UAEG RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AFGHANISTAN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 004696

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV AF KU QA SA TC
SUBJECT: UAEG RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AFGHANISTAN

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: On November 9, U.S. Ambassador to
Afghanistan, Ronald Neumann, visited Abu Dhabi and met with
Minister of Information Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al Nahyan
(AbZ) and MFA U/S Abdullah Rashid al Noaimi. He inquired
about GCC states, views and UAEG's recommendations on
Afghanistan. AbZ responded that Afghanistan needs to be
outward-looking and to be proactive in engaging other nations
in seeking assistance. Al Noaimi suggested that Afghanistan
should look to the UAE, a federation of seven emirates, as an
example of successful nation-building and should be more
specific in expressing its needs to potential donors. AbZ
showed some, unspecified, willingness to respond to a focused
direct approach from President Karzai. AbZ stated that
UAEG's 220-man Special Ops presence in Afghanistan would
continue. He was clear that UAE desire not to publicize its
military support for Coalition was based on potential
terrorist threats to UAE; not political factors. The
sensitivity does not apply to economic assistance. End
summary.

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"Afghans, Look Outward!"
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2. (S) Responding to Ambassador Neumann's inquiry as to what
Afghanistan could do differently, Al Noaimi said that the
Afghans need to arrive at consensus on a common vision for
their country and to "market" that vision, transcending
tribal loyalties. He said Karzai should appoint emissaries
to see what is happening in the gulf and elsewhere. AbZ
noted that Afghanistan has remained too insular and that many
of the Afghans' ongoing struggles stem from that isolation.
Both UAEG interlocutors extolled the UAE,s success as the
result of a conscious effort to keep up with the outside
world. AbZ called on Afghans to "learn from us--learn to
look outward; they should get out and follow our example."

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UAE Special Ops
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3. (S) Since October 2003, UAEG has maintained 220 Special
Ops troops in Afghanistan. In prior conversations, Abu Dhabi
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan (MbZ),Deputy
Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces, has told
Ambassador and General Abizaid that UAE troops will remain in
Afghanistan until the mission is complete, the intent being
to have UAE troops "bloodied" and seasoned by combat to
prepare them for action against potential security threats
when/if required at home. AbZ admitted that the UAEG has
little effective control over its ports and borders, noting
that over 3,000 Saudis alone and an "unknown number" of other
foreigners cross back and forth daily. AbZ warned that the
foreign threats menacing the UAE from inside are growing
daily, but joked that if he could choose between the current
situation and that posed by Abu Nidal twenty years ago, he
would welcome back Abu Nidal.

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GCC Attitudes toward Afghanistan
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4. (S) AbZ characterized the GCC states' perception of the
Afghan problem as relatively small compared to Iraq. He said
that caught between assisting with the earthquake in
Pakistan, Hurricane Katrina, infrastructure development in
Iraq, and development assistance projects in the Palestinian
territories, even the UAE is "stretched to its limits,"
noting that the rest of the GCC states are even less likely
to offer assistance. AbZ observed that Saudi Arabia will not
be reaching out overseas. Taking a swipe at the Saudi king,
he said: "It is not in King Abdullah's personality; he is
not the type to make sure his neighbor has a meal tonight."
He further noted that "the Kuwaitis have their own problems
right now and will not initiate any project on their own,"
but may be willing to join others once a development program
begins. He complained that "Qatar is doing much less than
they could," but said he has low expectations of their
willingness to help.

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Building a nation is not easy --
Leadership lacking in the region
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5. (S) Al Noaimi said that "Arabs are not having serious
discussions about anything right now including Afghanistan."
He sees "all talk and no action -- and with even the talk
being tailored to domestic audiences. Arabs have not
awakened to the seriousness of the current situation and to
security threats; we see it, the Qataris and Jordanians see
it, but no one else seems to." He continued: "Building a
nation is not easy, but it absolutely starts with leadership,
which is lacking throughout the region." He portrayed the
UAE as a leader in the region by default since everyone else
seemed to be "suffering from paralysis." AbZ pointed out
that immediately following 9/11 even the Saudis were slow to
act and distance themselves from the Taliban, and eventually
did so only after the UAE took the first action. He added
that he had heard later from the Saudis that if the UAE had
not acted when they did, the Saudi government would still be
deciding what to do.

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Afghan Elections, Counter Narcotics, Pakistan
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6. (S) AbZ expressed interest in the current state of Afghan
politics, asking why the vote count took so long to finalize.
Ambassador Neumann explained that the infrastructure
problems throughout Afghanistan meant that ballot boxes were
being transported from remote regions by horse and donkey,
pointing out the need for physical infrastructure to improve
trade and transportation of agriculture to market. AbZ said
he was not convinced that Karzai would be tough on the
narcotics because the international community was not
providing adequate alternatives. Ambassador noted that
better infrastructure will pave the way for agricultural
alternatives to opium to take hold in remote areas. He also
commented on the interaction between Presidents Karzai and
Musharraf, which has escalated into heated words in the past.
(Embassy Kabul Comment: It is better now and we are working
hard to keep it that way. End Comment.) AbZ wondered
whether Musharraf was perceived as domestically weaker than
in the past.


7. (C) Comment: Both UAEG interlocutors expressed
appreciation for Ambassador Neumann's visit and recommended
that the Government of Afghanistan be more specific and
forthcoming in describing its needs in ways that will appeal
to potential donors as, for instance, at the planned Compact
for Afghanistan Conference in London, January 30-31. Neumann
undertook to work on this with the GOA. UAEG has shown a
marked propensity to respond with greater alacrity when
requests are project-related as opposed to petitions for cash
contributions. End comment.


8. (U) This message has been cleared by Ambassador Neumann
in Kabul.
SISON