C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 003599

SIPDIS

LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO PTER ET ER UN EE BORDER ELEC UNREST
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: DAS YAMAMOTO DISCUSSES INTERNAL
POLITICS, ERITREA AND SOMALIA WITH PM MELES

Classified By: Charge Vicki Huddleston for reason 1.4 (b,d)



1. (C) SUMMARY: PM Meles told AF DAS Don Yamamoto that
Eritrean President Isaias was seeking to prod U.S. action on
the border issue through his recent ban on UNMEE helicopter
flights. Meles said he did not expect Isaias to attack, but
could not afford to allow Ethiopia's election dispute to drag
on much longer, lest it "confuse" the Eritrean leader about
Ethiopia's vulnerability. Yamamoto said the U.S. would
continue to urge opposition leaders to join parliament, but
also conveyed high-level USG concerns about arrests of
opposition members. Meles claimed that the GOE had shown
restraint with the opposition leaders and hoped that many
would join Parliament. Other elements of the opposition
would have to be "removed," he said. Ethiopian policy in
Somalia was directed at supporting the establishment of a
government in order to combat Al Qaeda in Mogadishu, the PM
indicated. He hoped for greater U.S. cooperation, but
understood if U.S. priorities lay elsewhere. DAS Yamamoto
told the PM that the USG was taking a fresh look at Somalia
and underscored that the U.S. sees Ethiopia as an "anchor
state" in the region. In spite of tremendous pressures
arising from the ongoing electoral dispute as well as
provocative Eritrean harassment of UNMEE, Meles appeared
remarkably serene and in control. End Summary.


2. (SBU) AF DAS Don Yamamoto called on Prime Minister Meles
October 7. He was accompanied by Charge Vicki Huddleston,
AF/E Director Eunice Reddick, Col. Kevin Kenny of AF/RSA and
Pol/Econ Counselor (notetaker). MFA Director for North
America and Europe Grum Abay and a notetaker joined PM Meles.

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Eritrea Border: Isaias Pressuring for Action on Demarcation
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3. (C) The only thing stopping Eritrea from attacking
Ethiopia was not the U.N. Mission on Ethiopia and Eritrea
(UNMEE), nor pressure from the international community, but
rather President Isaias' belief that "he would die first,"
Meles said bluntly. "The only chink in our armor is
instability in Addis," he added. If Isaias were to be
confused by signs of Ethiopian weakness, the PM said, people
would die. According to Meles, President Isaias was focused
on only one thing: regime survival. The PM observed that 600
Eritreans who would lose their jobs due to the closing of the
USAID mission in Asmara were "bit players" in Isaias' drama.
The Eritrean president had not yet come to grips with his
military defeat in 2000, Meles commented. Isaias was now
merely acting like a child trying to get attention.


4. (C) Meles commented that he had modified his own approach
to Isaias, from initially trying to "cage" his Eritrean rival
completely, to now trying to force him through a single exit
from his predicament. "All other doors must remain closed if
the President is to come out through the right opening," he
concluded. Meles professed not to know for sure how
comfortable Isaias' was with the status quo, but he seemed
less comfortable every day. The PM cautioned that if the
U.S. and international community reacted the wrong way to
Isaias' provocation, Ethiopia would pay the cost. Amb.
Bolton's response to Eritrea's decision to ban UNMEE
helicopter flights, for example, was "the wrong statement at
the wrong time." The GOE had remained quiet and restrained,
Meles noted. The PM commented that if Eritrea really wanted
to get rid of UNMEE, President Isaias would say so directly.


5. (C) DAS Yamamoto conveyed USG anguish over the situation
in Asmara. He mentioned that the USG was considering the
possibility of offering an American UN envoy to Ethiopia and
Eritrea. If the USG decided to put one forward, he added, it
would proceed "full-throttle" on the search for peaceful
resolution of the long-standing border conflict.

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Somalia: GOE Focused on Stopping Al Qaeda in Mogadishu
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6. (C) DAS Yamamoto told Meles that the USG had met with
Transitional Somali President Yusuf on the margins of the
UNGA in September. It had marked the Transitional Federal
Government's (TFG's) first such meeting with Washington
policymakers. Yamamoto noted that EU and Ethiopian
government had convinced the USG that the TFG might represent
the last chance for establishing stability in Somalia. In
the New York meeting, USG reps had told TFG representatives
that Washington expected them to reach out to other factions
and warlords -- at least those who might potentially be
supportive. The USG was not opposed to an eventual
peacekeeping mission, but only after essential security
conditions had been established.


7. (C) Meles replied that "we believe there must be a
proactive plan to de-activate Al Qaeda's presence in
Mogadishu. "Plan A" for Ethiopia was to encourage the
formation of a government so that GOE would have an ally in
the fight against Al Qaida. The PM said he thought Ethiopia
was acting in concert with the U.S. when it agreed to provide
support to the TFG at meetings in Abuja. After the U.S.
statement opposing direct Ethiopian military involvement,
however, Meles had decided not to invest in "Plan A." "Plan
B" was to protect Ethiopia's border with Somalia and maintain
contacts with friends in case the U.S. eventually decided to
become more proactive. The PM said he understood if Somalia
was not a priority for the USG, but remarked that a more
robust effort there would not overtax U.S. resources. If the
U.S. did decide to get more involved, Meles said the GOE
would be ready to go "full throttle" to assist. He added,
however, that the GOE no longer had any intention to supply
peacekeeping troops for Somalia, even if asked.


8. (C) The U.S. understands that Somalia is a security issue
for Ethiopia, Yamamoto replied. He said that U.S. also
believed that there might be Al Qaeda cells in Mogadishu and
Somaliland, and did see the need for reviewing strategy on
Somalia. The U.S. wanted to work with Ethiopia and would try
to speed up its own internal assessment and planning process.

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Political Crisis: "Disloyal" Opposition Between Parliament
and "Removal"
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9. (C) DAS Yamamoto told the PM that Ethiopia's opposition
must take up its seats in Parliament. He pledged to make
that case to Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD)
President Hailu Shawel when the latter returned to Ethiopia
the next day. Yamamoto stated that Secretary Rice had sent
him and his team to Ethiopia to bolster the efforts of the
Charge in seeking closure to Ethiopia's post-election
disputes and the successful formation of Parliament.


10. (C) Charge Huddleston interjected that all players knew
that Ethiopia had reached a critical juncture. The GOE's
flexibility had already proved effective in persuading key
United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF) leaders, and
possibly many segments of the CUD, to join the Parliament.
It was also important for the GOE to take steps to repair the
damage to its reputation from human rights abuses that had
occurred since the election. DAS Yamamoto noted that the
Secretary was concerned by the large number of what appeared

SIPDIS
to be politically-motivated arrests. He added that he had
also cautioned opposition leaders against recourse to
violence.


11. (C) The PM replied that he had been pleased by
Washington's positive response to Ethiopia's electoral
process. He remarked that so long as efforts to democratize
in Africa were externally driven, they would not be
sustainable. "We've tried to avoid that," he added, and
complained about some elements of the international
"democracy industry" (note: this was probably a reference to
the EU Observer Mission and/or NDI and IRI missions. End
note.) He said that democracy and ethnic federalism were
matters of survival for Ethiopia, which had to channel
dissent and differences in a peaceful, constitutional
manner. Meles lamented that Ethiopia had not been blessed
with a loyal opposition, and had instead been plagued by
remnants of the previous DERG regime. He claimed that the
GOE had responded with considerable restraint to provocative
and unconstitutional behavior by opposition parties, for
which the PM said he had ample evidence. He said he had
taken risks in order to preserve democracy and educate the
public. "If this opposition proves it is not loyal, however,
then removing its leaders will allow something better to grow
back." The PM said he thought the opposition was close to
entering Parliament, but that the GOE could not let the
process drag on beyond the following week, in part due to the
dangerous signals that continuing instability sent to
Eritrea.


12. (C) DAS Yamamoto urged the PM to reach out more
effectively to the Ethiopia Diaspora in Washington, including
through Ethiopian Embassy participation in meetings the
Department held with Diaspora groups. While Meles
acknowledged that the GOE's outreach efforts had been "weak,"
and indicated that he planned to revamp his Embassy's
programs to engage Ethio-Americans. He asked for patience
while his government prepared a new strategy for doing so.

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Talks With The OLF: No Intermediaries Needed
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13. (C) DAS Yamamoto called the meetings that he would be
holding the following week in Washington with exiled leaders
of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) discussions, not
negotiations. An OLF decision to disarm was
"non-negotiable," but was ultimately a matter between the OLF
and the GOE. Yamamoto offered the USG's good offices if they
would be helpful, and promised that the Department would not
issue any statement concerning the discussions.


14. (C) PM Meles said that the recent resumption of
discussions with the OLF had originated in a direct exchange
of letters between himself and a key OLF leader, and had
continued at a meeting in Norway in late summer. The PM
noted that the OLF leader was in touch with other
organization leaders in Asmara, and that the GOE also had
direct contact with the Asmara wing of the OLF. The
Government of Norway had offered to facilitate the
discussions, but Meles said he had declined the offer,
preferring to keep the talks private. Meles said he planned
to ask for USG help when appropriate, and welcomed U.S.
meetings with OLF leaders. He indicated that the OLF had put
forth a new approach in its dialogue with the GOE that had
some merits, but the winding down of the armed struggle would
also have to be addressed. One positive development was that
most of the organization no longer demanded independence for
the Oromiya region.

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Ethiopia: Anchor State, Partner and Good Customer
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15. (C) DAS Yamamoto told PM Meles that the USG continued to
view Ethiopia as an anchor state. "What happens here affects
the whole region," he said. He also thanked Meles for
Ethiopia's contribution of peacekeeping troops to Burundi.
Finally, he expressed the USG's appreciation for the GOE's
steadfastness in purchasing Boeing aircraft in the face of
tremendous pressure from European Governments on behalf of
Airbus.


16. (C) COMMENT: The discussion between PM Meles and DAS
Yamamoto reflected the broad strategic interests that are
encompassed within the Ethio-American bilateral
relationship. In spite of tremendous pressures arising from
the ongoing electoral dispute as well as provocative Eritrean
harassment of UNMEE, Meles appeared remarkably serene and in
control of the situation.


17. (SBU) DAS Yamamoto did not have the opportunity to clear
this message.
HUDDLESTON