Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ADANA185
2005-10-17 13:24:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Consulate Adana
Cable title:  

PKK VIOLENCE IN SE TURKEY CONTINUES DESPITE TURKEY, EU FIRST

Tags:  PREL PTER PKK ADANA EU 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS ADANA 000185 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PTER PKK ADANA EU
SUBJECT: PKK VIOLENCE IN SE TURKEY CONTINUES DESPITE TURKEY, EU FIRST
STEPS


UNCLAS ADANA 000185

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PTER PKK ADANA EU
SUBJECT: PKK VIOLENCE IN SE TURKEY CONTINUES DESPITE TURKEY, EU FIRST
STEPS



1. (SBU) The number of incidents of PKK-related violence in the
southeast has shown no sign of decreasing since the October 3
milestone beginning discussions on Turkey's EU accession. At
the same time, it does not appear that the GOT has made any
changes in its approach of using security forces as the primary
means of dealing with the Kurdish issue in the region. Indeed,
the recently-launched large-scale operations against 350 PKK
members whom, according to the press, the GOT alleges slipped
into Tunceli province from Iraq , combined with a visible
increase in the number of road checks and security forces
activities throughout the region, indicates that numbers of
violent incidents are not abating and could yet increase before
winter. (Note: Tunceli province has no international borders
and is over 200 kilometers from the Iraqi border. How PKK
terror forces could "slip" into Tunceli in such numbers is
unclear. Doing so would mean eluding deployed GoT forces at the
Iraqi border and in multiple other provinces. While some
smaller PKK terror units may well have originated outside
Turkey, the cited number raises questions about the the
credibility of the routine GoT claim that PKK forces do not have
domestic bases of operation and can only come from outside
Turkey. End Note.)

2.(SBU) On October 6, the PKK announced that it ended its
unilateral ceasefire declared on August 20. The press reported
that the PKK terrorist group claimed that 43 of its members were
killed during the 43-day ceasefire, and that the GOT had ended
its initiative for a democratic solution to the Kurdish issue by
responding with violence. (Comment: It bears serious
consideration that PKK terror units initiated multiple
improvised explosive device (IED) attacks and raids on Turkish
security force positions in southeast Turkey throughout the
so-called "ceasefire" period. The ceasefire seemed more a
rhetorical device or public relations gambit than an operational
limitation. End Comment.)


3. (U) Between October 3 and 13, a rough count from press
reports showed that in the area encompassing Tunceli, Bingol,
Van, Hakkari, Sirnak, Mardin and Diyarbakir provinces, at least
nine explosions and 12 clashes occurred involving the PKK
terrorist group and government security forces. In those
incidents, there were at least 14 people killed, 12 wounded and
one kidnapped, according to press reports. Over this 10-day
period, at least four, violent, pro-Ocalan demonstrations took
place in the region, wherein demonstrators clashed with security
forces.


4. (U) According to multiple press accounts, PKK forces, posing
as Turkish security forces, set up a roadblock on a
highly-traveled eastern Mardin road, taking hostage a Turkish
security officer whom they encountered. In reaction, a
wide-ranging Turkish sweep operation to punish the PKK and
locate the security officer is under way in Mardin province.
Together with two July/August hostage takings against official
Turks in Bingol, this could mark the return of roadblock use by
the PKK, a tactic used in the 1990's to assert control of
territory, even if short-lived in nature.


5. (SBU) Some or our contacts have told us that people in the
region believe the GOT missed an opportunity after PM R. Tayyip
Erdogan's August 12 speech in Diyarbakir by not following up
quickly with concrete, democratic measures to address the
Kurdish issue. Fears that the security forces have stepped in
to fill the gap left by government inaction have ratcheted up
the level of anxiety about the prospect of increased violence in
the region.


6. (SBU) Comment: Although many may hoped the October 3 opening
of EU talks would provide an opportunity for the violence to
subside, reports of continued numerous violent PKK-security
forces clashes in the region over the past 10 days indicate that
such hopes may have been drowned out by hardliners on both sides
bent on confronting each other. End Comment.


7. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.