DEFENSE MINISTER ON DOMESTIC SITUATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L YEREVAN 000885

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM AM
SUBJECT: DEFENSE MINISTER ON DOMESTIC SITUATION


Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway for reasons 1.5 (B, D)


1. (C) Defense Minister Serzh Sargsian joined the
Ambassador in opening a EUCOM-funded hospital renovation on
April 14. During the course of the event, the Ambassador had
a 30-minute one-on-one conversation with him. On the issue
of the dispersal of the anti-Kocharian demonstration on April
12, Sargsian was uncompromising. He defended the need to
clear the streets, and blamed the opposition for creating a
situation in which the authorities had no other course they
could take. He pointed out that they had not interfered in
the April 9 rally, nor had they acted in any way against the
"sit-in" conducted in the square adjacent to the Opera House.
They also had not acted to prevent the march up Baghramian
to the blocking point in front of the U.S. Embassy -- and had
let the rally continue for over eight hours. It was not, he
argued, that the government was trying to stifle the
opposition in expressing its views. Rather, in his analysis,
the opposition had deliberately and purposefully chosen to
conduct the Baghramian demonstration because the authorities
had not reacted to the previous demonstrations. For their
own purposes, he said, they needed a reaction from the
government that would, in their concept, stimulate further
mass support from the populace. Sargsian charged that in
this analysis, the opposition had been gravely mistaken:
there was not overwhelming support for them in the
population.


2. (C) The Ambassador told Sargsian that it was now
imperative to begin a dialogue with the opposition, and take
steps to involve them in productive political activity.
Sargsian immediately responded that the opposition was not
interested in a dialogue. The Ambassador said that this was
correct, but only for now. It was important for the
authorities to now reduce the pressure, release detainees,
and stop raiding political party headquarters. If this were
done, it would create conditions that would be conducive to
the dialogue. Sargsian immediately responded, "of course, we
will do all that." He then veered off onto charges that at
least elements of the opposition were violent, had committed
criminal acts, and that calls for violent overthrow of the
President were themselves criminal acts. The Ambassador
again urged that the police and prosecutors not pursue the
vast majority of opposition figures who were using
non-violent, political means. Although he expressed
continuing skepticism about whether the opposition would ever
be prepared to enter into a dialogue, he reiterated that they
intended to follow the very course the Ambassador had
outlined.


3. (C) Comment: Compared to the discussion with President
Kocharian on April 13, Sargsian was if anything more intense
on the culpability of the opposition, and on the need for
tough measures to counter them. However, unlike the
President, he gave no sign that there was any consideration
to continuing legal actions against the opposition. While
Kocharian was talking in terms of lessening the pressure if
and only if the opposition engaged with the governing
coalition, Sargsian presented that course as a matter of fact.

ORDWAY