Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ABUDHABI833
2005-02-22 12:15:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

G/TIP VISIT TO UAE INFORMATIVE BUT DISAPPOINTING

Tags:  ELAB ETRD PHUM PREL TC 
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Diana T Fritz 12/06/2006 02:51:17 PM From DB/Inbox: Search Results

Cable 
Text: 
 
 
UNCLAS ABU DHABI 00833

SIPDIS
CXABU:
 ACTION: POL
 INFO: DCM MEPI P/M ECON RSO AMB

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:MJSISON
DRAFTED: POL:SKRADDANT
CLEARED: DCM:RALBRIGHT POL:JMAYBURY CG:JDAVIS

VZCZCADI491
RR RUEHC RUEHZM RUEHBJ RUEHDO RUEHMS RUEHRH
RUEHDE
DE RUEHAD #0833/01 0531215
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 221215Z FEB 05
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8323
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0136
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 1122
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0386
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 1420
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 4863
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 000833 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

STATE FOR G/TIP, INL, DRL, NEA/RA, AND NEA/ARPI

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ELAB ETRD PHUM PREL TC
SUBJECT: G/TIP VISIT TO UAE INFORMATIVE BUT DISAPPOINTING

REF: A) ABU DHABI 663 B) ABU DHABI 507 C) ABU DHABI

353 D) ABU DHABI 296 E) 04 ABU DHABI 4237
F) MUSCAT 209

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 000833 SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR G/TIP, INL, DRL, NEA/RA, AND NEA/ARPI E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ELAB ETRD PHUM PREL TC SUBJECT: G/TIP VISIT TO UAE INFORMATIVE BUT DISAPPOINTING REF: A) ABU DHABI 663 B) ABU DHABI 507 C) ABU DHABI 353 D) ABU DHABI 296 E) 04 ABU DHABI 4237 F) MUSCAT 209 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. G/TIP Senior Coordinator for Reports Mark Taylor visited the UAE February 5-8 to update information for the 2005 Trafficking in Persons Report. High ranking UAEG officials assured him of their ongoing commitment to combating all forms of human trafficking. (Note: On February 13, a senior UAEG official suggested to Ambassador that Abu Dhabi could impose financial penalties against the financially dependent northern emirates if they did not cut the use of underage camel jockeys (ref. A). End note.) Despite the stated political commitment of Abu Dhabi leadership to eliminate the use of underage camel jockeys by this summer (refs. A, B, C and D),G/TIP visitor and Post,s TIP Officer found that the abuse of underage camel jockeys and sex trafficking incidents has persisted since G/TIP,s visits in February 2004 and December 2004. ¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY CONTINUED: G/TIP and Poloff witnessed dozens of young, foreign boys being used to train and race camels, and hundreds of women, some of whom are likely trafficking victims, openly working as prostitutes on the streets and in the clubs of Dubai. A senior officer with the Dubai police commented that law enforcement officials UAE-wide have never viewed the September 2002 camel jockey ban as legally enforceable. After the visit, UAEG officials hesitantly agreed that the ban had not proved enforceable, and described this as the principal reason why the UAEG was pressing ahead with a federal law to criminalize human trafficking. They stated the law would be passed by April 2005. In a separate meeting prior to the visit, Interior Minister Sheikh Saif told the Ambassador that the UAEG will implement &big changes8 this year (ref. B). END SUMMARY. -------------- - UAEG OFFICIALS CONVEY ONGOING ANTI-TIP SUPPORT -------------- - ¶3. (SBU) Amb. Tareq Al Haidan, MFA Assistant U/S for Political Affairs, and Col. Nasser Al Noaimi, Office Director for the Minister of Interior, offered G/TIP visitor assurances of their ongoing commitment to fight human trafficking on UAE soil, and stated that the use of young foreign children as camel jockeys was declining. G/TIP and Poloff witnessed on three occ
asions the use of very young children, some estimated to be as young as three years old, during training sessions and at a race at Nad Al Sheba camel racetrack in Dubai. On one occasion, G/TIP and Poloff were refused entry to the racetrack, on the orders of the director of the Camel Racing Federation, despite the fact that the race was open to the public. The guard at the entrance was aware that G/TIP and Poloff were in a U.S. diplomatic vehicle and were attempting to investigate the child camel jockey issue. The guard stated that this factored into the director,s decision to bar us from the race, saying that &no American diplomats (were) allowed in.8 ¶4. (SBU) G/TIP was also refused entry to the Dubai Immigration Detention Center by the deputy director of the center, where he wanted to talk to potential sex trafficking victims awaiting deportation. The ostensible reason was a lack of prior coordination. In reality, the refusal came despite several requests by the Embassy through proper diplomatic channels, and promises by officials from the Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs that the meeting would occur. ¶5. (SBU) G/TIP was very impressed, however, with the child camel jockey shelter and rehabilitation center in Abu Dhabi Emirate, and encouraged officials to increase the number of boys rescued from farms and sheltered there. Shelter managers stated that the facility can hold up to 400 boys. Currently, about 25 boys are housed there. G/TIP advised a Ministry of Interior official to consider implementing one or more major steps to show genuine commitment to fighting the human trafficking problem, such as passage of the camel jockey law, rescuing a large number of trafficking victims and prosecuting their traffickers, preferably before the March 31 end of the TIP reporting period, and/or allowing the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to open an office here. G/TIP also urged MFA and police officials to engage with the IOM with the goal of establishing a formal IOM anti-TIP program in the UAE. This would greatly help police and immigration officials with the difficult tasks of victim identification, interviewing, victim care, and repatriation. G/TIP participated in a teleconference with IOM Kuwait,s Chief of Mission, Muhammed Al Nassery, to discuss the IOM,s next steps in advancing the IOM/UAE relationship. -------------- - DUBAI POLICE ADMIT 2002 BAN HAS NO LEGAL TEETH -------------- - ¶6. (SBU) During a meeting at the Dubai police headquarters, the Commandant General of the Dubai Police Force, Lt. Gen. Dhahi Khalfan Al Tamim, bluntly told G/TIP, CG and Poloff that that law enforcement officials in all seven emirates have never viewed the September 2002 presidential decree banning the use of underage foreign camel jockeys as legally enforceable. (Comment: This statement confirmed the obvious ) that the ban was not working and that stronger measures were necessary. End comment.) Al Tamim said that, unless a child is injured while racing and hospitalized, or another crime is committed and police learn of the offense, law enforcement officers have no authority to rescue children from racetracks or farms. Al Tamim mentioned that he had tried to meet with the director of the Camel Racing Federation to discuss the issue in the past, however, the Federation director declined to meet with him. Al Tamim pointed out that not one case had been prosecuted under the 2002 ban. Before the visit, Abu Dhabi leadership assured us that it was for this reason that the UAEG planned to codify the ban into new legislation. ¶7. (SBU) Al Tamim also stated that, unlike all other emirates (particularly emphasizing Abu Dhabi Emirate),Dubai makes no efforts to &hide8 its ongoing use of child camel jockeys, which he expected would continue until a law forbidding the practice is passed. (Note: Several officials, including the Minister of Interior Sheikh Saif, have told us in the past that the UAEG would codify the ban into legislation that would be enacted by April 2005, see refs. B and C. However, during this visit, Sheikh Saif,s media consultant would not confirm that timeline, stating instead that the ban would become a law &soon8 and would be enforced by the beginning of the next camel racing season in Fall 2005. End note.) Al Tamim also alleged that other emirates, particularly Abu Dhabi, were moving large numbers of child camel jockeys deeper into the desert and to neighboring countries, including Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, to &hide8 them until public attention on the issue died down. (Note: This statement tracks with allegations made by Pakistani human rights activist Ansar Burney over the past few months. However, it does not track with Embassy Muscat reporting, which reported no evidence of camel jockeys being brought from the UAE into Oman at a recent race near the border, see ref. F. End note.) Al Tamim said that Dubai officials disagree with this practice, and will continue to address the problem overtly. He recommended that the USG strongly lobby Dubai Crown Prince Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum and Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan for passage and enforcement of the camel jockey law. ¶8. (SBU) After elaborating on the conflict between Abu Dhabi and Dubai emirates on the camel jockey issue, the Minister of Interior,s media consultant and assistant to Al Noaimi, Issam Azouri, confirmed the validity of Al Tamim,s statement that law enforcement officials do not regard the ban as legally enforceable. He also confirmed that the Camel Racing Federation and a number of powerful sheikhs were resisting federal efforts to end the use of children as camel jockeys. However, he pointed out other measures being taken to address the issue pending the passage of the new camel jockey law, including DNA testing, the iris recognition system, and the opening of the new camel jockey shelter. He avowed that the new law would eliminate all future use of foreign children as camel jockeys. (Note: Two key Embassy interlocutors ) Yousef Al Otaiba, Special Advisor to the Abu Dhabi Crown Prince, and Amb. Abdullah Rashid Al Noaimi, MFA U/S ) have identified Dubai Deputy Ruler Sheikh Hamdan bin Rashid Al Maktoum as the chief obstacle to change. End note.) -------------- SEX TRAFFICKING ISSUE -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Dubai police chief Al Tamim stated that, although a specific anti-TIP law does not exist, Dubai police and public prosecutors do arrest and prosecute human traffickers, citing three cases just the previous week. He said the problem was that traffickers often use false names and work through legitimate travel agencies to acquire visas for victims, which makes it difficult to locate them. He also said that very few victims cooperate with investigators, which makes locating their traffickers nearly impossible. Al Tamim said that police are building relationships with source country diplomatic missions and law enforcement agencies, and will increase efforts to do so. At the same time, he complained that some source country embassies and consulates were not helpful to police and were reluctant to assist their own citizens. He opined that the sex trafficking problem seemed to be growing, especially among the Chinese population, and he wished that source countries would do more to try to stop their own citizens from trafficking people here. ¶10. (SBU) Dr. Mohammed Al Murr, the Director of the Dubai Police,s Human Rights Care Department, explained that victims, once identified, are housed in hotels rather than prisons, and are given financial support and employment opportunities while investigations and trials are underway. (Note: While victims are afforded care once &identified,8 as Al Murr states, this identification relies almost exclusively on the willingness of a victim to take the initiative in filing a complaint against a trafficker. UAE police and immigration authorities have yet to devise and adopt an effective method to screen and identify real or potential TIP victims at ports of entry or after arrests unless they comes forward on their own, which rarely happens. End note.) Al Murr and Al Tamim confirmed that they do not keep records of trafficking cases per se and/or efforts to prosecute traffickers, and were not able to state how many trafficking victims they assisted in 2004. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Although G/TIP and Poloff witnessed the persistence of the UAE,s human trafficking problem since G/TIP,s two visits in 2004, top UAE leaders, including the Crown Princes of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the Minister of Interior, and the MFA U/S, have voiced commitment over the past four months to eradicate human trafficking. The October 2004 airing of an HBO &Real Sports8 program that highlighted the continued exploitation of trafficked foreign children as camel jockeys has had a galvanizing effect. Since the program, UAEG officials have been working closely with Pakistani human rights activist Ansar Burney, who was prominently featured in the show, to help rescue children and combat future use of child camel jockeys. MFA U/S Abdullah Rashid Al Noaimi told us on February 13 that the federal government welcomes this kind of publicity because it helps increase the pressure on other emirates that are resisting taking action. ¶12. (SBU) In December 2004, the UAEG transferred responsibility for addressing the human trafficking issue from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Interior. This move was beneficial, as the new Interior Minister Sheikh Saif, appointed in November, has taken a strong interest in addressing trafficking issues. Interior will be responsible for enforcing the camel jockey law, once passed, in addition to caring for sex trafficking victims and helping Ministry of Justice officials prosecute traffickers. However, leadership from all emirates will have to resolve their conflicts over the use of young boys as camel jockeys to enact and implement new legislation banning the practice. SISON

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