SMLO Col. Hirata informed Amb. Djinnit of the NATO staff
capacity-building training schedule and said DITF Head Amb.
Ki Doulaye had informally requested NATO assistance in "force
multiplier" training related to the Canadian-provided APCs.
Djinnit placed importance on discussing how to expand the
scope of NATO training for Darfur. He said that NATO's
contribution to AMIS has been modest in comparison to NATO's
capabilities, but nevertheless important.


4. (C) Because NATO-AU relations got off to such a positive
start for Darfur, Djinnit said, the AU has invited NATO to
work with it on the African Standby Force (ASF) effort.
(Note: NATO has not yet officially responded to the AU's
informal invitation to contribute to ASF workshops scheduled
to begin in early 2006. End note).


5. (C) Gen. Jones said that NATO is committed to developing
its relationship with the AU. He reassured Djinnit that NATO
is attuned to AU sensitivities, which is why NATO requires AU
requests to provide assistance. He encouraged Djinnit to be
forthcoming in letting NATO know what types of support the AU
requires. Amb. Djinnit agreed that the request method is the
best means of building a solid relationship. He stated his
willingness to travel to NATO to engage in further
discussions (Note: Djinnit said he had been the first AU
official to travel to NATO. He visited NATO in 1999, when he
was OAU ASG for Political Affairs. End note).


6. (C) Comment: SACEUR's visit was constructive in
strengthening NATO-AU relations, and NATO SMLO presence in
Addis is vital. Post notes, though, the difficulties local
NATO representation faces in engaging the AU on specific ways
NATO could expand its assistance for Darfur, not to mention
the African Standby Force. The AU needs a "menu" of NATO
competencies from which it can request areas of support, but

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local NATO representatives do not have the mandate to
actively engage the AU on that point. AU interest in
visiting NATO and taking NATO School courses is a positive
first step in expanding AU knowledge of NATO value-added.
Post looks forward to working with Washington and USNATO in
crossing the hurdle of ensuring the AU understands what NATO
has to offer so that the AU can generate practical requests
for assistance.

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AMIS FUTURE -- A QUESTION OF CAPABILITY AND FUNDING
-------------- --------------


5. (C) NATO BG Porter noted that NATO wants to concentrate on
a value-added role in AMIS support and asked Amb. Djinnit for
information on AMIS' future and how that may impact NATO
support requirements. Amb. Djinnit stated that the AU intends
to pursue its role in Darfur "as far as possible." AMIS
represented a strategic objective for the AU in showing that
it is no longer the "indifferent" institution the OAU was,
and instead is serious about addressing continental peace and
security challenges. AU credibility and institutional
relevance will suffer if AMIS is seen to have failed, he
noted.


6. (C) Amb. Djinnit did concede that realities on the ground
do not necessarily match the AU's ambition, and that a
"courageous decision" may be needed. The AU took on Darfur
as an ad-hoc mission and AU institutional transformation is
still in progress. The AU is building its institutional
capacity through Darfur, Djinnit said. Djinnit noted that
the AU is willing to accept partner assistance provided that
assistance also allows for African capacity-building.


7. (C) While the AU has its own work to do to improve
operations on the ground and at AU headquarters, Djinnit
said, the AU also needs partners to commit to more reliable
funding. "The AU cannot engage in a mission of long duration
without resource security", he lamented.


8. (C) Djinnit said that AU leadership is still undecided
regarding the future of AMIS and whether it is fair to
continue AMIS as an ad-hoc arrangement. Djinnit stated his
own inclination of asking the PSC to approve a one-year
extension of AMIS when it meets on Darfur in early January.
He noted that any eventual transition will be to a UN
mission, but indicated the AU is undecided on timing. He
called for a frank discussion with partners.


9. (C) Comment: If the AU really does intend to remain in
Darfur another year, now is the time for frank discussion on
concrete steps needed to improve mission effectiveness and
sustainability. An AU green light to the UN to begin
contingency planning and perhaps provide logistical support
should not be seen as contradictory to the AU's steps to
improve its mission - but the AU may need convincing. The AU
will also need to be forthcoming in requesting and utilizing
partner expertise, especially in the field of command and
control. Finally, the AU will need to be encouraged to reach
out more to its member states and other possible sources of
funding, such as the Middle East. End comment.


10. (U) This cable was cleared by SACEUR.


HUDDLESTON