C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 003444

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ET ELEC UNREST
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: CHARGE PRESSES MFA FOR GOE RESPONSE TO
POLITICAL CRISIS

REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 3129


B. ADDIS ABABA 3128


1. (C) Summary: Charge took the opportunity of a summons to
the MFA on Sept. 5 to press Deputy Minister Tekeda Alemu on
the GOE's response to the current political crisis. Charge
argued that while the international community and others
urged the opposition to take up its newly-won seats in
parliament, it was also incumbent upon the GOE to take steps
to restore credibility to Ethiopian institutions and reduce
tensions in Addis Ababa. Tekeda took the point on board, but
wondered whether PM Meles retained sufficient political
capital and flexibility to undertake such initiatives. End
Summary.


2. (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Tekeda summoned the Charge on
very short notice September 5 to deliver a note protesting
the EU Election Observer Mission's conduct in Ethiopia.
Pol/Econ Counselor accompanied the Charge, while Tekeda was
joined by Director for American Affairs Ayalew. Septel
includes a report on that conversation as well as the text of
the note. The Charge took the opportunity of the high-level
MFA call to ask Tekeda for his thoughts on next steps to
resolve the country's current political crisis. Bio note:
Tekeda is a career diplomat who has served as (political
appointee) Foreign Minister Seyoum's deputy for well over a
decade.

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We Know You're Upset -- But What Are You Gonna Do?
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3. (C) Charge told Tekeda that while she could understand in
some measure the GOE's concerns about the EU-EOM report, what
was really important was to focus on what happens next. It
was clear to everyone that tensions in Addis were rising over
the disputed election results. Would opposition leaders be
willing and able to control popular anger and frustration,
she asked? Tekeda replied that the expected the bulk of the
opposition's newly elected parliamentarians to take their
seats. He admitted, however, that there was a large mass of
"lumpen" in the capital that leaders in the CUD could easily
mobilize for m

ischief if they wished. Tekeda estimated that
40 percent of the young adults in Addis were unemployed,
plenty of "combustible material" to cause a problem if
politicians were irresponsible. EU-EOM head Ana Gomes had
already poured fuel on the fire, he added.


4. (C) The Charge returned to the point that the future was
still largely in the GOE's hands. People both within Ethiopia
and in the international community were looking to the GOE to
do something to calm the situation. She noted that the
international donor community hoped that both sides of the
current dispute would work together to move forward, or
everyone risked falling backward. Ethiopia stood at an
important crossroads in its democratic evolution. The Charge
underscored that Ethiopia's opposition leaders had far less
experience in government, and so the world was looking
primarily to the GOE for leadership. A public message
emphasizing the GOE's readiness to work with all parties to
develop a truly open, multiparty system would be a good
start, she said.

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No Way Back -- But is There a Way Out?
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5. (C) Tekeda recognized that the GOE did have a greater
responsibility to manage the situation. Tekeda said that
while he was not an EPRDF member, he believed that the
coalition's leadership understood the political sea change
that had taken place as a result of the May elections. The
ruling party's acceptance of this reality was evident when
the EPRDF ceded control of Addis Ababa -- the historical
center of power in Ethiopia. The difficulty, however, was
that the top leadership in the ruling coalition was not sure
that opposition leaders from the Coalition for Unity and
Democracy (CUD) would "play ball." While Ana Gomes was
fueling anger with the EU-EOM report, he said, some key
opposition leaders in Washington (note: from the UEDF) issued
a statement calling for public protests in early October.
Members of the governing Ethiopian People's Revolutionary
Democratic Front (EPRDF) were wondering whether such people
were really ready to engage with the GOE within the
Constitutional order. Tekeda confided that GOE officials like
him could argue that the GOE had to lead the way out of the
current crisis, but the response from EPRDF leaders was, "how
can I trust our opponents to cooperate?"


6. (C) Tekeda lamented that moderate leaders in the
opposition, such as the CUD's Berhanu Nega and the UEDF's
Beyene Petros, did not seem to have the upper hand in
internal party debates. The UEDF was extremely dependent on
financial support from the United States, while the CUD was
somewhat less so. Tekeda argued that most Ethiopian Diaspora
leaders had ties to the former Mengistu regime, known as the
DERG. If they were in Ethiopia, he said, they would be in
jail for crimes committed under that government. It was
ironic, Tekeda remarked, that the United States was the
source of extremism in Ethiopia's current situation. There
was still time, however, for opposition moderates to reassert
control, but they would have to "come out" and make their
good intentions known. Tekeda believed that the GOE was still
open to dialogue with them.

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Help the Moderate Opposition Help You
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7. (C) Pol/Econ Counselor noted that the GOE could take
certain measures on its own initiative -- with or without
direct negotiations with the opposition -- that might lower
the level of tension and stem popular anger against the
government. The GOE might express willingness to revisit the
package of changes to parliamentary procedures that the
ruling coalition hurried through in the dying days of the
previous parliament, for example. Re-establishing the
opposition's access to the state-run broadcast media would be
another potential confidence-building measure. Such steps
could improve the GOE's tarnished image on the street in
Addis and make it easier for moderate opposition leaders to
justify taking their seats in parliament. Positive steps
would also make it easier for the international community to
press the opposition on participating in parliament.


8. (C) Tekeda took the suggestions on board, and indicated
that changes in media's conduct should not be so difficult if
a climate of greater trust existed. At the same time, he
noted that "PM Meles has only so much political capital. Is
he really in a position to take more steps toward the
opposition? The PM cannot stray too far from his followers in
the EPRDF. He lost a lot of capital with them by allowing
Eritrea to secede. He also brought the EPRDF to this point
(in the election/democratization process). What did they get?
The lost Addis." Tekeda commented while Meles was strong, he
was not all powerful, and internal EPRDF debates were now
common.


9. (C) The Charge concluded by saying that the international
community wanted to work with the GOD to promote a peaceful
solution to the current impasse, but that the GOE had to be
willing to address the problems that existed with the
electoral process and Ethiopian institutions. Everyone would
be looking for GOE leadership. "I'm worried that the ruling
coalition has decided that it can't give anymore, when now is
precisely the time when more initiative is most needed," she
concluded. Tekeda replied that the most difficult period
seemed to have passed now.


10. (C) COMMENT: It is unclear how open members of PM Meles'
inner circle are to new initiatives that could ease tensions
and pave the way for a successful new parliament in Ethiopia,
but our suggestions will no doubt reach EPRDF ears.
HUDDLESTON