MOVING FORWARD ON ACOTA

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 000676 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2015 TAGS: PREL MASS MARR PHUM KPKO NI SUBJECT: MOVING FORWARD ON ACOTA REF: ABUJA 659 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.4 (B and D) ¶1. (C) Summary. In meetings with visiting USG delegation led by Gen. Wald, Dr. Courville and DASD Whelan on May 2, the GON indicated its agreement to move forward on ACOTA. Intra-GON coordination has been accomplished, at least for now, and Post recommends keeping up momentum by dispatch soonest of team or teams to work out training details with the Nigerian military. End Summary. ¶2. (C) In meetings with National Security Advisor Aliyu Mohammed, CDS Gen. Ogomudia and President Obasanjo on May 2, visiting USDel was told that Nigeria agreed to an ACOTA program. The Nigerian presentation emphasized training the trainers as an approach, and doing that training at the Peacekeeping Wing at Jaji, in coordination with ongoing British training efforts. -------------- -------------- Earlier Meeting at Defense HQ and Peacekeeping Doctrine -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) On April 22, the DATT and ODC Chief met with Major General PA Akpa, Chief of Training and Operations (Defense), at the request of Defense Headquarters (DHQ). Also in attendance were Brigadier General Hassan (Director of Peacekeeping, Army HQ),Major General Guar (DHQ),the British DATT and the British BMATT (ODC Chief equivalent). Hassan was initially concerned about ACOTA training undermining or interrupting the momentum of the Nigerian Army's development of peacekeeping doctrine, an effort that is already far along. He was eventually persuaded that Nigeria's ACOTA program would be developed in close coordination with his office and in line with the new doctrine. Hassan requested a detailed program of instruction (POI) and details of the contents of each instructional block for his review prior to the return of an ACOTA team for detailed discussions. Hassan left the meeting clearly very enthusiastic about entering an ACOTA partnership. ¶4. (C) The Chief of Defense Staff, General Ogomudia, had absented himself from any of the ACOTA meetings at DHQ. The first indication of his involvement in the decision-making process came after the April 22 meeting at DHQ when the DATT received a telephone call from Nigerian DIA saying Ogomudia had decided to accept the equipment side of ACOTA, but not the training. The DATT made clear that there would be no equipment without training, and the DIA representative said he would pass that message. The DIA representative later told the DATT that Army Chief of Staff Agwai was very upset with the activities of DHQ. -------------- Recommendation -------------- ¶5. (C) Post strongly recommends moving quickly to keep up the momentum by sending a team or teams as soon as possible to meet with the Nigerian military on ACOTA training requirements and modalities. General Ogomudia had seemed a roadblock; for now he on board. There is also a lack of basic organizational infrastructure and transmission channels in DHQ, and moving quickly on getting the planning team(s) out here will help minimize that problem as well. CAMPBELL