CENTCOM DEPUTY COMMANDER GENERAL SMITH VISITS UAE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 002975

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/04/2015
TAGS: MCAP MASS AF IZ IR PK SA TC
SUBJECT: CENTCOM DEPUTY COMMANDER GENERAL SMITH VISITS UAE

REF: A. BERN 1122

B. ABU DHABI 2946

Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary: CENTCOM Deputy Commander Lieutenant General
Smith met July 2 with UAE Armed Forces Deputy Chief of Staff
Major General Mohammed Al Kaabi and UAE Air Force and Air
Defense Commander Staff Pilot Major General Khaled Al
Buainnan. Smith briefed Al Kaabi on international troop
deployments in both Afghanistan and Iraq in the run-up to
their respective elections, and thanked the UAE for its
contributions to security and stability in both countries.
Smith and Al Kaabi agreed that land borders -) whether
Iraq's or the UAE's -- remain vulnerable to smugglers and
infiltrators and require greater protection. Al Kaabi noted
the mounting tensions between the UAE and Saudi Arabia that
are in part related to an unresolved border dispute. Smith
and Al Buainnan reviewed the status of the UAE's Gulf Air
Warfare Center, training needs, and the F-16 Block 60 fighter
aircraft program. End Summary.

AFGHANISTAN UPDATE
--------------


2. (SBU) On July 2, CENTCOM Deputy Commander Lieutenant
General Smith, accompanied by the Ambassador, Acting USLO
Chief, and Pol Chief (notetaker) met with UAE Armed Forces
Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Al Kaabi. Al Kaabi was
accompanied by Brigadier Obaid Al Hairi Salem Al Ketbi,
Director of General Purchasing, and Jack McGuinness, advisor
to Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed.


3. (C) The bulk of the discussion concerned Afghanistan,
Iraq, and UAE-Saudi border tensions. Al Kaabi expressed his
condolences for the 16 American service members in
Afghanistan who died June 28 when their MH-47 helicopter
crashed as they attempted to reinforce a small number of U.S.
Special Forces. Al Kaabi, who has twice been to Afghanistan
to visit the UAE's Special Operations forces, and is familiar
with its mountainous terrain, said he understood how
insurgents in hiding could have employed a rocket-propelled
grenade to down the helicopter. Smith thanked the UAE for
contributing its own Special Forces to Operation Enduring
Freedom and for training a Bahraini Special Forces contingent
to serve alongside them in Afghanistan.


4. (C) Smith said he expected more violence in Afghanistan in
the run-up to the September election. If the remnant Taliban
forces do not succeed in disrupting the election, "it's over
for them," he said. Already, 163 mid-level Taliban leaders
have indicated they are "ready for conciliation." Some of
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's followers are ready to reconcile as
well, he added. Al Kaabi said the Taliban did not have
another option. He noted that some Afghan expatriates with
Taliban sympathies living in Al Ain in the Emirate of Abu
Dhabi had to be stopped from trying to create their own legal
system. Smith said the Taliban tried to re-establish
themselves in the Kandahar area by taking over a village and
establishing their own laws. The government had to "go in
and take it back." Al Kaabi also said that President Karzai
continued to view Pakistanis with suspicion. "He sees a
Pakistani behind every tree."


5. (C) Smith briefed Al Kaabi on efforts to train the Afghan
National Army, saying that 22,000 troops have received
training to date, with a goal of training 70,000 troops by

2007. The challenge is finding suitable military leadership,
he said. Al Kaabi said if the U.S. provides the training and
then turns over the military command to the Afghans, the
Afghans "will find their way." The U.S. is doing exactly
that through "embedded training teams," Smith said. Prior to
the September election, there will be a troop increase,
including one battalion each from Spain, the Netherlands, the
UK, and the U.S., and three from NATO. Those forces will
stay on the ground for 90 days during the election period.
After the election, if possible, the U.S. will reduce the
number of its conventional forces slightly, Smith said.


6. (C) Parenthetically, the Ambassador noted the strong
relationship between the UAE and Pakistan (President
Musharraf recently traveled to Abu Dhabi to meet with
President Khalifa and senior leaders). Al Kaabi, who spent
seven months training in Peshawar earlier in his career,
nodded in agreement and proceeded to describe the challenges
of combatting the weapons and drug trade in the
Pakistani-Afghan border areas.

DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ
--------------


7. (C) Smith also briefed Al Kaabi on the situation in Iraq,
noting that 170,000 Iraqi troops had been trained and
equipped to date, with the goal of training 200,000 troops by
October 2005, and 205,000 troops by January 2006. He said
that the First Brigade in Baghdad is operating independently
and is in control of some difficult neighborhoods. An
additional 22 battalions are within a few months of becoming
independent, he said. Iraqi troops are fighting successfully
in Mosul and Fallujah, and are fighting in the Tigris and
Euphrates valleys where U.S. forces believe some of the
insurgent leadership is located and where Iraqis have helped
find weapons caches. Smith said the U.S. would probably
increase its forces by a brigade for the October 2005
constitutional referendum and the December 2005 election, and
only begin to reduce forces after January 2006. Smith said
that U.S. forces serving on "transition teams" embedded with
the Iraqi military are a success story. Once the Iraqis say
they are ready to take over, the U.S. forces will leave, he
said.

BORDER SECURITY ) A CHALLENGE FOR IRAQIS AND EMIRATIS
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Al Kaabi identified weak border security as a major
challenge in Iraq and the UAE. Smith recalled telling
California Congressman Duncan Hunter, who had asked him
whether having another U.S. division would secure Iraq's
borders, that border security was not something land forces
could do well. Smith said the problem in Iraq was that the
thousands of persons coming across the border from Syria,
Jordan, and Saudi Arabia "appear to be legal." Some may be
using forged documents. The authorities do not have any
biomedical data that could help them determine who should and
should not be admitted to Iraq. Smith said that smugglers
along the Iraq-Syria border were sophisticated tunnel
builders, burrowing under berms and digging holes under
fences. Some prisoners in Iraq have employed ingenious
techniques in an attempt to dig escape tunnels, he said.


9. (C) Al Kaabi drew parallels with the UAE's border with
Saudi Arabia, and noted that there were currently 10 firms
building a wall along the entire UAE border in an attempt to
stop smuggling and illegal immigration. The project is
scheduled for completion by the end of 2005. Apparently
prepared to discuss the topic of UAE-Saudi border tension, Al
Kaabi produced a photo book containing illustrations of the
UAE-Saudi border, the wall that is under construction, and
the UAE frontier troops deployed there. In response to the
Ambassador's question, Al Kaabi said the Saudis were building
up their border forces as well. Al Kaabi said the UAE has
witnessed the same determination by smugglers trying to enter
into the UAE, or trying to smuggle drugs into the UAE.

IRANIAN INFLUENCE ON IRAQ
--------------


10. (C) Al Kaabi said Iran was trying to influence Iraqi
internal affairs, but he personally did not think Iran posed
as much of a threat as Hizbollah in Lebanon. Smith said the
U.S. remains wary about the Iranians and Iranian influence on
SCIRI and Moqtada Al Sadr. However, he said that he was not
that concerned that Iran would influence the new Iraqi
government. In Smith's view, Grand Ayattolah Ali SISTANI was
having a positive influence on the Iraqi political scene and
did not appear to be interested in a close relationship with
Iran. Al Kaabi said to rule Iraq, you have to be tough, and
that Iraqis were accustomed to having tough rulers. Smith
replied that the U.S. believes a representative government
could work in Iraq. Al Kaabi agreed, noting that Shi'a
moderate Iyad Allawi could be a visionary leader who would
not play the sectarian card. (Note: Allawi remains a
frequent visitor to Abu Dhabi. Al Kaabi indicated that the
had met Allawi during the latter's most recent visit.)

REBUILDING IRAQ
--------------


11. (C) Smith said that the new Iraqi ministers of defense
and interior had been performing well and were determined to
protect the country's oil and power infrastructure. He cited
an Iraqi opinion poll that found most Iraqis were more
concerned about having electricity, water, and jobs than they
were about security. Al Kaabi said Iraq would be an
important country in about five years' time and that its
highly educated population would be an asset. Smith said
that Iraqis had a good work ethic, but Saddam had neglected
the infrastructure in favor of building palaces instead of
maintaining water treatment plants, power plants, and oil
wells.


12. (C) Al Kaabi said that Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh
Mohammed bin Zayed had instructed him to ask Smith how the
UAE could be helpful in Iraq. Smith said that Iraqis needed
basic computer and communications training, as well as a
modernized banking system, to make up for the years of
neglect under Saddam. Smith said one of the legacies of
Saddam's time was that one-third of the Iraqi armed forces
are on leave at any given time because soldiers and officers
need time to collect their pay and return to their villages
and take care of their families' needs. Al Kaabi inquired
about the status of members of Saddam's army and police.
Smith said that many of the current police chiefs and
officers were former army officers, and that the desertion
problem has declined. He acknowledged that it would take
time for the Iraqi Transitional Government to allow former
Saddam officials to fill leadership positions. Former
Republican Guard members are still not acceptable to the new
Iraqi leadership, Smith said. During the exchange, Al Kaabi
confirmed that the Swiss government had finally approved the
transfer of more than 150 M-113 Armed Personnel Carriers to
Iraq via the UAE (ref A).

UAE AIR FORCE UPDATE
--------------


13. (C) Smith, accompanied by Ambassador and Acting USLO
Chief, also met July 2 with UAE Air Force and Air Defense
Commander Major General Khaled Al Buainnan. Khaled opened by
noting the UAE's interest in building a high-speed rail line
to Qatar. The project, part of a planned causeway, is
opposed by the Saudis because it bypasses the kingdom, Khaled
said.


14. (U) The UAE-Qatar causeway plan is one aspect of the
mounting tension between Saudi Arabia and the UAE over their
common boundaries. The dispute dates back to a 1974 Border
Agreement in which the UAE relinquished to Saudi Arabia a
25-kilometer coastal area known as Khor Al Adeed, separating
Abu Dhabi and Qatar, and also relinquished 80 percent of the
giant Zararah/Shaybah oil field (ref B). Deputy Prime
Minister/Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamdan
bin Zayed told NEA PDAS Cheney during her June 26 visit that
he would travel to Riyadh in July to meet again with Saudi
Interior Minister Prince Nayef to follow up on Nayef's June
19 visit to Abu Dhabi, but he was not optimistic about those
talks.


15. (C) Smith inquired about the UAE's F-16 Block 60 "Desert
Falcon" fighter aircraft, the first batch of which was
delivered on May 3. Khaled expressed his satisfaction on
this achievement. They reviewed operational, maintenance,
and training issues related to the fighter aircraft. In
discussing the UAE Desert Falcon program, Khaled stated that
MBZ directed that only Lieutenants and Captains be assigned
to fly the aircraft, no one higher. All who have entered
training with the exception of senior squadron leadership
have been Captains, some of whom have since been promoted to
Major while in training. Khaled stated he had 61 pilots
already trained (F-16 basic training provided by Turkey and
the USAF, not Block 60 training) all of whom were First
Lieutenants or Captains. When asked about aircraft
maintenance, Khaled noted UAE plans for long term follow-on
support. He acknowledged the UAEAF need for a dedicated FMS
case but was non-committal on when he intended to pursue such
support.


16. (C) Khaled further requested the U.S. Navy's
participation in future Gulf Air Warfare Center classes, UAE
Air Force hosted exercises, and with US Navy ships in the
Gulf. Khaled indicated a strong desire for participation of
AWACs or E-2C participation as well in future GAWC classes.
Khaled concluded by asking for CENTCOM support in providing
valuable air-to-air refueling operations to help his pilots
maintain their currency. Acting USLO Chief pointed out to
Khaled that it was necessary to conclude the bilateral
Acquisition Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) to help
facilitate refueling operations. Staff Pilot Col. Mahash Al
Hameli, Chief of UAE Air Force Intelligence and Security, who
also attended the meeting, acknowledged that the ACSA was key
to going forward on the UAEAF aerial refueling operation
request. Khaled indicated his desire to have this agreement
concluded soon. As of July 3, to the Embassy's knowledge,
ACSA was still in the interagency clearance process.

Comment:
--------------


17. (C) It was unusual for two UAE senior military officers
to be making points about the UAE-Saudi border dispute, a
political topic recently raised by Deputy Prime
Minister/Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamdan
bin Zayed during NEA PDAS Cheney's June 26 visit (ref B).
That Al Kaabi would produce a photo book showing the UAE's
frontier corps on the border and construction of the wall,
and that Khaled would mention the rail and causeway projects
at the start of his meeting, are indications that UAEG
officials are wanting to get their position out to a broader
audience (septel to follow). The local press has been giving
the issue prominent coverage in recent days.
SISON