AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD VISITS ABU DHABI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 004815

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/I, NEA/ARPI AND NEA/I

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2015
TAGS: PREL PINR PTER IR IZ SA AE
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD VISITS ABU DHABI

REF: A. ABU DHABI 4200

B. ABU DHABI 4540

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: On November 23, Ambassador Khalilzad met with
Deputy Prime Minister/MinState for Foreign Affairs Sheikh
Hamdan bin Zayed (HbZ). They discussed the role Dubai-based
Iraqi cleric Ahmed Al Kubaysi might play in encouraging
greater Sunni Arab participation in Iraq's political process
and discourage violence. HbZ noted that he had helped former
Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi (the UAE leadership's
favorite) obtain meetings with the Qatari leadership. HbZ
then invited Al Kubaysi to join the meeting. Al Kubaysi made
clear his support for a non-sectarian, representative
government in Iraq as well as for a professional military
free of politics. Al Kubaysi said the new government elected
December 15 would need to show concrete results (i.e.
guarantee security and stability and provide basic services)
within a year.


2. (S) Summary continued: Ambassador Khalilzad met
separately with Pakistan's Ambassador to the UAE and Special
Middle East Envoy Ehsan Ullah Khan, who had earlier in the
week accompanied Allawi to Riyadh to meet with King Abdullah,
Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al Faisal, intelligence chief
Muqrin bin Abdul Aziz, and Chief of the General Staff General
Saleh bin Ali bin Mohammed Al Muhaya. The Saudis reportedly
told Khan and Allawi that they would back Allawi's candidacy
as Prime Minister and would cooperate with him in the future,
and they expressed concerns about Iran. Khalilzad also
reviewed Iraq developments with former Iraqi Foreign Minister
Adnan Pachachi. End Summary.


3. (C) HbZ, who had delayed his departure for a two-week
hunting trip in Pakistan in order to see Ambassador
Khalilzad, split the November 23 meetings at his palace into
two parts. The first meeting, which lasted an hour, gave him
an opportunity to speak with Ambassador Khalilzad and
Ambassador Sison alone. HbZ then invited Al Kubaysi to join
the group for the second part, which lasted approximately 50
minutes. Major General Atiq Juma Ali bin Darwish, director
of Defense Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid's Office for
Military Coordination and a frequent UAE emissary to Baghdad,
sat in on both meetings.

Preview to Meeting with Iraqi Cleric Al Kubaysi
-------------- --


4. (C) During the meeting without Al Kubaysi, HbZ said he had
spoken with the Iraqi cleric the night before and Al Kubaysi
appeared willing to cooperate "within a general framework" to
encourage greater Sunni participation. HbZ judged that many
Shi'a were willing to listen to Al Kubaysi, too. He said it
would be necessary to "monitor" Al Kubaysi, however. As a
cleric, he was used to giving "a different sermon every
Friday," but his message on Sunni participation and upcoming
elections, as well as his post-election message, would have
to be consistent.


5. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad noted that it was important to
form a new government as soon as possible after the December
15 elections, and that the new government be seen as
effective. Military and police training remained critical
needs, he said. He and HbZ had a general discussion on the
likely prime minister candidates, including former Prime
Minister Iyad Allawi, Vice President Minister Adil Abdul
Mahdi, Ahmad Chalabi, and Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari.
They also discussed the role of Tariq Al Hashmi, leader of
the Iraq Islamic Party.


6. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad agreed with HbZ that the goal was
a successful Iraq in which all Iraqis, regardless of
ethnicity, could see themselves playing a role in the new
Iraq. He said it was important to work together so that
Iraqis could provide security and economic stability in their
own country. HbZ and General bin Darwish raised Sunni
concerns on elections: the possibility that militias would
intimidate would-be voters and prevent voter turnout; the
possibility of intimidation at the polling places (he noted
the importance of elections monitors); the possible
controversy over the number of polling places; the need for
electoral commission balance. Ambassador Khalilzad said he
had heard these concerns by Sunnis in Iraq and that the U.S.
was working with the U.N. and the election committee to
address legitimate concerns. Ambassador Khalilzad raised the
need for discussion about the possibility of declaring the
insurgency "unlawful" (after elections). He said this point
should be broached with Al Kubaysi.


7. (C) Turning to the discovery of 179 detainees in an
underground bunker near the Iraqi Interior Ministry compound
in Baghdad, Ambassador Khalilzad noted that many of the
victims had shown signs of torture and mistreatment. HbZ
wanted to know who the victims were. Khalilzad replied that
approximately 70 percent were Sunni, with Shi'a and
foreigners (Syrian, Egyptian, possibly Iranian) also
represented. HbZ emphasized that it was critical that Iraqis
saw Americans as "just." He highlighted the need to focus on
the Interior Ministry's upcoming role in the elections to
ensure that people accepted the results.


8. (C) With respect to Iyad Allawi's political campaign, HbZ
said that he had helped Allawi get in to see the Qatari Emir
and Foreign Minister recently and that the meetings had gone
well. The Qataris pledged moral, financial, and political
support. HbZ said that campaigning had just begun and the
media and advertising for Allawi's campaign would be
important. HbZ also said the Saudis did not seem to have
made their support to Iraq concrete yet.

Iraqi Cleric Al Kubaysi Joins Meeting
--------------


9. (C) HbZ then invited Al Kubaysi to join the group for the
second part of the discussion. Al Kubaysi made the following
points: Iraq needed a representative government that
represented all citizens without regard to religion; Iraq
needed a professional military "without politics"; the newly
elected government would need to show concrete results
(water, electricity, clean streets, security, stability,
economic development) "from day one"; there needed to be
changes before December 15 at the Interior Ministry.
Ambassador Khalilzad noted that given the challenges, the new
government would need time. Al Kubaysi replied that the
Iraqi people would expect results "within the first year."
Al Kubaysi agreed that the USG and the Islamic region needed
to work on these goals together. Ambassador Khalilzad
emphasized that the goal was a successful Iraq in which all
Iraqis, regardless of ethnicity, could see themselves playing
a role in the new Iraq. There needed to be a political
compact. It was important to work so that Iraqis could
provide security and economic stability in their own country.
There were no plans for a permanent presence of US forces in
Iraq, he reassured Al Kubaysi. Al Kubaysi said that the
democratic system which allows a free media in the U.S. has
allowed the "real story" of Iraq to be told. He said Iraqis
have a real attachment to the U.S., adding that they love
American culture and education.


10. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad asked Al Kubaysi to consider
concrete actions that Al Kubaysi could take to encourage
broad political participation both before and after the
elections; encourage good government; bring down the level of
the insurgency, including by declaring it illegitimate after
the upcoming elections in which all communities will
participate; improve the security and economic situation; and
ensure regional balance so that constructive regional players
played an increased role, while "negative regional players"
played a lesser role. (Note: Although Al Kubaysi said
several times that he wanted to "put the past in the past and
look forward to the future," he then spent 10 minutes
defending his April 2003 sermon in the mosque just after the
fall of Baghdad. He insisted that he had never asked for a
"fighting" jihad against US troops, but had asked for a
"struggle of the pen" as well as for discussions and
negotiations. This sermon had been misreported and had led
to the order being given to expel him from Iraq. He said the
real struggle now is to bring Iraq out of chaos, and to
provide food and security to the people of Iraq.


11. (C) Al Kubaysi also said that it had been a "disaster" to
hand the Interior Ministry over to SCIRI and the "Iranian
side"/"Persian agenda" and to disband the Army. Al Kubaysi
asked whether it was possible to make changes at the Interior
Ministry before the December 15 elections. The consensus
from others in the group was that it was too late to change
the Interior Ministry's leadership. Later, Al Kubaysi noted
that China, India, and Afghanistan had been able to achieve
internal reconciliation by putting religion to one side.
After HbZ departed the room to catch his plane for Pakistan,
Ambassador asked Al Kubaysi whether he was optimistic about
the December 15 elections. Al Kubaysi replied that he was
worried about the role of "outsiders" (presumably Iran). He
also discussed developments in Fallujah (his hometown) and
the importance of bringing order, security, and hope to its
people. (Note: Al Kubaysi was in a palace anteroom during
the first part of the meeting. He became vexed at the length
of time he had to wait before he was asked to join and had
threatened at one point to leave the palace without seeing
Ambassador Khalilzad. Al Kubaysi gave no sign of this ire
when he finally joined the meeting, however, and even joked
at the end that he was 70 years old and had to "protect his
reputation" despite this meeting with the Americans. While
Al Kubaysi spoke mostly in Arabic, his English is fairly
good. He exclaimed at one point, "Iran is very bad!" before
referring to Churchill's description of Iranians as a
"deceiving people." End note.) It was agreed that specific
points on cooperation would be passed to MG bin Darwish who
will work with Al Kubaysi to deliver them.

Meeting with Pakistan's Special Middle East Envoy
-------------- --------------


12. (S) Following his meeting with Al Kubaysi, Ambassador
Khalilzad met with Pakistan to UAE Ambassador Ehsan Ullah
Khan. Allawi and Khan were in Riyadh November 21. Allawi
met with King Abdullah, intelligence chief Prince Muqrin bin
Abdul Aziz, Chief of the General Staff General Saleh bin Ali
bin Mohammed Al Muhaya, and Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al
Faisal. Khan briefed Khalilzad about the Saudi leadership's
decision to endorse Allawi. Muqrin told Allawi and Khan that
Allawi was "the man for the unity of Iraq." When Muqrin
added that "time was against us," Khan told his Saudi hosts
that he had told them that six weeks earlier. Khan said that
the Saudis promised to contact Al Arabiya TV owner Walid
Ibrahim, a member of the Saudi ruling family about giving
Allawi an endorsement. (Note: Allawi was also in Dubai
November 22 and met Defense Minister/Dubai Crown Prince
Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid. End note.)


13. (S) In addition, Khan said, the Saudis said they were
interested in providing humanitarian assistance (i.e. food
supplies) for the winter months to candidates on Allawi's
slate to help them. Khan said he told the Saudis that
Allawi's campaign needed financial assistance now and more
financial assistance immediately after the elections for
"wheeling and dealing" to form coalitions. Khan said he did
not attend Allawi's meeting with King Abdullah, but reported
that during the 35-minute session the King had been "very
warm and very concerned about what was happening" in Iraq.
The King was not "entirely happy" with some of the other
candidates for Prime Minister. Allawi also found Saud Al
Faisal receptive at a subsequent meeting. Khan said Al
Faisal told Allawi: "We will be taking decisions on how to
support you." As Allawi and Khan waited at the airport to
depart Riyadh, Khan gave Al Faisal and Muqrin a handwritten
note in which he repeated his concern that financial
assistance -) immediate and right after the elections )-
was more important than humanitarian aid, and in underscored
the importance of "putting pillars in place in Iraq first" to
ensure "we win the election."


14. (S) Khan said Muqrin also voiced concern about Iranian
influence in Iraq, noting that Iran had "taken over" Basra.
Khan also talked about Saudi concerns about the possible
repercussions of a decision to refer Iran's nuclear program
to the UNSC. He said that an ex-Iraqi general working for
the Saudis has information that should the Iranian nuclear
issue be referred to the UNSC and the U.S. were to decide to
take action against Iran, Iran would unleash sleeper cells in
Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan, and the UAE that would hit U.S.
targets and seek to close the shipping lanes in the Straits
of Hormuz. Khan said the information was from a credible
source and he had informed HbZ about it.


15. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad also shared a two-hour
one-on-one lunch with former Iraqi Foreign Minister Adnan
Pachachi and discussed Pachachi's desire to travel to the
U.S. and his expectations on the election.


16. (U) This message has been cleared by Ambassador
Khalilzad.
SISON