NIGERIA'S MILITARY: PART I OF THE SERIES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000953 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/RSA; INR/AA E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2015 TAGS: MCAP MASS PGOV PINR KDEM KPKO NI POLMIL SUBJECT: NIGERIA'S MILITARY: PART I OF THE SERIES REF: A. 04 ABUJA 1813 ¶B. 04 ABUJA 1997 ¶C. ABUJA 676 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.4 (B & D). ¶1. (S) Summary. Nigeria's military is the largest in West Africa, but is significantly less capable than its size and equipment inventory would indicate. A large percentage of the Army is capable of little more than basic defensive operations, and most of Nigeria's ships and aircraft are inoperable. The leadership of the military, from junior to senior levels, recognizes the role that the Armed Forces play as Nigeria's most effective national institution, and the principal one committed to its unity. We do not know as much as we would like about the attitudes and motivations of the mid-grade officers, and they have missed opportunities to be exposed to U.S. training during periods of IMET suspension. The military continues to be intensively employed, and stretched thin, with significant (and increasing) internal and external deployments. There may come a point, perhaps soon, when Nigeria's military can no longer meet all of its commitments, particularly if one or more new internal security crises erupt. The U.S. security assistance program for Nigeria, while significant, can hope to do little more than influence the direction Nigeria moves in, particularly if Nigeria continues to fail fully to commit itself to the modernization and improvement of its Armed Forces. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) This is the first in a three cable series examining the current state of the Nigerian military, and particularly its role in Nigerian politics. This cable provides a broad overview of the military, its current operations, and U.S. security assistance programs. The second cable will delve into the "nuts and bolts" of the major players in the defense establishment and the power dynamics visible to Post. The final cable will examine the question of whether the military is truly done in politics in Nigeria, and the circumstances that could trigger a renewed involvement. -------------- ORGANIZATIONAL REALITIES -------------- ¶3. (C) As a large, complex organization, the Nigerian military contains a number of contradictions, incongruities, and internal disjunctions. It is the largest, most capable military in West Africa with major foreign deployments under ECOWAS and the AU, as well as extensive UN PKO commitments. At the same time, chronic under-resourcing has led to low operational readiness, lack of training, and relatively poor conditions of service. These problems, along with endemic corruption, have made the Nigerian military somewhat of a hollow giant resting on its reputation -- more capable than any other force in the sub-region, but considerably less capable than it should be with 80,000 troops and a large stock of major weapons systems and other equipment. A high percentage of the heart of the force -- the 60,000-soldier strong Army's 25 infantry battalions -- are capable of little more than basic defensive operations. Most of Nigeria's ships and aircraft are inoperable. Of its 8 C-130s, only one is operational, and a recent USAF technical inspection revealed that even this one serviceable aircraft does not meet USAF airworthiness standards. There are six times as many general officers and flag officers in the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) and Nigerian Navy (NN) as there are operational ships and aircraft. ¶4. (S) Nevertheless, the Nigerian Armed Forces, particularly the Army, retains its role as the bulwark against Nigerian anarchy. It is the nation's one indispensable institution, committed to Nigerian unity and sovereign survival -- a role military leaders revel in and brag about. The Armed Forces is also arguably Nigeria's most effective national institution. The leadership of the Armed Forces, at the highest levels, consistently makes public statements supporting civilian control of the military, and recognizing the military's appropriate role in a democracy. The senior leadership seems to understand the penalties that would result if the military should "misbehave" again. They recognize the missed training opportunities that have resulted as the U.S. and other international partners have suspended important programs in the wake of coups and human rights abuses. Nigeria's top military leaders also frequently comment about the need to "reprofessionalize" the officer ranks. We do not know as much we would like about the attitudes of mid-grade officers, and we have had little opportunity to influence them -- they are among the lost generations who have not been able to benefit from U.S. IMET training during the years the program has been suspended. What we do know is that the Army is frequently used in internal security operations -- currently there are 10-12 battalions committed internally, including four in the Bakassi peninsula. Whenever the Army is employed in this manner, the availability for training is low and the potential for human rights violations is high. ¶5. (S) This high level of internal security operations, combined with participation in foreign peacekeeping missions, has stretched the Armed Forces thin (Ref A). However, they always seem able to find the resources for just "one more" mission. For example, they were able to come up with a battalion for Darfur in October 2004 when, on the face of it, all their battalions were fully committed, and they have now pledged an additional two battalions for Sudan (whether for Darfur or the North/South peace process is not clear yet). They are also from the "just do it" school of deployments. They were able to deploy to Darfur in mid 2004 and then in early 2005 using their own C-130s (even though one broke down during the initial operation). The Nigerians recognize that logistics and strategic lift are major weaknesses and have repeatedly expressed an interest in U.S. assistance in these areas (but have thus far taken little initiative on their own). So far, the Nigerian military has been able to take on and sustain "one more" mission, but we need to recognize that, in the end, personnel, supplies, and equipment are finite resources, and one day "one more mission" will be one too many. Given the military's significant role in quelling domestic violence, there could well be tensions in the face of competing priorities for military manpower. ¶6. (U) The Nigerian military has both suffered from and gloried in its PKO (peacekeeping operations) participation. The Nigerian military's reputation certainly took some hits in the early days of ECOMOG for its unprofessional performance. They generally fought well (with a few notable defeats),but they also looted, engaged in corruption, and committed human rights violations. The latter days of ECOMOG and ECOMIL's performance in Liberia in 2003 seem to have restored some pride in the military. The senior Nigerian military leadership seems to see participation in peacekeeping missions, especially UN operations, as a means of restoring both soldiers' pride and public confidence in the military. Current deployments include two battalions in Liberia, one battalion in Sierra Leone, and one (soon two) in Sudan. Nigeria also has military observers in Cote d'Ivoire, DROC, Western Sahara, and Darfur. President Obasanjo has mentioned the possibility of committing troops to missions in Somalia, Cote d'Ivoire, and DROC, but he has not mentioned where these soldiers would come from. Nigeria is starting to make an effort to keep units deployed outside of Nigeria on a 6 month rotation schedule and has made a commitment to make a motorized infantry battalion and a variety of combat support and logistics elements available to the ECOWAS Standby Force. -------------- Security Assistance -------------- ¶7. (C) The U.S. security assistance program in Nigeria has 4 objectives: the reprofessionalization of the military, reinforcement of the military's subordination to civilian control, improvement of Nigeria's capability to respond to regional threats and conduct peacekeeping operations, and enhancement of the military's capability to control Nigeria's borders and territorial waters, particularly as it relates to the Global War on Terrorism. Underpinning all of this, we are also working to mitigate the impact of HIV/AIDS on the Nigerian military. Until the Nigerian government makes a real and sustained commitment to modernize and improve the Armed Forces, however, the impact of U.S. assistance will be minimal. Our FMF (Foreign Military Financing) budget for Nigeria will never be enough to do more than influence the direction that Nigeria moves in. IMET and various military-to-military events will remain the best and most effective way to guard U.S. long-term security interests in Nigeria. IMET's positive impact on the military would be far greater than its relatively modest budget would suggest, were it restarted. ¶8. (SBU) Sanctions placed on Nigeria after the failure to hold anyone accountable for the 2001 massacre of civilians at Zaki-Biam were lifted in 2005, but the subsequent sanctions relating to Charles Taylor remain. These sanctions prohibit IMET training and the execution of new FMF cases. Other forms of military engagement, however, are still permitted. We are working to schedule a series of joint exercises that will enhance the capability of the Army to work in riverine areas. We are working to improve the tactical skills of the Nigerian Air Force. We are attempting to bring Nigeria into an ACOTA partnership (Ref C). We are also offering Nigeria the opportunity to participate in naval exercises, such as the West Africa Training Cruise (WATC). ¶9. (U) The U.S. funded and helps to run the only Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulator (JCATS) in sub-Saharan Africa (Ref B). This powerful simulator allows the Armed Forces to realistically plan and train for a wide variety of conventional peacekeeping and internal security operations. The JCATS program has been successful, but once it is entirely Nigerian-run in 2005, it will be difficult to sustain the current level of effectiveness due to budget constraints and the difficulty of retaining skilled and experienced Nigerian operators. There are tentative plans, however, to link continued U.S. funding of the Simulator to Nigerian support for ECOWAS Peacekeeping training. ¶10. (U) Another important area of cooperation is with the C-130 fleet. Even though we have a 7.5M USD maintenance and training program (pre-sanction FMF),we will not begin to see major improvements in the C-130 fleet until Nigeria decides to dedicate a significant amount of its own resources to conduct the maintenance. We are working with the Nigerian Air Force on a plan to reduce the size of their fleet so resources are better focused. ¶11. (U) We have an ongoing sustainment program to support the four American-provided U.S. Coast Guard buoy tenders. These boats have proven to be effective, with some small modifications, in providing security to oil platforms. The Nigerian Navy has recently taken delivery of the first 4 of 15 U.S. Coast Guard Defender-class patrol boats (a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) purchase),and the Chief of Naval Staff intends to push for the President to purchase more once these are all delivered. ¶12. (U) Nigeria has an official HIV/AIDS prevalence of about 5%, and the rate in the military is believed to be significantly higher, particularly in units that have participated in foreign peacekeeping missions. Nigeria is a PEPFAR country and the Nigerian military has proven receptive and energetic in working with the U.S. on combating HIV/AIDS. In FY05, approximately 5.5M USD will be dedicated towards combating HIV/AIDS in the military. A centerpiece of our efforts will be the start this year of a U.S. DOD/Nigerian HIV/AIDS Training Center. This will also serve as a training laboratory to allow us to expand our effort to other Nigerian military health care facilities. CAMPBELL