SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR JEFFREY AND TEAM'S

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ABU DHABI 004102 SIPDIS STATE FOR S/I, AND NEA/ARPI, NEA/I TREASURY FOR LARRY MCDONALD NSC FOR CHARLES DUNNE CENTCOM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL MARK KIMMITT CJCS FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL MICHAEL JONES E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2015 TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS EFIN IZ IR SY TC SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR JEFFREY AND TEAM'S VISIT TO UAE REF: A. ABU DHABI 3161 ¶B. ABU DHABI 4045 ¶C. ABU DHABI 4074 ¶D. STATE 152459 ¶E. ABU DHABI 1680 ¶F. ABU DHABI 3244 ¶G. ABU DHABI 3272 ¶H. ABU DHABI 3700 ¶I. ABU DHABI 3266 ¶J. STATE 177476 ¶K. STATE 176666 ¶L. ABU DHABI 4025 Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: The United Arab Emirates has been a key Arab partner and has supported our objectives in Iraq, condemned terror attacks, allowed Coalition forces access to UAE air force bases and ports, and hosted German training for the Iraqi military and police. UAE aid to Iraq, both pledged and delivered, has been significant. The UAEG has publicly committed to forgive the majority of Iraq's debt although debt relief commitments have yet to be implemented. Your visit will be an opportunity to thank UAE leaders for their ongoing support, lay out the USG strategy for achieving success in Iraq, enlist UAEG views about future courses of action, and encourage the UAE to publicly support Iraq's political process and accelerate disbursements of pledged assistance. End Summary. Political Support -------------- ¶2. (U) The UAE leadership has strongly condemned terror attacks in Iraq )- including the dissemination of UAEG-drafted sermons in the mosques condemning the killing of civilians in Iraq and the assassinations of the Egyptian Ambassador (ref A). The UAEG has also regularly voiced support for the Iraqi people. In September at UNGA, UAE Information Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed urged the international community to "support the Iraqi government in its efforts to build a stabilized and united Iraq." The UAE leadership had also publicly supported the January 30 Iraqi national assembly elections, and allowed the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to operate an Out-of-Country Voter (OCV) program for Iraqi citizens resident in the Gulf to enable them to vote. ¶3. (C) To date, however, the UAEG has not made a public statement in support of the constitutional referendum or upcoming elections, although privately Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) has told us he believed Sunni Iraqis should participate more in the political process. He told Ambassador and a visiting delegation September 20 that the U.S. should try to "get the maximum percentage of Sunnis to support it" (ref B). (Comment: We continue to make the point that it shouldn,t be up to the U.S. alone to achieve greater Sunni participation; key Arab partners, including the UAE, should be taking a more active role in getting Sunnis to participate. End Comment.) MFA U/S Abdullah Rashid Al Noaimi told Ambassador September 24 that the UAE's leadership has tried to allay Iraqi Sunni fears about federalism by explaining its benefits, using the UAE as an example of a federal system that has not disintegrated (ref C). The UAE has also advised Iraqis that their new constitution could be provisional without putting the country in jeopardy. "The constitution is a live document that can be developed," Al Noaimi said. ¶4. (C) MbZ and other leaders regularly express to us their preference for Iyad Allawi, whom they regard as capable and trustworthy and a moderate Shi'a who would put Iraq's interests before Iran's. Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed (HbZ) told the Secretary on August 15 that the UAE would continue to give strong support to Allawi, whom he and his brother, MbZ, consider a friend and "the most credible leader for Iraq" (ref D). Allawi has made several unannounced trips to Abu Dhabi over the past year to meet with UAE leaders and met with HbZ in late August in Morocco. MbZ reiterated his and his brothers' financial and moral support for Allawi to us on September 20. He also emphasized that Iraq needed laws to punish corrupt officials, citing Ahmed Chalabi specifically. He pointedly criticized the USG for "bringing in rogue people to run Iraq." ¶5. (C) Despite repeated demarches urging the Emiratis to post an Ambassador in Baghdad, the UAE has not yet upgraded its Charge position. The UAEG has noted that it intends to wait for the security situation to improve before sending an Ambassador and expanding its Embassy staff. UAE Concerns re: Iranian Interference in Iraq -------------- ¶6. (C) UAE leaders have told the Secretary, Ambassador and visiting USG civilian and military officials that they view with suspicion Iranian motives in Iraqi politics, and in the Gulf region as a whole. The topic of Iran and its influence in Iraq,s domestic affairs is likely to generate a vivid exchange during your visit. HbZ had told Ambassador Dick Jones during their meeting in Abu Dhabi April 12 that if the Interior Minister post were to go to someone close to Iranian intelligence, there could be assassinations of Sunnis and liberal-minded Shi'as (ref E). During a July 20 lunch meeting with CENTCOM Commander General Abizaid, MbZ talked about his discomfort and dismay at the ascendance of the Shi'a majority in Iraq, as well as his belief that the Iraqi Transitional Government was being influenced by Iran (ref F). Syria's Role -------------- ¶7. (C) The UAE leadership has heard our concerns about Syria and its failure to prevent foreign fighters from pouring into Iraq, and the need to pressure both Syria and Iran to respect Iraq's sovereignty and stop their territory from being used by insurgents. MbZ told General Abizaid July 20 that the Syrians were "making themselves vulnerable to extremists" and that President Bashar Al Asad should "get the message very clearly" that Syria cannot continue to help the insurgency. In a meeting with Ambassador July 24, Information Minister Sheikh Abdullah pledged his government's vigilance in preventing Emirati citizens or expatriate residents from traveling to Iraq )- directly or via Iran -- to join the insurgency (ref G). UAE security services monitor ferry traffic to Um Qasr (passengers and cargo) and anyone exhibiting signs of extremist sympathies. Sheikh Abdullah agreed with Ambassador that foreign fighters might eventually seek to return to their home or neighboring countries "credentialed" with terror experience gained in Iraq. He vowed that the UAE would not allow that to occur. However, Sheikh Abdullah's decision to travel to Damascus to meet with President Bashar on July 31 (ref H) highlights the UAEG decision to continue to engage with Syria rather than to isolate the regime. Ambassador Jeffrey and team should continue to underscore USG concerns over Syria's failure to take genuine steps to alter its behavior toward Iraq by stemming the flow of insurgents and denying safehaven to former regime elements. Military/Security Support -------------- ¶8. (C) MbZ has advised against a premature U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq. He indicated to us September 20 that the Iraqis probably would be receptive to having certain Arab forces on their soil, but he was critical of Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa for blocking such initiatives in SIPDIS the past. ¶9. (S) The Emirati leadership has tried in earnest to accommodate U.S. requests for OIF military cooperation and assistance. Al Dhafra Air Base (just outside of Abu Dhabi) remains a key component of our relationship with the UAE and is vital to the ability of CENTCOM and CENTAF to project combat power in the AOR, including OIF/OEF/HOA support operations. Al Dhafra currently hosts the 380th Air Expeditionary Wing, with more than 1200 CENTAF personnel, operating 16 KC-135 and 4 KC-10 air refueling tankers, as well as 5 U-2 surveillance aircraft and a Global Hawk remotely piloted vehicle. The Emiratis have granted thousands of annual aircraft overflight and landing clearances since OEF began. The UAE Air Force and Air Defense has accommodated virtually every request for periodic increases in forces at Al Dhafra, as mandated by our fluctuating operations tempo. The ports of Jebel Ali and Fujairah are vital to U.S. Navy maritime interdiction operations, resupply and sustainment, and combat support efforts across the region, and have hosted in excess of 500 annual USN port visits for each of the past two years. ¶10. (C) The UAE has been working with Germany to provide police and military training to the Iraqis in the UAE, although police training is on hold because Iraq's Interior Minister Baqir Solagh apparently wants it to take place on Iraqi soil, the German Ambassador told us September 27. The UAE and Germany have trained four groups of Iraqi civil police (431 total) in the fundamentals of crime scene investigation. Training took place at Al Ain Police College in Abu Dhabi emirate. The UAE provided food, accommodations, a small per diem, and transportation for the Iraqi police between Iraq and the UAE. The UAE has hosted personal protection training for 30 Iraqi police, a course to be followed by a UAE-taught course in hostage rescue techniques at a UAE armed forces location. ¶11. (C) In April-May 2005, 83 Iraqi army engineers came to the UAE to receive basic leadership and mine awareness training from the German Ministry of Defense. Those Iraqi army engineers will return to the UAE in October-December 2005 to help train another 244 Iraqi army engineers. Once the training is complete, this Iraqi engineering battalion will serve in various Iraqi divisions. In addition to hosting the training at the Zayed Military City army base, the UAE armed forces are paying the Iraqis' rooms and board, per diem, and transportation between Iraq and the UAE. In addition, the UAE is donating some engineering equipment to the Iraqi armed forces. Germany intends to offer training in EOD tactics in the future. ¶12. (C) In addition to training, the UAE contributed over $8 million toward the transfer of M-113 armored personnel carriers from Jordan to Iraq. The UAE donated four light reconnaissance aircraft to Iraq and trained Iraqi pilots to fly the planes, as well as 45 French-built Panhard APCs, with a pledge of 180 additional M-113 APCs purchased from Switzerland. Since May 2004, the UAE Director of Military Intelligence has provided officers to coalition headquarters in Baghdad to perform duties as joint operations and joint intelligence officers. Economic Support -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Humanitarian/Reconstruction Aid: Since OIF, the UAE has provided significant humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to the Iraqis. The UAE pledged $215 million in Madrid for Iraqi reconstruction, and has informed us that it has disbursed the entire pledge on projects inside Iraq. Although it has been very difficult to get an exact breakdown of total UAE assistance to Iraq, given the loose federal nature of the UAE and the fact that most assistance is provided by the Emirate of Abu Dhabi rather than the federal government, we do have breakdown of humanitarian assistance for the period 2003 to April 2005 showing disbursements of $77 million (ref I). The breakdown includes: -- $34.3 million from the UAE Military General Headquarters for medical services, money, machines, supplies, computers and fuel; -- $33.6 million from the UAE Red Crescent Society for medicine and medical services, equipping hospitals and medical facilities, desalinization plants, electric generators for hospitals, services and care in the UAE; -- $3.4 million from UAE Red Crescent "Air Bridge" for 26 flights with medicine, medical needs, foodstuffs, computer, clothes, blood; -- $2.4 million from the Office of His Highness the President of the UAE for emergency relief and money. -- $1.3 million from Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan Foundation for Charitable and Humanitarian Work for emergency relief; -- $2 million from various charitable sources for foodstuffs, medicine, flights to Baghdad, an orphans' project, emergency school education, emergency relief, and training for Iraqi diplomats. ¶14. (C) Generators: The UAE has yet to deliver Siemens generators it had pledged as part of its $215 million pledge at the Madrid Conference. In April, HbZ told Ambassador Dick Jones that the generators were still being warehoused in UAE because of "complications" on the Iraqi side. Moving and installing the generators would cost between $33 million and $37 million, and the UAE is willing to pay half that cost, MbZ told Ambassador September 20. (Note: From what we are told, the UAE has not discussed this issue with the Iraqis recently. We understand that the UAEG had originally requested support from the Germans and possibly other donors to pay for the shipment and installation of the generators. End note.) ¶15. (C) Debt Relief: The UAE publicly committed to SPE James Baker that it would forgive most Iraqi debt in January 2004. UAEG officials have told us that they have not, and would not, asked the Iraqis to repay any of the debt that is owed them. However, HbZ told the Secretary on August 15 that the UAE wanted to announce publicly its debt relief commitments, but it could not do so because it was bound by the GCC to adopt a common position on Iraqi debt. He asked the U.S. to put pressure on the GCC to announce a common stance on Iraqi debt reduction. HbZ also said that the UAE would continue to support Iraq financially but criticized its neighbors )- particularly Kuwait and Saudi Arabia )- for not providing more assistance. ¶16. (C) Asset Freezes: Embassy believes that the UAE continues to freeze small sums of assets from the former Iraqi government, but we do not have details. On a related issue, in 2003 UAE courts released $43.5 million in frozen assets from the Al Wasl and Babel trading company. In April 2004, Embassy presented the UAE Central Bank with a pre-notification of the U.S. intent to propose the listing of Al Wasl and Babel to the UN 1518 Sanctions Committee. At that time, the Central Bank Governor said that the UAE would comply with the UN resolution and freeze the account, but that the Dubai Attorney General would need to take the lead in investigating the case. In July 2004 the Dubai A/G confirmed to CG Dubai that the accounts had been frozen (at the request of the federal government); in October 2004, Central Bank Governor Al Suwaidi told then-Treasury Assistant Secretary Juan Zarate the same thing. SIPDIS USG Outreach to Media Having Positive Impact -------------- ¶17. (SBU) Coalition objectives are getting fairer treatment in the UAE-based regional media today compared to two years ago. The Dubai-based, Saudi-owned Al Arabiya Arabic satellite news station competing with Al Jazeera for viewers, stirred up controversy with sensationalistic broadcasts of coalition POWs and dead Iraqis in 2003 and early 2004. It appears that the station's owners received our message and some quiet advice from the UAEG, as they brought in new management in early 2004. Following active outreach in 2005 by senior U.S. military officers from CENTCOM (Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Smith, and Deputy Director for Plans and Policy Brigadier General Kimmitt) and NAVCENT to the Arab media, and in particular Al Arabiya, we have observed a willingness to candidly discuss issues and events, as well as more balanced and objective reporting from Al Arabiya. For its part, Al Arabiya's new management is willing to meet, interview and exchange views with CENTCOM and civilian officials to get the U.S. side of the story. CENTCOM's Arab Media Engagement Center is up and running in the UAE as of September 2005. Post has provided many opportunities for local Arabic language journalists to participate in media tours and naval embarkations to encourage more balanced reporting and awareness of U.S. policy objectives. SISON