UAE DEMARCHE: CUTTING OFF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRADE

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 004049 SIPDIS STATE FOR T - U/S BOB JOSEPH; T - PATTY MCNERNEY ALSO FOR NP/RA - CAROLINE RUSSELL NSC FOR DAVID STEPHENS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2015 TAGS: PARM MNUC KNNP IR CH KN TC SUBJECT: UAE DEMARCHE: CUTTING OFF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRADE WITH NORTH KOREA REF: A. STATE 173768 ¶B. ABU DHABI 3804 ¶C. ABU DHABI 3050 Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (U) This message contains an action request at the end of para 2. ¶2. (S) Summary: Reminding MFA U/S Abdullah Rashid Al Noaimi of the UAE's commitment to working with the United States on shutting down proliferators and targeting their assets (refs A and B),Ambassador highlighted the need to work together to ensure that North Korea was not in a position to export nuclear and nuclear-related technologies on September 24. She urged that the UAE formally renounce any military trade with North Korea and noted in particular possible North Korean use of UAE's ports as transshipment points for vessels carrying North Korean conventional and missile related shipments. In the course of the discussion, Abdullah Rashid shared the UAEG's concerns not only about North Korea and Iran, but also about China's possible role in facilitating North Korea's transactions with Iran. Action request: We would recommend that U/S Joseph be prepared to address the issue of possible Chinese involvement in such transactions with his UAEG interlocutors on an "if asked" basis during his Oct. 1-2 visit to Abu Dhabi and Dubai. End Summary. ¶3. (S) Ambassador made the points in ref A, noting our concerns that items originating from North Korea -- both conventional and missile-related shipments )- could be transshipped through UAE's ports. She thanked the UAE for its past nonproliferation cooperation, and noted USG desire to deepen engagement on all North Korean arms trade. She also noted USG concerns about the Korean Mining Development Trading Organization (KOMID),which is identified in the new U.S. Executive Order as a key entity that is subject to penalties, including freezing of its assets. The UAE should refrain from purchasing any dual use items from KOMID and the UAEG should prohibit KOMID's presence in the country, Ambassador added. Ambassador had provided Abdullah Rashid with copies of E.O. 13382 on July 5 and September 4; emboffs provided copies of E.O. 13382 to the Central Bank, UAE Federal Customs and Dubai Customs (refs B and C). (Note: The focus of these previous discussions had been Tanchon Commercial Bank accounts in the UAE. End note.) ¶4. (S) Abdullah Rashid replied that the UAE was "well aware" of the North Korean role in "spreading weapons of mass destruction materials." He said that the North Koreans had long expressed an interest in having an "official presence" in the UAE. He later switched the term to a "cover." The UAEG, unconvinced about the North Koreans' real intentions, had "always said no" to such requests. "We don't think they are a positive player in the international community yet," Abdullah Rashid said. ¶5. (S) Transactions between North Korea and Iran cannot be fully understood without knowing the role China plays, Abdullah Rashid argued. "When we want to focus on North Korea, we need to focus on China as well," he said. The North Koreans and Iranians conduct "a lot of their meetings" in China, he added. The UAE intelligence services had "some information" about what the Iranians and North Koreans were doing through China. However, "China is a big dragon," he added, and the UAEG did not have enough manpower "to cover everything" the Chinese were doing. ¶6. (C) Ambassador then previewed U/S Joseph's Oct. 1-2 visit to the UAE, noting that Iran's nuclear program, the need to develop comprehensive export controls and enforcement capabilities, the need to address proliferation financing issues, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and specific proliferation cases would likely be on the agenda. SISON