NIGERIA: DEMOCRACY AT THE TIPPING POINT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 002148 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, DRL, G, S/P, R E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2015 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM NI ELECTIONS SUBJECT: NIGERIA: DEMOCRACY AT THE TIPPING POINT REF: A. SECSTATE 182307 ¶B. ABUJA 2079 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i.Thomas P. Furey for reason 1.4 b &d. ¶1. (C) With the shadow of the 2007 elections looming and a democracy scorecard that is mixed at best, Nigeria finds itself at a critical tipping point. There is great concern about whether the GON has the political will to implement the political reforms needed to increase transparency and enhance the effectiveness of key electoral institutions. Failure to do so will have a negative impact on the GON's burgeoning domestic credibility gap, which is in large part a byproduct of its dismal conduct of the 1999 and 2003 elections. Lack of adequate preparation only fuels continued speculation about the intentions of Obasanjo regarding a third term. As a result, it is important for the USG to engage the GON about laying the groundwork for a credible and democratic transition process in 2007. The USG must continue and ratchet up frank discussions with the GON about the need for free and fair elections in 2007 and continue, when necessary, with critical feedback on the GON,s progress in its preparations for and execution of those elections. End summary. ¶2. (U) The following headings are keyed to the questions in reftel, paragraph 6. -------------- -------------- ¶A. Identify key areas of democratic deficit and the 3 - 5 most important desired outcomes over the next 6 - 8 months -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Democratic deficit: Nigeria,s shortcomings are well known: corruption, a weak judiciary, winner-take all politics, weak political parties, a passive electorate, an overly strong executive, no system of effective checks and balances, and ineffective electoral institutions wholly dependent on the executive branch. Taken together these deficiencies impede Nigeria's democratization efforts and raise important questions about the Obasanjo administration's priorities and intentions. ¶4. (S) Given this difficult political terrain, the Obasanjo administration's plans are of major concern. Political activity is in a holding pattern as the body politic attempts to decipher the intentions of the President (see ref B) to either exit in 2007 and to pave the way for a successor. The major concern is that although President Obasanjo is �00A;constitutionally ineligible to run for a third term, he continues to behave as if he is an incumbent candidate. He has sought to punish anyone demonstrating opposition to a potential third term bid or anyone making moves to position himself to become Nigeria's next president. This is especially true regarding his rival, Vice President Atiku Abubakar. The shrinking political space has reduced the normal pre-election politicking to a guessing game of "is he staying or is he going," creating an environment in which substantive movement on major electoral reforms has stalled and political tensions and violence are on the increase. ¶5. (S) Desired Outcomes: Given this background, the most important short term priority is getting President Obasanjo to agree publicly to leave office in 2007. Further progress flows from this simple declaration of his plans. Thus, clarity on this fundamental issue would help open the political space necessary to allow Nigeria to return to a dynamic process and begin the process of implementing the major reforms still necessary for credible elections in 2007. ¶6. (C) A second important short-term priority is to improve the functionality and credibility of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). As an appendage to the executive branch which is stacked with pro-government politicians: it has a poor track record in organizing past elections. INEC will play an important role in determining whether the 2007 elections are credible. The specific agenda of reform starts with bolstering INEC's independence and continues with improving INEC,s capacity for the technical and logistical business of organizing an election. The discussion must be initiated and completed as soon as possible in order to give INEC a chance to concentrate on the details of organizing an election including, most immediately, accurate registration of a voter,s roll for an estimated 50 million eligible voters. Post is already working with INEC through partner organization IFES, but technical assistance from the USG and other donors is not enough. Nigeria must commit to fully funding the commission (as of October INEC still had not received its 2005 budget allocation from the GON) and the GON must show the political will to enable INEC to conduct free and fair elections. ¶7. (C) The third short-term priority outcome is to focus Nigeria on quickly and decisively establishing the &rules of the game8 for the 2007 elections and avoiding lengthy debates on distractions. The National Assembly has been considering a draft electoral bill since early this year. Nigeria,s electoral rules need reform and the Assembly,s draft bill would solve some of the problems in the system while exacerbating others. However, if the new electoral rules are not established soon, they will be very difficult to implement and risk becoming too little, too late. INEC has also stated publicly that it is committed to pressing forward with an electronic voting system (EVS) for the 2007 elections. This is a controversial proposal, and there is considerable debate about the feasibility and merits of electronic voting amongst civil society and in the National Assembly. Given the time frame, costs, technical challenges and size of such a project in Nigeria, post believes that for 2007 the EVS issue is a non-starter and is little more than a "red herring" which diverts time and attention from more pressing issues. Eliminating this and any other pre-election red herrings, including pedantic discussion of the electoral reform bill, will encourage greater focus on the myriad of technical and logistical problems waiting to be solved. -------------- -------------- ¶B. Outline a six-month diplomatic and programmatic strategy to achieve the outcomes and C. Identify specific needs from the department or other parts of the USG, including resources, high-level visits, public diplomacy-related efforts, that would provide key support to accomplish these objectives. -------------- -------------- ¶8. (S) A six-month strategy aimed at affecting these outcomes should start with a policy anchored on convincing President Obasanjo to articulate his plans to step down in 2007. This policy should be communicated to President Obasanjo by the USG at the highest levels and at the earliest opportunity. A visit to Nigeria by a high level USG official with a major policy speech on democratization in Africa would be a timely and important way to communicate this important message. Other visits by official and unofficial Americans respected by President Obasanjo should reinforce the same message. ¶9. (C) This strategy could be complemented by a robust in-country public diplomacy campaign in which post clearly articulates the message that in a democracy the electoral process is more important than any individual officeholder. The USG should articulate consistent and unequivocal support for a dynamic political process which leads to credible elections for a new president in 2007. ¶10. (C) This campaign should seek to contrast the impressive African regional and continental record established by Obasanjo since 1999 with the challenge of leaving an equally impressive domestic legacy. Success in the international arena and failure in the domestic one would only tarnish the overall reputation of the Obasanjo administration. Thus, free and fair elections, credible by international and domestic standards, could make or break the president,s domestic legacy. Both public and private feedback by the USG on the Obasanjo administration's progress in implementing a free and fair 2007 election should be part of an ongoing and high-level dialogue. ¶11. (C) While it is important to start at the top in the Nigerian political context, it is also important to simultaneously work other potential levers of influence. Key targets are members of the National Assembly who are currently debating important electoral reforms and who have been called on to change the rules in order to extend the present presidential mandate. Frank, private discussions about the pace and content of the current electoral legislation, supplemented by public statements underscoring the vital role of the National Assembly in a democratic system, would reinforce the consistent theme of reform paving the way for a successful transition in 2007. ¶12. (C) Finally, the USG has to selectively provide clear feedback on the electoral process. Actions by the GON, especially those which contravene the country's laws, should be criticized. Key deficiencies such as the lack of electoral preparation, and the lack of overall credibility of key electoral institutions should also be the target of public critique. Thus, a selective strategy pointing out the most serious shortcomings in preparation for 2007 should be combined with positive messages reminding the current administration of its heavy burden of responsibility in helping create an environment that is consistent with the aspirations of the Nigerian people. -------------- -- ¶D. Impediments to progress in democratization -------------- -- ¶13. (C) In Nigeria, the major roadblock to democratization lies with the lack of political will thus far demonstrated by the Obasanjo administration. With its intentions not clearly articulated, the political environment is confused and preparations for the election of a new administration stalled. With a strong record of getting what it wants in terms of policy and legislation, it is easy to conclude that the current confusion is intentional. This is especially true regarding the continued institutional deficiencies of the national and state electoral bodies. The obvious conclusion is that by leaving election institutions weak and dependent, one will be able to manipulate them later. ¶14. (C) Ironically this pattern of behavior runs contrary to the ideals espoused by Nigeria in its official capacity as respected leader in ECOWAS, the African Union and its New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD),and the United Nations. In front of these international bodies, Nigeria has spoken out, often eloquently, in defense of democracy and the rule of law. In a sense, this pro-active strategy, in which President Obasanjo has become an important African interlocutor and symbol of African leadership, has insulated him from probing criticism about domestic shortcomings in Nigeria's implementation of these same ideals. As a result, African and European leaders most likely to be able to influence Nigeria's haphazard implementation of democracy are probably reluctant, primarily because of its importance in regional and international issues. -------------- -------------- ¶E. Identify Other Countries, Organizations or Groups with significant impact -------------- -------------- ¶15. (S) President Obasanjo is most influenced by the opinions of other leaders whom he considers to be his peers on the world stage. He is concerned about his legacy. U.S. and European leaders are most likely to have some sway over his decision regarding whether or not to remain in office beyond 2007 and how well his administration will conduct the 2007 elections. Within Nigeria, the two groups most likely to have an impact on these matters are the National Assembly, who need to pass any constitutional changes enabling a 3rd term, and the judiciary, who play a vital role in enforcing the constitution and the electoral rules. However, the weak judiciary has failed to adequately play this role in past elections. We should also remember the potential impact of Nigeria,s largely passive electorate. If this &sleeping giant8 is roused to action, most likely by a political/economic crisis, the power of 150 million people could be channeled to advocate for democratic change. -------------- -------------- ¶F. Identify key areas of democracy promotion supported by host government. Identify areas in which host government policies run contrary to USG goals -------------- -------------- ¶16. (C) Nigeria largely has in place the necessary democratic structures, laws, and institutions and there are no overt government policies which would impede our pursuit of democracy promotion. However, poor implementation and lack of political will often cause these institutions and structures to underperform. Nigeria is making some efforts to attack root problems such as corruption and to improve transparency, especially through institutions like the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC),Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC),and through their participation in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI),although to date the efforts are perceived to be focused on the President's political enemies. These initiatives need to continue and to be applied more widely and vigorously. -------------- ¶G. Evaluate the consequences of this policy -------------- ¶17. (U) The USG's relationship with Nigeria is based on mutual need and respect. Nigeria provides critical support for USG policies in Africa, through leadership on important political issues and especially by providing peacekeepers for trouble spots around the continent. As a country with major international aspirations, Nigeria is likely to continue these activities in lines with its own view of its role on the world stage. ¶18. (C) Implementation of a proactive policy does run the short-term risk of alienating the Obasanjo administration. With the political stakes for 2007 high, and a sense that the USG has formed a unique and interdependent relationship with the Obasanjo administration, he could view public criticism of Nigeria's democratic deficiencies as a lack of appreciation for his efforts in moving Nigeria forward on issues such as corruption and therefore alienate him at the end of his mandate. ¶19. (C) However, an equally sizable risk is that lack of action in taking a stand about Nigeria's democratic deficiencies will risk alienating both Obasanjo's successor and the Nigerian people. With the potential for violence particularly high in a confused and manipulated transition, failure by the USG to take a clear stand in support of basic democratic principles risks creating greater long-term problems. Ultimately in Nigeria, as elsewhere, the process is more important than any one individual. Building policy on this basic pillar, while not without risks, will in the long-term pay the best dividends both in terms of the process of democratization as well as long-term stability. FUREY