Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ABUDHABI833
2005-02-22 12:15:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:
G/TIP VISIT TO UAE INFORMATIVE BUT DISAPPOINTING
null Diana T Fritz 12/06/2006 02:51:17 PM From DB/Inbox: Search Results Cable Text: UNCLAS ABU DHABI 00833 SIPDIS CXABU: ACTION: POL INFO: DCM MEPI P/M ECON RSO AMB DISSEMINATION: POL CHARGE: PROG APPROVED: AMB:MJSISON DRAFTED: POL:SKRADDANT CLEARED: DCM:RALBRIGHT POL:JMAYBURY CG:JDAVIS VZCZCADI491 RR RUEHC RUEHZM RUEHBJ RUEHDO RUEHMS RUEHRH RUEHDE DE RUEHAD #0833/01 0531215 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 221215Z FEB 05 FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8323 INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0136 RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 1122 RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0386 RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 1420 RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 4863
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 000833
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
STATE FOR G/TIP, INL, DRL, NEA/RA, AND NEA/ARPI
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ELAB ETRD PHUM PREL TC
SUBJECT: G/TIP VISIT TO UAE INFORMATIVE BUT DISAPPOINTING
REF: A) ABU DHABI 663 B) ABU DHABI 507 C) ABU DHABI
353 D) ABU DHABI 296 E) 04 ABU DHABI 4237
F) MUSCAT 209
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 000833
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
STATE FOR G/TIP, INL, DRL, NEA/RA, AND NEA/ARPI
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ELAB ETRD PHUM PREL TC
SUBJECT: G/TIP VISIT TO UAE INFORMATIVE BUT DISAPPOINTING
REF: A) ABU DHABI 663 B) ABU DHABI 507 C) ABU DHABI
353 D) ABU DHABI 296 E) 04 ABU DHABI 4237
F) MUSCAT 209
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. G/TIP Senior Coordinator for Reports Mark
Taylor visited the UAE February 5-8 to update information for
the 2005 Trafficking in Persons Report. High ranking UAEG
officials assured him of their ongoing commitment to
combating all forms of human trafficking. (Note: On February
13, a senior UAEG official suggested to Ambassador that Abu
Dhabi could impose financial penalties against the
financially dependent northern emirates if they did not cut
the use of underage camel jockeys (ref. A). End note.)
Despite the stated political commitment of Abu Dhabi
leadership to eliminate the use of underage camel jockeys by
this summer (refs. A, B, C and D),G/TIP visitor and Post,s
TIP Officer found that the abuse of underage camel jockeys
and sex trafficking incidents has persisted since G/TIP,s
visits in February 2004 and December 2004.
2. (SBU) SUMMARY CONTINUED: G/TIP and Poloff witnessed dozens
of young, foreign boys being used to train and race camels,
and hundreds of women, some of whom are likely trafficking
victims, openly working as prostitutes on the streets and in
the clubs of Dubai. A senior officer with the Dubai police
commented that law enforcement officials UAE-wide have never
viewed the September 2002 camel jockey ban as legally
enforceable. After the visit, UAEG officials hesitantly
agreed that the ban had not proved enforceable, and described
this as the principal reason why the UAEG was pressing ahead
with a federal law to criminalize human trafficking. They
stated the law would be passed by April 2005. In a separate
meeting prior to the visit, Interior Minister Sheikh Saif
told the Ambassador that the UAEG will implement &big
changes8 this year (ref. B). END SUMMARY.
-------------- -
UAEG OFFICIALS CONVEY ONGOING ANTI-TIP SUPPORT
-------------- -
3. (SBU) Amb. Tareq Al Haidan, MFA Assistant U/S for
Political Affairs, and Col. Nasser Al Noaimi, Office Director
for the Minister of Interior, offered G/TIP visitor
assurances of their ongoing commitment to fight human
trafficking on UAE soil, and stated that the use of young
foreign children as camel jockeys was declining. G/TIP and
Poloff witnessed on three occasions the use of very young
children, some estimated to be as young as three years old,
during training sessions and at a race at Nad Al Sheba camel
racetrack in Dubai. On one occasion, G/TIP and Poloff were
refused entry to the racetrack, on the orders of the director
of the Camel Racing Federation, despite the fact that the
race was open to the public. The guard at the entrance was
aware that G/TIP and Poloff were in a U.S. diplomatic vehicle
and were attempting to investigate the child camel jockey
issue. The guard stated that this factored into the
director,s decision to bar us from the race, saying that
&no American diplomats (were) allowed in.8
4. (SBU) G/TIP was also refused entry to the Dubai
Immigration Detention Center by the deputy director of the
center, where he wanted to talk to potential sex trafficking
victims awaiting deportation. The ostensible reason was a
lack of prior coordination. In reality, the refusal came
despite several requests by the Embassy through proper
diplomatic channels, and promises by officials from the
Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs that the meeting
would occur.
5. (SBU) G/TIP was very impressed, however, with the child
camel jockey shelter and rehabilitation center in Abu Dhabi
Emirate, and encouraged officials to increase the number of
boys rescued from farms and sheltered there. Shelter
managers stated that the facility can hold up to 400 boys.
Currently, about 25 boys are housed there. G/TIP advised a
Ministry of Interior official to consider implementing one or
more major steps to show genuine commitment to fighting the
human trafficking problem, such as passage of the camel
jockey law, rescuing a large number of trafficking victims
and prosecuting their traffickers, preferably before the
March 31 end of the TIP reporting period, and/or allowing the
International Organization for Migration (IOM) to open an
office here. G/TIP also urged MFA and police officials to
engage with the IOM with the goal of establishing a formal
IOM anti-TIP program in the UAE. This would greatly help
police and immigration officials with the difficult tasks of
victim identification, interviewing, victim care, and
repatriation. G/TIP participated in a teleconference with
IOM Kuwait,s Chief of Mission, Muhammed Al Nassery, to
discuss the IOM,s next steps in advancing the IOM/UAE
relationship.
-------------- -
DUBAI POLICE ADMIT 2002 BAN HAS NO LEGAL TEETH
-------------- -
6. (SBU) During a meeting at the Dubai police headquarters,
the Commandant General of the Dubai Police Force, Lt. Gen.
Dhahi Khalfan Al Tamim, bluntly told G/TIP, CG and Poloff
that that law enforcement officials in all seven emirates
have never viewed the September 2002 presidential decree
banning the use of underage foreign camel jockeys as legally
enforceable. (Comment: This statement confirmed the obvious
) that the ban was not working and that stronger measures
were necessary. End comment.) Al Tamim said that, unless a
child is injured while racing and hospitalized, or another
crime is committed and police learn of the offense, law
enforcement officers have no authority to rescue children
from racetracks or farms. Al Tamim mentioned that he had
tried to meet with the director of the Camel Racing
Federation to discuss the issue in the past, however, the
Federation director declined to meet with him. Al Tamim
pointed out that not one case had been prosecuted under the
2002 ban. Before the visit, Abu Dhabi leadership assured us
that it was for this reason that the UAEG planned to codify
the ban into new legislation.
7. (SBU) Al Tamim also stated that, unlike all other emirates
(particularly emphasizing Abu Dhabi Emirate),Dubai makes no
efforts to &hide8 its ongoing use of child camel jockeys,
which he expected would continue until a law forbidding the
practice is passed. (Note: Several officials, including the
Minister of Interior Sheikh Saif, have told us in the past
that the UAEG would codify the ban into legislation that
would be enacted by April 2005, see refs. B and C. However,
during this visit, Sheikh Saif,s media consultant would not
confirm that timeline, stating instead that the ban would
become a law &soon8 and would be enforced by the beginning
of the next camel racing season in Fall 2005. End note.) Al
Tamim also alleged that other emirates, particularly Abu
Dhabi, were moving large numbers of child camel jockeys
deeper into the desert and to neighboring countries,
including Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, to &hide8 them
until public attention on the issue died down. (Note: This
statement tracks with allegations made by Pakistani human
rights activist Ansar Burney over the past few months.
However, it does not track with Embassy Muscat reporting,
which reported no evidence of camel jockeys being brought
from the UAE into Oman at a recent race near the border, see
ref. F. End note.) Al Tamim said that Dubai officials
disagree with this practice, and will continue to address the
problem overtly. He recommended that the USG strongly lobby
Dubai Crown Prince Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum and Abu
Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan for passage
and enforcement of the camel jockey law.
8. (SBU) After elaborating on the conflict between Abu Dhabi
and Dubai emirates on the camel jockey issue, the Minister of
Interior,s media consultant and assistant to Al Noaimi,
Issam Azouri, confirmed the validity of Al Tamim,s statement
that law enforcement officials do not regard the ban as
legally enforceable. He also confirmed that the Camel Racing
Federation and a number of powerful sheikhs were resisting
federal efforts to end the use of children as camel jockeys.
However, he pointed out other measures being taken to address
the issue pending the passage of the new camel jockey law,
including DNA testing, the iris recognition system, and the
opening of the new camel jockey shelter. He avowed that the
new law would eliminate all future use of foreign children as
camel jockeys. (Note: Two key Embassy interlocutors )
Yousef Al Otaiba, Special Advisor to the Abu Dhabi Crown
Prince, and Amb. Abdullah Rashid Al Noaimi, MFA U/S ) have
identified Dubai Deputy Ruler Sheikh Hamdan bin Rashid Al
Maktoum as the chief obstacle to change. End note.)
--------------
SEX TRAFFICKING ISSUE
--------------
9. (SBU) Dubai police chief Al Tamim stated that, although a
specific anti-TIP law does not exist, Dubai police and public
prosecutors do arrest and prosecute human traffickers, citing
three cases just the previous week. He said the problem was
that traffickers often use false names and work through
legitimate travel agencies to acquire visas for victims,
which makes it difficult to locate them. He also said that
very few victims cooperate with investigators, which makes
locating their traffickers nearly impossible. Al Tamim said
that police are building relationships with source country
diplomatic missions and law enforcement agencies, and will
increase efforts to do so. At the same time, he complained
that some source country embassies and consulates were not
helpful to police and were reluctant to assist their own
citizens. He opined that the sex trafficking problem seemed
to be growing, especially among the Chinese population, and
he wished that source countries would do more to try to stop
their own citizens from trafficking people here.
10. (SBU) Dr. Mohammed Al Murr, the Director of the Dubai
Police,s Human Rights Care Department, explained that
victims, once identified, are housed in hotels rather than
prisons, and are given financial support and employment
opportunities while investigations and trials are underway.
(Note: While victims are afforded care once &identified,8
as Al Murr states, this identification relies almost
exclusively on the willingness of a victim to take the
initiative in filing a complaint against a trafficker. UAE
police and immigration authorities have yet to devise and
adopt an effective method to screen and identify real or
potential TIP victims at ports of entry or after arrests
unless they comes forward on their own, which rarely happens.
End note.) Al Murr and Al Tamim confirmed that they do not
keep records of trafficking cases per se and/or efforts to
prosecute traffickers, and were not able to state how many
trafficking victims they assisted in 2004.
--------------
COMMENT
--------------
11. (SBU) Although G/TIP and Poloff witnessed the persistence
of the UAE,s human trafficking problem since G/TIP,s two
visits in 2004, top UAE leaders, including the Crown Princes
of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the Minister of Interior, and the MFA
U/S, have voiced commitment over the past four months to
eradicate human trafficking. The October 2004 airing of an
HBO &Real Sports8 program that highlighted the continued
exploitation of trafficked foreign children as camel jockeys
has had a galvanizing effect. Since the program, UAEG
officials have been working closely with Pakistani human
rights activist Ansar Burney, who was prominently featured in
the show, to help rescue children and combat future use of
child camel jockeys. MFA U/S Abdullah Rashid Al Noaimi told
us on February 13 that the federal government welcomes this
kind of publicity because it helps increase the pressure on
other emirates that are resisting taking action.
12. (SBU) In December 2004, the UAEG transferred
responsibility for addressing the human trafficking issue
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of
Interior. This move was beneficial, as the new Interior
Minister Sheikh Saif, appointed in November, has taken a
strong interest in addressing trafficking issues. Interior
will be responsible for enforcing the camel jockey law, once
passed, in addition to caring for sex trafficking victims and
helping Ministry of Justice officials prosecute traffickers.
However, leadership from all emirates will have to resolve
their conflicts over the use of young boys as camel jockeys
to enact and implement new legislation banning the practice.
SISON
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
STATE FOR G/TIP, INL, DRL, NEA/RA, AND NEA/ARPI
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ELAB ETRD PHUM PREL TC
SUBJECT: G/TIP VISIT TO UAE INFORMATIVE BUT DISAPPOINTING
REF: A) ABU DHABI 663 B) ABU DHABI 507 C) ABU DHABI
353 D) ABU DHABI 296 E) 04 ABU DHABI 4237
F) MUSCAT 209
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. G/TIP Senior Coordinator for Reports Mark
Taylor visited the UAE February 5-8 to update information for
the 2005 Trafficking in Persons Report. High ranking UAEG
officials assured him of their ongoing commitment to
combating all forms of human trafficking. (Note: On February
13, a senior UAEG official suggested to Ambassador that Abu
Dhabi could impose financial penalties against the
financially dependent northern emirates if they did not cut
the use of underage camel jockeys (ref. A). End note.)
Despite the stated political commitment of Abu Dhabi
leadership to eliminate the use of underage camel jockeys by
this summer (refs. A, B, C and D),G/TIP visitor and Post,s
TIP Officer found that the abuse of underage camel jockeys
and sex trafficking incidents has persisted since G/TIP,s
visits in February 2004 and December 2004.
2. (SBU) SUMMARY CONTINUED: G/TIP and Poloff witnessed dozens
of young, foreign boys being used to train and race camels,
and hundreds of women, some of whom are likely trafficking
victims, openly working as prostitutes on the streets and in
the clubs of Dubai. A senior officer with the Dubai police
commented that law enforcement officials UAE-wide have never
viewed the September 2002 camel jockey ban as legally
enforceable. After the visit, UAEG officials hesitantly
agreed that the ban had not proved enforceable, and described
this as the principal reason why the UAEG was pressing ahead
with a federal law to criminalize human trafficking. They
stated the law would be passed by April 2005. In a separate
meeting prior to the visit, Interior Minister Sheikh Saif
told the Ambassador that the UAEG will implement &big
changes8 this year (ref. B). END SUMMARY.
-------------- -
UAEG OFFICIALS CONVEY ONGOING ANTI-TIP SUPPORT
-------------- -
3. (SBU) Amb. Tareq Al Haidan, MFA Assistant U/S for
Political Affairs, and Col. Nasser Al Noaimi, Office Director
for the Minister of Interior, offered G/TIP visitor
assurances of their ongoing commitment to fight human
trafficking on UAE soil, and stated that the use of young
foreign children as camel jockeys was declining. G/TIP and
Poloff witnessed on three occasions the use of very young
children, some estimated to be as young as three years old,
during training sessions and at a race at Nad Al Sheba camel
racetrack in Dubai. On one occasion, G/TIP and Poloff were
refused entry to the racetrack, on the orders of the director
of the Camel Racing Federation, despite the fact that the
race was open to the public. The guard at the entrance was
aware that G/TIP and Poloff were in a U.S. diplomatic vehicle
and were attempting to investigate the child camel jockey
issue. The guard stated that this factored into the
director,s decision to bar us from the race, saying that
&no American diplomats (were) allowed in.8
4. (SBU) G/TIP was also refused entry to the Dubai
Immigration Detention Center by the deputy director of the
center, where he wanted to talk to potential sex trafficking
victims awaiting deportation. The ostensible reason was a
lack of prior coordination. In reality, the refusal came
despite several requests by the Embassy through proper
diplomatic channels, and promises by officials from the
Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs that the meeting
would occur.
5. (SBU) G/TIP was very impressed, however, with the child
camel jockey shelter and rehabilitation center in Abu Dhabi
Emirate, and encouraged officials to increase the number of
boys rescued from farms and sheltered there. Shelter
managers stated that the facility can hold up to 400 boys.
Currently, about 25 boys are housed there. G/TIP advised a
Ministry of Interior official to consider implementing one or
more major steps to show genuine commitment to fighting the
human trafficking problem, such as passage of the camel
jockey law, rescuing a large number of trafficking victims
and prosecuting their traffickers, preferably before the
March 31 end of the TIP reporting period, and/or allowing the
International Organization for Migration (IOM) to open an
office here. G/TIP also urged MFA and police officials to
engage with the IOM with the goal of establishing a formal
IOM anti-TIP program in the UAE. This would greatly help
police and immigration officials with the difficult tasks of
victim identification, interviewing, victim care, and
repatriation. G/TIP participated in a teleconference with
IOM Kuwait,s Chief of Mission, Muhammed Al Nassery, to
discuss the IOM,s next steps in advancing the IOM/UAE
relationship.
-------------- -
DUBAI POLICE ADMIT 2002 BAN HAS NO LEGAL TEETH
-------------- -
6. (SBU) During a meeting at the Dubai police headquarters,
the Commandant General of the Dubai Police Force, Lt. Gen.
Dhahi Khalfan Al Tamim, bluntly told G/TIP, CG and Poloff
that that law enforcement officials in all seven emirates
have never viewed the September 2002 presidential decree
banning the use of underage foreign camel jockeys as legally
enforceable. (Comment: This statement confirmed the obvious
) that the ban was not working and that stronger measures
were necessary. End comment.) Al Tamim said that, unless a
child is injured while racing and hospitalized, or another
crime is committed and police learn of the offense, law
enforcement officers have no authority to rescue children
from racetracks or farms. Al Tamim mentioned that he had
tried to meet with the director of the Camel Racing
Federation to discuss the issue in the past, however, the
Federation director declined to meet with him. Al Tamim
pointed out that not one case had been prosecuted under the
2002 ban. Before the visit, Abu Dhabi leadership assured us
that it was for this reason that the UAEG planned to codify
the ban into new legislation.
7. (SBU) Al Tamim also stated that, unlike all other emirates
(particularly emphasizing Abu Dhabi Emirate),Dubai makes no
efforts to &hide8 its ongoing use of child camel jockeys,
which he expected would continue until a law forbidding the
practice is passed. (Note: Several officials, including the
Minister of Interior Sheikh Saif, have told us in the past
that the UAEG would codify the ban into legislation that
would be enacted by April 2005, see refs. B and C. However,
during this visit, Sheikh Saif,s media consultant would not
confirm that timeline, stating instead that the ban would
become a law &soon8 and would be enforced by the beginning
of the next camel racing season in Fall 2005. End note.) Al
Tamim also alleged that other emirates, particularly Abu
Dhabi, were moving large numbers of child camel jockeys
deeper into the desert and to neighboring countries,
including Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, to &hide8 them
until public attention on the issue died down. (Note: This
statement tracks with allegations made by Pakistani human
rights activist Ansar Burney over the past few months.
However, it does not track with Embassy Muscat reporting,
which reported no evidence of camel jockeys being brought
from the UAE into Oman at a recent race near the border, see
ref. F. End note.) Al Tamim said that Dubai officials
disagree with this practice, and will continue to address the
problem overtly. He recommended that the USG strongly lobby
Dubai Crown Prince Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum and Abu
Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan for passage
and enforcement of the camel jockey law.
8. (SBU) After elaborating on the conflict between Abu Dhabi
and Dubai emirates on the camel jockey issue, the Minister of
Interior,s media consultant and assistant to Al Noaimi,
Issam Azouri, confirmed the validity of Al Tamim,s statement
that law enforcement officials do not regard the ban as
legally enforceable. He also confirmed that the Camel Racing
Federation and a number of powerful sheikhs were resisting
federal efforts to end the use of children as camel jockeys.
However, he pointed out other measures being taken to address
the issue pending the passage of the new camel jockey law,
including DNA testing, the iris recognition system, and the
opening of the new camel jockey shelter. He avowed that the
new law would eliminate all future use of foreign children as
camel jockeys. (Note: Two key Embassy interlocutors )
Yousef Al Otaiba, Special Advisor to the Abu Dhabi Crown
Prince, and Amb. Abdullah Rashid Al Noaimi, MFA U/S ) have
identified Dubai Deputy Ruler Sheikh Hamdan bin Rashid Al
Maktoum as the chief obstacle to change. End note.)
--------------
SEX TRAFFICKING ISSUE
--------------
9. (SBU) Dubai police chief Al Tamim stated that, although a
specific anti-TIP law does not exist, Dubai police and public
prosecutors do arrest and prosecute human traffickers, citing
three cases just the previous week. He said the problem was
that traffickers often use false names and work through
legitimate travel agencies to acquire visas for victims,
which makes it difficult to locate them. He also said that
very few victims cooperate with investigators, which makes
locating their traffickers nearly impossible. Al Tamim said
that police are building relationships with source country
diplomatic missions and law enforcement agencies, and will
increase efforts to do so. At the same time, he complained
that some source country embassies and consulates were not
helpful to police and were reluctant to assist their own
citizens. He opined that the sex trafficking problem seemed
to be growing, especially among the Chinese population, and
he wished that source countries would do more to try to stop
their own citizens from trafficking people here.
10. (SBU) Dr. Mohammed Al Murr, the Director of the Dubai
Police,s Human Rights Care Department, explained that
victims, once identified, are housed in hotels rather than
prisons, and are given financial support and employment
opportunities while investigations and trials are underway.
(Note: While victims are afforded care once &identified,8
as Al Murr states, this identification relies almost
exclusively on the willingness of a victim to take the
initiative in filing a complaint against a trafficker. UAE
police and immigration authorities have yet to devise and
adopt an effective method to screen and identify real or
potential TIP victims at ports of entry or after arrests
unless they comes forward on their own, which rarely happens.
End note.) Al Murr and Al Tamim confirmed that they do not
keep records of trafficking cases per se and/or efforts to
prosecute traffickers, and were not able to state how many
trafficking victims they assisted in 2004.
--------------
COMMENT
--------------
11. (SBU) Although G/TIP and Poloff witnessed the persistence
of the UAE,s human trafficking problem since G/TIP,s two
visits in 2004, top UAE leaders, including the Crown Princes
of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the Minister of Interior, and the MFA
U/S, have voiced commitment over the past four months to
eradicate human trafficking. The October 2004 airing of an
HBO &Real Sports8 program that highlighted the continued
exploitation of trafficked foreign children as camel jockeys
has had a galvanizing effect. Since the program, UAEG
officials have been working closely with Pakistani human
rights activist Ansar Burney, who was prominently featured in
the show, to help rescue children and combat future use of
child camel jockeys. MFA U/S Abdullah Rashid Al Noaimi told
us on February 13 that the federal government welcomes this
kind of publicity because it helps increase the pressure on
other emirates that are resisting taking action.
12. (SBU) In December 2004, the UAEG transferred
responsibility for addressing the human trafficking issue
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of
Interior. This move was beneficial, as the new Interior
Minister Sheikh Saif, appointed in November, has taken a
strong interest in addressing trafficking issues. Interior
will be responsible for enforcing the camel jockey law, once
passed, in addition to caring for sex trafficking victims and
helping Ministry of Justice officials prosecute traffickers.
However, leadership from all emirates will have to resolve
their conflicts over the use of young boys as camel jockeys
to enact and implement new legislation banning the practice.
SISON