Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ADDISABABA4234
2005-12-29 14:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

DARFUR: AU TELLS SACEUR NATO ASSISTANCE

Tags:  PREL KPKO MARR SU AU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9052
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #4234/01 3631413
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 291413Z DEC 05
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8462
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0711
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEPGBA/USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 6811
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 004234 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO, AF/SPG, AF/RSA AND EUR/RPM.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2015
TAGS: PREL KPKO MARR SU AU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: AU TELLS SACEUR NATO ASSISTANCE
EXCELLENT; FRANK DISCUSSION NEEDED ON AMIS

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. VICKI HUDDLESTON. REASON: 1.4 (B)
AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 004234 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO, AF/SPG, AF/RSA AND EUR/RPM. E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2015 TAGS: PREL KPKO MARR SU AU SUBJECT: DARFUR: AU TELLS SACEUR NATO ASSISTANCE EXCELLENT; FRANK DISCUSSION NEEDED ON AMIS Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. VICKI HUDDLESTON. REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: The African Union (AU) Commission views its collaboration with NATO on Darfur as "excellent" and welcomes discussion on how to expand NATO assistance in areas such as training, Commissioner for Peace and Security Amb. Said Djinnit told SACEUR Gen. Jones December 16. Amb. Djinnit would welcome the opportunity to visit NATO. He noted that, based on positive Darfur experience, the AU has invited NATO to work with it on the African Standby Force effort (ASF). On the future of AMIS, Amb. Djinnit said that the AU would likely prefer to retain the military mission if AU organizational capacity and partner funding prerequisites are in place. AMIS is a test of the AU's new policy of "non-indifference", putting AU credibility and institutional relevance at risk if it fails. While AU leadership remains undecided, Amb. Djinnit seeks a frank discussion with partners on the way forward. End summary. ¶2. (U) Also present at the meeting were Amb. Huddleston, EUCOM J5 MG Gration, EUCOM Polad Amb. Yates, NATO J5 BG Porter, NATO SMLO Col. Hirata, NATO Military Assistant Col. Mirr, other members of the SACEUR's delegation, NATO Civilian Liaison Officer Rye and Poloff (notetaker). In addition to Amb. Djinnit, the AU was represented by members of the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF),members of the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD),and various conflict "focal points." -------------- EXCELLENT START TO AU-NATO RELATIONS -------------- ¶2. (C) Gen. Jones expressed hope that NATO assistance to the AU for Darfur has added value. He said that NATO is changing its culture and capacities to be a more proactivie institution and that there is political support among NATO member states to do more. Amb. Djinnit responded that the AU Commission views its collaboration with NATO as "excellent." Despite initial doubts due to the unprecedented nature of cooperation with NATO, Djinnit said that the AU was pleased with the level of cooperation with NATO. ¶3. (C) Amb. Djinnit said that NATO coordination with the EU to provide strategic lift for Darfur is an example of the spirit of AMIS partnership. He characteriz
ed NATO training assistance as "promising" and said that NATO should strengthen and deepen its training partnership with the AU. NATO SMLO Col. Hirata informed Amb. Djinnit of the NATO staff capacity-building training schedule and said DITF Head Amb. Ki Doulaye had informally requested NATO assistance in "force multiplier" training related to the Canadian-provided APCs. Djinnit placed importance on discussing how to expand the scope of NATO training for Darfur. He said that NATO's contribution to AMIS has been modest in comparison to NATO's capabilities, but nevertheless important. ¶4. (C) Because NATO-AU relations got off to such a positive start for Darfur, Djinnit said, the AU has invited NATO to work with it on the African Standby Force (ASF) effort. (Note: NATO has not yet officially responded to the AU's informal invitation to contribute to ASF workshops scheduled to begin in early 2006. End note). ¶5. (C) Gen. Jones said that NATO is committed to developing its relationship with the AU. He reassured Djinnit that NATO is attuned to AU sensitivities, which is why NATO requires AU requests to provide assistance. He encouraged Djinnit to be forthcoming in letting NATO know what types of support the AU requires. Amb. Djinnit agreed that the request method is the best means of building a solid relationship. He stated his willingness to travel to NATO to engage in further discussions (Note: Djinnit said he had been the first AU official to travel to NATO. He visited NATO in 1999, when he was OAU ASG for Political Affairs. End note). ¶6. (C) Comment: SACEUR's visit was constructive in strengthening NATO-AU relations, and NATO SMLO presence in Addis is vital. Post notes, though, the difficulties local NATO representation faces in engaging the AU on specific ways NATO could expand its assistance for Darfur, not to mention the African Standby Force. The AU needs a "menu" of NATO competencies from which it can request areas of support, but ADDIS ABAB 00004234 002 OF 002 local NATO representatives do not have the mandate to actively engage the AU on that point. AU interest in visiting NATO and taking NATO School courses is a positive first step in expanding AU knowledge of NATO value-added. Post looks forward to working with Washington and USNATO in crossing the hurdle of ensuring the AU understands what NATO has to offer so that the AU can generate practical requests for assistance. -------------- -------------- AMIS FUTURE -- A QUESTION OF CAPABILITY AND FUNDING -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) NATO BG Porter noted that NATO wants to concentrate on a value-added role in AMIS support and asked Amb. Djinnit for information on AMIS' future and how that may impact NATO support requirements. Amb. Djinnit stated that the AU intends to pursue its role in Darfur "as far as possible." AMIS represented a strategic objective for the AU in showing that it is no longer the "indifferent" institution the OAU was, and instead is serious about addressing continental peace and security challenges. AU credibility and institutional relevance will suffer if AMIS is seen to have failed, he noted. ¶6. (C) Amb. Djinnit did concede that realities on the ground do not necessarily match the AU's ambition, and that a "courageous decision" may be needed. The AU took on Darfur as an ad-hoc mission and AU institutional transformation is still in progress. The AU is building its institutional capacity through Darfur, Djinnit said. Djinnit noted that the AU is willing to accept partner assistance provided that assistance also allows for African capacity-building. ¶7. (C) While the AU has its own work to do to improve operations on the ground and at AU headquarters, Djinnit said, the AU also needs partners to commit to more reliable funding. "The AU cannot engage in a mission of long duration without resource security", he lamented. ¶8. (C) Djinnit said that AU leadership is still undecided regarding the future of AMIS and whether it is fair to continue AMIS as an ad-hoc arrangement. Djinnit stated his own inclination of asking the PSC to approve a one-year extension of AMIS when it meets on Darfur in early January. He noted that any eventual transition will be to a UN mission, but indicated the AU is undecided on timing. He called for a frank discussion with partners. ¶9. (C) Comment: If the AU really does intend to remain in Darfur another year, now is the time for frank discussion on concrete steps needed to improve mission effectiveness and sustainability. An AU green light to the UN to begin contingency planning and perhaps provide logistical support should not be seen as contradictory to the AU's steps to improve its mission - but the AU may need convincing. The AU will also need to be forthcoming in requesting and utilizing partner expertise, especially in the field of command and control. Finally, the AU will need to be encouraged to reach out more to its member states and other possible sources of funding, such as the Middle East. End comment. ¶10. (U) This cable was cleared by SACEUR. HUDDLESTON

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -