AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD MEETS ABU DHABI, DUBAI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 004540 SIPDIS STATE FOR S/I, AND NEA/ARPI, NEA/I E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2015 TAGS: PREL PGOV IR SY IZ AE SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD MEETS ABU DHABI, DUBAI LEADERSHIP, AND IYAD ALLAWI REF: A. ABU DHABI 4200 ¶B. ABU DHABI 4261 Classified By: DCM Martin R. Quinn, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: During an October 18-20 visit to the UAE, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad met leaders of Abu Dhabi and Dubai emirates, as well as former Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. Ambassador Khalilzad reviewed the just-held constitutional referendum and the approaching December 15 parliamentary elections, and thanked Abu Dhabi's leadership for its quiet efforts to urge greater Sunni Arab participation in Iraq's political process. A significant portion of each meeting centered on USG and UAEG concerns over Iranian interference in Iraq's domestic affairs, and Syria's failure to stop insurgents from crossing into Iraq from Syria. Dubai Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid proposed a joint Abu Dhabi-Dubai "operation" to urge Sunni Arab involvement in the political process. All interlocutors favored a greater role for Dubai-based Iraqi Sunni cleric Ahmed Al Kubaysi. End Summary. Constitutional Referendum -------------- ¶2. (C) At a meeting October 18 with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) and Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed (HbZ),Ambassador Khalilzad reviewed the October 15 constitutional referendum, noting that approximately 10 million Iraqis had voted. He briefly described the constitutional amendments announced on October 12, including the review clause that will allow the next Council of Representatives a one-time opportunity to amend the constitution. He thanked MbZ and HbZ for their help in persuading greater Sunni Arab participation in the political process. Next Political Milestone: December 15 Elections -------------- -- ¶3. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad underscored the need for Iraqis to participate in the December 15 parliamentary elections, and that it would be particularly helpful to see greater involvement by moderate, cross-sectarian political personalities and parties. ¶4. (C) MbZ inquired whether the U.S. had had any success tracing financing for Zarqawi and the Baathists from "this part of the world." He said the UAEG believes there is money coming from "the Wahhabi part of the world," namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar. In a smaller meeting immediately following this discussion, MbZ, without being specific, mentioned his concern that funds from some entities in the UAE were getting into the wrong hands. Iranian Influence -------------- ¶5. (C) MbZ asked about the extent of Iranian influence in Iraq, particularly on the security forces. Ambassador Khalilzad said the Iranians were gaining "considerable influence" in Iraq. Sunni insurgents were inadvertently helping Iranian penetration into Iraq. U.S. forces are "entangled" in western Iraq fighting the insurgency, which has "opened the door" for the Iranians in the south. In Baghdad, certain institutions, including the police, have been "penetrated" by Badr Brigades and other forces that are Iranian, he said. Iranian influence can be felt "across the board," Khalilzad said. MbZ: Syria's Bashar No Different Than Old Guard -------------- -- ¶6. (C) The Al Nahyans expressed little sympathy for Syrian President Bashar. Ambassador Khalilzad said the Syrians are seeking to get Bashar and Iraqis together for a "photo opportunity," and some Iraqis were contemplating going to Syria. MbZ said the Iraqis should not go to Syria until they get something positive from the Syrians in return. Ambassador Khalilzad said that was his tactic as well. MbZ inquired about the situation in Syria in light of Interior Minister Kanaan's suicide. "How messy it is going to be?" Ambassador Khalilzad said President Bashar was going to come under more pressure. MbZ said the Syrian president was "living in another world. I don,t think Bashar is a person you can trust." Bashar may be in his 30s, but he has the same mentality as the old guard, MbZ said. "Syria is a country that needs a major change." Ambassador Khalilzad agreed with MbZ. Sufis to the Rescue? -------------- ¶7. (S) In a smaller meeting with only Khalilzad and Charge, MbZ and HbZ asked whether other countries ) especially Jordan and Turkey -) were being helpful to the U.S. in Iraq. MbZ also offered his theory that the promotion of Sufism (as a benign, more spiritual form of Islam) would serve as an antidote to Muslim fundamentalism and extremist violence in the region. MbZ said he would supply the names of Sufis who might advance such a strategy. Meeting with Dubai Crown Prince -------------- ¶8. (C) At a meeting October 19 with Dubai Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid (MbR),Ambassador Khalilzad discussed the need to "win over the population from the insurgency," and urged MbR to use his influence with his Sunni contacts. Iraqis idealize the UAE and its success in producing prosperity, he added. Ambassador Khalilzad said the UAE could help Iraq economically by encouraging investment there, but also by helping Iraqis build their institutional capacity, such as in the banking sector. MbR affirmed the UAE's support for U.S. objectives in Iraq. One way to succeed, MbR said, is to ensure that Iraqis reap more of the economic benefits in the post-war period. ¶9. (C) MbR proposed that Dubai, together with Abu Dhabi, create a joint "unit" or "operation room" that would identify people and organizations in Iraq that the USG could work with to encourage Sunnis to participate. MbR also said that he still believes that Ahmed Al Kubaysi, a Dubai-based Iraqi cleric, could be urged to play a positive role in encouraging Sunni participation. "He does not want to be prime minister. He wants to help bring people together," MbR said. Khalilzad agreed that it would be good for the UAE to encourage not only Al Kubaysi, but Al Kubaysi's other contacts as well. MbR said that Dubai had "a lot of contacts" in Iraq, and that he would "talk with my brothers in Abu Dhabi (referring to the Al Nahyan ruling family)" about how the UAE can help move Iraq's political process forward. (Note: MbR delegated Dubai State Security Chief Mohammed Qemzi to follow up on the "operations room." End note.) An organized cross-sectarian alliance of Iraqis headed by Allawi would isolate and weaken Al Qaida, MbR said. He also applauded the constitutional amendment addressing the legal protection of Baath Party members. Some Iraqis were forced to be Baathists, he said, and should not be held liable. Rank and file Baathists should be allowed to participate in the political process, ideally with a new name for their movement. ¶10. (C) MbR also sought U.S. views on Iran, including its interest in acquiring nuclear power. He said it would be good to persuade Iran that they don't need nuclear weapons, and that dealing with Iran needed to be done peacefully, not militarily, since Iran would "make a great deal of trouble for us" if the U.S. went to war with it. A Role for Ahmed Al Kubaysi? -------------- ¶11. (S) Al Kubaysi's name came up again the night of October 19 when Ambassador Khalilzad and Charge met with MbZ, HbZ, and Iyad Allawi in HbZ's palace. When asked whether Al Kubaysi could play a positive role, HbZ responded that what was required was to guide him. Allawi said that Al Kubaysi could be "very useful" in getting the insurgents on board. He added that Al Kubaysi is respected by the ulema and is influential. Major General Atiq Juma Ali bin Darwish, director of Defense Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid's Office for Military Coordination and a frequent UAE emissary to Baghdad, said Al Kubaysi's call in 2003 for American forces to leave Iraq had been misunderstood because of an exaggeration by interpreters at the time. Al Kubaysi did not say that he wanted American forces to leave Iraq immediately, but only after finishing the job in Iraq, Atiq said. HbZ said that the UAE was not promoting Al Kubaysi out of any love for Al Kubaysi, but out of love for Iraq. Atiq added that Al Kubaysi is accepted by the vast majority of Shi'a in Iraq and can be used as a bridge. Allawi agreed with the assessment. Allawi suggested that Al Kubaysi go to Baghdad to sit, talk, and influence. HbZ said he would support frank talks with Al Kubaysi, adding that "moderate Sunnis and Shi'a must be supported in Iraq or the country will be handed over to Iran. America will be replaced by Iran." Bringing Sunnis, Baathists, on Board -------------- ¶12. (S) Allawi advised the U.S. to talk to President Talabani and Prime Minister Jaafari about helping with the budgets of mosques and salaries of imams. The U.S. could also help pay for mosques that were destroyed and use its influence to raise the quota for Sunni pilgrims, Allawi said. Atiq observed that the de-Baathification process had produced negative consequences and that it was important to try to fix the situation. The way to handle it was not to go after the Baathis themselves (who are scared),but to treat them as normal citizens. He would advise the Iraqi government not to prosecute or punish Baathis who did not have blood on their hands but who joined the party only to survive and put food on the table. It was important, he said, to bring back most of those who were disbanded from the police and army. Atiq added, "We need a strong leader in Iraq, not someone who is sleeping." HbZ agreed that Iraq's history made that point clear. ¶13. (U) Ambassador Khalilzad has cleared this message. SISON