Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ACCRA1885
2005-09-19 07:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Accra
Cable title:  

IAEA DECISION ON IRAN: GHANA SYMPATHETIC BUT NOT

Tags:  KNNP PARM PREL IR TRGY MNUC ENRG AORC GH IAEA 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ACCRA 001885 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2010
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL IR TRGY MNUC ENRG AORC GH IAEA
SUBJECT: IAEA DECISION ON IRAN: GHANA SYMPATHETIC BUT NOT
READY TO COMMIT TO U.S. POSITION

REF: A. STATE 168950

B. STATE 159113

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Jerry Lanier for Reasons 1.5 (B and D)

Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ACCRA 001885

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2010
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL IR TRGY MNUC ENRG AORC GH IAEA
SUBJECT: IAEA DECISION ON IRAN: GHANA SYMPATHETIC BUT NOT
READY TO COMMIT TO U.S. POSITION

REF: A. STATE 168950

B. STATE 159113

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Jerry Lanier for Reasons 1.5 (B and D)

Summary
--------------

1. (C) On September 15, Charge and EconChief delivered Ref A
points on reporting Iran to the UN Security Council to the
Foreign Ministry. EconChief also delivered these points and
Ref B points on safeguards and verification to GoG
representatives to the IAEA. Deputy Foreign Minister Kwasi
Osei-Adjei said Ghana would "do the right thing" and promised
to pass our concerns to President Kufuor. Ghana's IAEA
representative, Professor Daniel Bekoe, agreed negotiations
with Iran have gone on too long, but highlighted differences
between the U.S. and EU3 positions and stated Ghana would
need to hear from Iran before making a decision. End Summary.


2. (C) Charge Jerry Lanier delivered Ref A talking points and
background material to Deputy Foreign Minister Osei-Adjei,
urging GoG support for the U.S./EU3 position that it is time
for the IAEA to report Iran to the UNSC. Osei-Adjei said
Ghana fully supported efforts to keep nuclear weapons out of
the hands of irresponsible parties, and the U.S. could count
on Ghana to "do the right thing." He promised to convey the
U.S. position (and non-paper) to President Kufuor's party,
which is now in New York City to attend the UN High Level
meeting.


3. (C) EconChief Chris Landberg delivered Ref A points on
Iran as well as Ref B points on the IAEA Committee on
Safeguards and Verification to Professor Daniel Bekoe,
Chairman of the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission (GAEC),and
the GoG's representative to the IAEA Board of Governors.
(Note: Bekoe is also Chairman of the Council of State, an
advisory body to the Executive branch. End Note). The
Director General of the GAEC, Professor Akaho, as well as a

Foreign Ministry representative also participated in the
meeting. Both Bekoe and Akaho depart Ghana September 16 to
attend the upcoming IAEA Board of Governors meeting.


4. (C) EconChief emphasized U.S. support for the EU3
position, outlined the legal basis under which the IAEA Board
of Governors can report Iran to the IAEA, and stressed that
the U.S. fully supports peaceful use of nuclear technology.
Professor Bekoe's response was more nuanced than that of the
Foreign Ministry. He agreed that negotiations with Iran had
gone on for too long, but highlighted differences he
perceived between the U.S. and EU3 positions.


5. (C) Bekoe said he met on September 14 with the UK's
representative to the IAEA Board of Governors, who was
visiting Ghana. Bekoe commented that his impression
following that meeting was that the EU3 position appeared to
leave some room for continuing negotiations without reporting
Iran to the UNSC. GAEC Director General Akaho read from the
talking points the UK official left behind, and argued that
the EU3 position seemed to encourage Iran to return to
negotiations. Bekoe added that it appeared the EU3 was open
to delaying an IAEA decision to report Iran to the UNSC if
Iran agrees to resume negotiations and suspend enrichment of
uranium, production of plutonium, and similar activities.
Whereas the U.S. position seemed to be the IAEA MUST report
Iran to the UNSC now.


6. (C) Bekoe stated that Ghana would need to hear from Iran
before making a final decision. In particular, he wanted to
get Iran's reaction to the IAEA Director General's recent
report that there have been clear breaches of the NPT. Bekoe
agreed that it did not appear likely that Iran would resume
negotiations in good faith. He also seemed to agree that a
more likely scenario is Iran would continue to exploit
differences on the IAEA Board of Governors and try to keep
the possibility of negotiations open, just to delay the
process and avoid UNSC involvement. Nevertheless, Bekoe did
not explicitly state that the IAEA should report Iran to the
UNSC if there is Board of Governor's agreement that
negotiations are over.


7. (SBU) Professors Bekoe and Akaho expressed full support
for the establishment of an IAEA Committee on Safeguards and
Verification, and promised to provide any comments they have
during the upcoming IAEA Board of Governors meeting.

Comment
--------------

8. (C) Emboffs conveyed Ref A messages in as strong a tone as
possible. We appear to have support at the political level,
but the technical-level officials who actually represent
Ghana to the IAEA are still hedging their position, pending
further discussions in Vienna. Professors Bekoe and Akaho
certainly are fed-up with Iran actions over the last few
years, but would prefer to find a solution that continues
negotiations and holds off on taking this to the level of the
UNSC. While we expect the Ghanaian leadership now in New
York to raise this issue with Professor Bekoe, we cannot be
certain that they will instruct Bekoe to support reporting
Iran to the UNSC, or at least not prior to the IAEA Board of
Governors meeting. End Comment

LANIER