AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD VISITS ABU DHABI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 004815 SIPDIS STATE FOR S/I, NEA/ARPI AND NEA/I E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2015 TAGS: PREL PINR PTER IR IZ SA AE SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD VISITS ABU DHABI REF: A. ABU DHABI 4200 ¶B. ABU DHABI 4540 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: On November 23, Ambassador Khalilzad met with Deputy Prime Minister/MinState for Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed (HbZ). They discussed the role Dubai-based Iraqi cleric Ahmed Al Kubaysi might play in encouraging greater Sunni Arab participation in Iraq's political process and discourage violence. HbZ noted that he had helped former Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi (the UAE leadership's favorite) obtain meetings with the Qatari leadership. HbZ then invited Al Kubaysi to join the meeting. Al Kubaysi made clear his support for a non-sectarian, representative government in Iraq as well as for a professional military free of politics. Al Kubaysi said the new government elected December 15 would need to show concrete results (i.e. guarantee security and stability and provide basic services) within a year. ¶2. (S) Summary continued: Ambassador Khalilzad met separately with Pakistan's Ambassador to the UAE and Special Middle East Envoy Ehsan Ullah Khan, who had earlier in the week accompanied Allawi to Riyadh to meet with King Abdullah, Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al Faisal, intelligence chief Muqrin bin Abdul Aziz, and Chief of the General Staff General Saleh bin Ali bin Mohammed Al Muhaya. The Saudis reportedly told Khan and Allawi that they would back Allawi's candidacy as Prime Minister and would cooperate with him in the future, and they expressed concerns about Iran. Khalilzad also reviewed Iraq developments with former Iraqi Foreign Minister Adnan Pachachi. End Summary. ¶3. (C) HbZ, who had delayed his departure for a two-week hunting trip in Pakistan in order to see Ambassador Khalilzad, split the November 23 meetings at his palace into two parts. The first meeting, which lasted an hour, gave him an opportunity to speak with Ambassador Khalilzad and Ambassador Sison alone. HbZ then invited Al Kubaysi to join the group for the second part, which lasted approximately 50 minutes. Major General Atiq Juma Ali bin Darwish, director of Defense Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid's Office for Military Coordination and a frequent UAE emissary to Baghdad, sat in on both meetings. Preview to Meeting with Iraqi Cleric Al Kubaysi -------------- -- ¶4. (C) During the meeting without Al Kubaysi, HbZ said he had spoken with the Iraqi cleric the night before and Al Kubaysi appeared willing to cooperate "within a general framework" to encourage greater Sunni participation. HbZ judged that many Shi'a were willing to listen to Al Kubaysi, too. He said it would be necessary to "monitor" Al Kubaysi, however. As a cleric, he was used to giving "a different sermon every Friday," but his message on Sunni participation and upcoming elections, as well as his post-election message, would have to be consistent. ¶5. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad noted that it was important to form a new government as soon as possible after the December 15 elections, and that the new government be seen as effective. Military and police training remained critical needs, he said. He and HbZ had a general discussion on the likely prime minister candidates, including former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, Vice President Minister Adil Abdul Mahdi, Ahmad Chalabi, and Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari. They also discussed the role of Tariq Al Hashmi, leader of the Iraq Islamic Party. ¶6. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad agreed with HbZ that the goal was a successful Iraq in which all Iraqis, regardless of ethnicity, could see themselves playing a role in the new Iraq. He said it was important to work together so that Iraqis could provide security and economic stability in their own country. HbZ and General bin Darwish raised Sunni concerns on elections: the possibility that militias would intimidate would-be voters and prevent voter turnout; the possibility of intimidation at the polling places (he noted the importance of elections monitors); the possible controversy over the number of polling places; the need for electoral commission balance. Ambassador Khalilzad said he had heard these concerns by Sunnis in Iraq and that the U.S. was working with the U.N. and the election committee to address legitimate concerns. Ambassador Khalilzad raised the need for discussion about the possibility of declaring the insurgency "unlawful" (after elections). He said this point should be broached with Al Kubaysi. ¶7. (C) Turning to the discovery of 179 detainees in an underground bunker near the Iraqi Interior Ministry compound in Baghdad, Ambassador Khalilzad noted that many of the victims had shown signs of torture and mistreatment. HbZ wanted to know who the victims were. Khalilzad replied that approximately 70 percent were Sunni, with Shi'a and foreigners (Syrian, Egyptian, possibly Iranian) also represented. HbZ emphasized that it was critical that Iraqis saw Americans as "just." He highlighted the need to focus on the Interior Ministry's upcoming role in the elections to ensure that people accepted the results. ¶8. (C) With respect to Iyad Allawi's political campaign, HbZ said that he had helped Allawi get in to see the Qatari Emir and Foreign Minister recently and that the meetings had gone well. The Qataris pledged moral, financial, and political support. HbZ said that campaigning had just begun and the media and advertising for Allawi's campaign would be important. HbZ also said the Saudis did not seem to have made their support to Iraq concrete yet. Iraqi Cleric Al Kubaysi Joins Meeting -------------- ¶9. (C) HbZ then invited Al Kubaysi to join the group for the second part of the discussion. Al Kubaysi made the following points: Iraq needed a representative government that represented all citizens without regard to religion; Iraq needed a professional military "without politics"; the newly elected government would need to show concrete results (water, electricity, clean streets, security, stability, economic development) "from day one"; there needed to be changes before December 15 at the Interior Ministry. Ambassador Khalilzad noted that given the challenges, the new government would need time. Al Kubaysi replied that the Iraqi people would expect results "within the first year." Al Kubaysi agreed that the USG and the Islamic region needed to work on these goals together. Ambassador Khalilzad emphasized that the goal was a successful Iraq in which all Iraqis, regardless of ethnicity, could see themselves playing a role in the new Iraq. There needed to be a political compact. It was important to work so that Iraqis could provide security and economic stability in their own country. There were no plans for a permanent presence of US forces in Iraq, he reassured Al Kubaysi. Al Kubaysi said that the democratic system which allows a free media in the U.S. has allowed the "real story" of Iraq to be told. He said Iraqis have a real attachment to the U.S., adding that they love American culture and education. ¶10. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad asked Al Kubaysi to consider concrete actions that Al Kubaysi could take to encourage broad political participation both before and after the elections; encourage good government; bring down the level of the insurgency, including by declaring it illegitimate after the upcoming elections in which all communities will participate; improve the security and economic situation; and ensure regional balance so that constructive regional players played an increased role, while "negative regional players" played a lesser role. (Note: Although Al Kubaysi said several times that he wanted to "put the past in the past and look forward to the future," he then spent 10 minutes defending his April 2003 sermon in the mosque just after the fall of Baghdad. He insisted that he had never asked for a "fighting" jihad against US troops, but had asked for a "struggle of the pen" as well as for discussions and negotiations. This sermon had been misreported and had led to the order being given to expel him from Iraq. He said the real struggle now is to bring Iraq out of chaos, and to provide food and security to the people of Iraq. ¶11. (C) Al Kubaysi also said that it had been a "disaster" to hand the Interior Ministry over to SCIRI and the "Iranian side"/"Persian agenda" and to disband the Army. Al Kubaysi asked whether it was possible to make changes at the Interior Ministry before the December 15 elections. The consensus from others in the group was that it was too late to change the Interior Ministry's leadership. Later, Al Kubaysi noted that China, India, and Afghanistan had been able to achieve internal reconciliation by putting religion to one side. After HbZ departed the room to catch his plane for Pakistan, Ambassador asked Al Kubaysi whether he was optimistic about the December 15 elections. Al Kubaysi replied that he was worried about the role of "outsiders" (presumably Iran). He also discussed developments in Fallujah (his hometown) and the importance of bringing order, security, and hope to its people. (Note: Al Kubaysi was in a palace anteroom during the first part of the meeting. He became vexed at the length of time he had to wait before he was asked to join and had threatened at one point to leave the palace without seeing Ambassador Khalilzad. Al Kubaysi gave no sign of this ire when he finally joined the meeting, however, and even joked at the end that he was 70 years old and had to "protect his reputation" despite this meeting with the Americans. While Al Kubaysi spoke mostly in Arabic, his English is fairly good. He exclaimed at one point, "Iran is very bad!" before referring to Churchill's description of Iranians as a "deceiving people." End note.) It was agreed that specific points on cooperation would be passed to MG bin Darwish who will work with Al Kubaysi to deliver them. Meeting with Pakistan's Special Middle East Envoy -------------- -------------- ¶12. (S) Following his meeting with Al Kubaysi, Ambassador Khalilzad met with Pakistan to UAE Ambassador Ehsan Ullah Khan. Allawi and Khan were in Riyadh November 21. Allawi met with King Abdullah, intelligence chief Prince Muqrin bin Abdul Aziz, Chief of the General Staff General Saleh bin Ali bin Mohammed Al Muhaya, and Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al Faisal. Khan briefed Khalilzad about the Saudi leadership's decision to endorse Allawi. Muqrin told Allawi and Khan that Allawi was "the man for the unity of Iraq." When Muqrin added that "time was against us," Khan told his Saudi hosts that he had told them that six weeks earlier. Khan said that the Saudis promised to contact Al Arabiya TV owner Walid Ibrahim, a member of the Saudi ruling family about giving Allawi an endorsement. (Note: Allawi was also in Dubai November 22 and met Defense Minister/Dubai Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid. End note.) ¶13. (S) In addition, Khan said, the Saudis said they were interested in providing humanitarian assistance (i.e. food supplies) for the winter months to candidates on Allawi's slate to help them. Khan said he told the Saudis that Allawi's campaign needed financial assistance now and more financial assistance immediately after the elections for "wheeling and dealing" to form coalitions. Khan said he did not attend Allawi's meeting with King Abdullah, but reported that during the 35-minute session the King had been "very warm and very concerned about what was happening" in Iraq. The King was not "entirely happy" with some of the other candidates for Prime Minister. Allawi also found Saud Al Faisal receptive at a subsequent meeting. Khan said Al Faisal told Allawi: "We will be taking decisions on how to support you." As Allawi and Khan waited at the airport to depart Riyadh, Khan gave Al Faisal and Muqrin a handwritten note in which he repeated his concern that financial assistance -) immediate and right after the elections )- was more important than humanitarian aid, and in underscored the importance of "putting pillars in place in Iraq first" to ensure "we win the election." ¶14. (S) Khan said Muqrin also voiced concern about Iranian influence in Iraq, noting that Iran had "taken over" Basra. Khan also talked about Saudi concerns about the possible repercussions of a decision to refer Iran's nuclear program to the UNSC. He said that an ex-Iraqi general working for the Saudis has information that should the Iranian nuclear issue be referred to the UNSC and the U.S. were to decide to take action against Iran, Iran would unleash sleeper cells in Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan, and the UAE that would hit U.S. targets and seek to close the shipping lanes in the Straits of Hormuz. Khan said the information was from a credible source and he had informed HbZ about it. ¶15. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad also shared a two-hour one-on-one lunch with former Iraqi Foreign Minister Adnan Pachachi and discussed Pachachi's desire to travel to the U.S. and his expectations on the election. ¶16. (U) This message has been cleared by Ambassador Khalilzad. SISON