CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP OF

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 000348 SIPDIS STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP JOINT STAFF FOR DD, PMA-A FOR WTC COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) NSC FOR CHUPA WINPAC FOR LIEPMAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL CWC SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP OF FEBRUARY 3-6 INDUSTRY INTERSESSIONALS This is CWC-18-04 -------------- Captive Use -------------- ¶1. (U) The decision regarding Schedule 2/3 Captive Use remains on a political track, with the Indian delegation indicating they support the Schedule 2/3 Captive Use decision, as written, but noting their interagency review process has not yet completed. Privately, the Indians informed Del that their consideration of the issue is moving in the "right direction," that the text of the decision document has received support by their technical experts, and lacks only acceptance by their legal authorities. ¶2. (U) To avoid reopening the text of the Schedule 2/3 Captive Use decision and allow the political process to continue, the facilitator (Rudduck, UK) focused discussion on the German paper regarding Schedule 1 Captive Use. Canada was the only delegation to raise serious concerns with the German paper, citing that any decision clarifying the declarability of Schedule 1 Captive Use creates a requirement in absence of demonstrated activity. The Canadians noted that all German examples are speculative and that, to their knowledge, no production of Schedule 1 chemicals is ongoing. Furthermore, the Canadians noted that Schedule 1 "unwanted byproducts or intermediates" produced during manufacture of Schedule 1 chemicals should not be declared, either on their own or as elements of facility aggregate production totals. The Russian Federation seconded the Canadian intervention. ¶3. (U) Del and the United Kingdom noted the examples provided in German paper are derived from open literature and though no evidence exists suggesting undeclared Schedule 1 Captive Use production is ongoing, use of the listed production pathways cannot be ruled out. Del and the UK further stated that any production of Schedule 1 above relevant thresholds constitutes a declarable activity and the treaty, existing law and regulations already cover that production. However, Del and UK asserted that clarifying Schedule 1 Captive Use is subject to declaration if applicable thresholds are exceeded, and this rationale is consistent with the rationale for clarification in regards to captive use for Schedule 2/3 chemicals. -------------- Clarification of Declarations -------------- ¶4. (U) Discussion focused on the Technical Secretariat's (TS) approach towards clarification requests and TS clarification request status reports to the Executive Council (EC). To facilitate understanding of the process, the facilitator (Williams, U.S.) arranged for the TS to brief participants on the current status of clarification requests and to detail conditions under which the TS might not consider a plant site inspectable based upon ambiguities or inconsistencies in data declarations. The TS removes plant sites from the inspectable facilities if a clarification requests has been issued relative to: ambiguities in declared quantities, plant site address, declared activity years, production range codes, incorrect CAS numbers where no chemicals are specified, incorrect chemical names and mismatched CAS/chemical names. States Parties (SP) expressed concern that this approach results in plant sites being insulated from verification activities simply by withholding responses. ¶5. (U) States Parties also expressed concern that, given the compliance-related nature of such ambiguities, in particular in relation to plant site inspectability, TS reporting to the EC on clarification requests has not been consistent or meticulous. States Parties called upon the TS to gather further data and report, during the next round of consultations, on how many plant sites have been removed from verification consideration in the past and the status of outstanding clarification requests related to the inspectability of plant sites. ¶6. (U) Regarding the facilitator's proposal, some delegations (Canada, Italy) requested the timeframe for responses to clarification requests return to a 60-day window. The TS presentation seemed to support a shorter window as well, as that would have less effect on planning inspections. However, the majority of delegations appeared satisfied with the 90-day timeframe contained in the revised proposal. The Indian delegation also requested that the use of the word "ambiguities" in the second operative paragraph be reconsidered, given its use in the treaty and relation to on-site verification activities and access. No SP, however, raised serious objection to the text proposed and a decision appears ripe for adoption during EC-36 in the form circulated to SP prior to the March 3 consultations. -------------- Schedule 2 Facility Agreements -------------- ¶7. (U) Pursuant to SP's request during the previous round of consultations, the facilitators (Heinzer, Switzerland and Abe, Japan) arranged for TS Inspection Team Leaders (ITLs) to present their views on the use of Schedule 2 facility agreements during subsequent inspections. ITLs (Steyn and Mears) confirmed that inspection teams do not find facility agreements useful during subsequent inspection for inspection planning or conduct. ITLs noted they use draft facility agreements, if available, for information purposes only. ITLs speculated that facility agreements may provide some utility for an inspected State Party (iSP) if health, safety, equipment, sampling or analysis procedures, or other specific administrative arrangements would impact the conduct of an inspection, but did not view these as critical to the TS conduct of inspections. ¶8. (U) Discussions revealed a general consensus on a phased approach for improving the facility agreement process may be preferable. In such an approach, the first step would be for the TS to demonstrate greater flexibility in the field to reach agreement with an iSP not to conclude a facility agreement. To this end, SP requested the TS to draft and circulate, to inspection teams and States Party, guidelines or criteria to expand the ability of TS teams to determine that a facility agreement is unnecessary. Such criteria may include facility type, complexity and estimated inspection frequency. As a second step, SP noted that a streamlined format for facility agreements is desirable, but recognized that such a process runs the risk of opening up issues resolved by the model facility agreement and could be time consuming. Therefore, streamlining of declarations could be a longer-term goal. ¶9. (U) Though the TS was receptive to ideas on how to improve the process, the TS remains concerned that to draft guidelines that would result in a "significant" reduction of facility agreements proposed to the EC exceeds their authority. Therefore, the TS indicated that some decision or report language to draft flexible guidelines may be necessary to provide the TS with top-cover. (COMMENT: Report language urging the TS to make greater use of the "opt-out" provision in the CWC should be developed as soon as possible. This will provide both policy direction and political cover for a change in TS practice. END COMMENT.) -------------- Schedule 2A/2A* Low Concentrations -------------- ¶10. (U) UK experts delivered a detailed presentation based on their Perfluoroisobutylene (PFIB) paper ("Report on investigations into industrial production of PFIB at Tetrafluoroethylene (TFE) and Hexafluoropropylene (HFP) monomer production facilities" 26 Jan 04),which essentially says that because TFE and HFP manufacturers have the capability to produce the unwanted by-product, PFIB, in large quantities in high concentration, both via chemistry and engineering changes to the process, they pose a risk to the object and purpose of the Convention. States Parties were set to "receive" mode, and offered little comment either in support or non-support of the UK proposal. ¶11. (U) The facilitator (Wade, UK) also circulated a draft decision covering each of the three Schedule 2A/2A* chemicals (Amiton, PFIB and BZ). States Parties indicated such a decision was not ripe for text agreement yet, given that technical discussions remain ongoing, but that such a decision is consistent with the SP desire to have ONE decision for all three chemicals. However, since the decision document suggests .1% appropriate for Amiton and PFIB and no concentration for BZ (all should be declared), some SP, including the UK, Italy, India and France, expressed a desire to see the chemicals treated equally, with ONE set concentration limit. No countervailing views were offered. ¶12. (U) COMMENT: ONE read of the UK paper suggests that a cumulative total for quantity is acceptable for declaration purposes and any spike above relevant concentration threshold would trigger a declaration requirement. Del notes this appears inconsistent with the understanding reached on Boundaries of Production and Schedule 2/3 Captive Use that stipulates that a declaration requirement is triggered if both concentration and quantity are exceeded, simultaneously. END COMMENT. ¶13. (U) Italy suggested that 0.5% is more appropriate for BZ, in particular, and circulated a paper in support ("Technical Document on Schedule 2A* (BZ) Chemicals Declarations for Low Concentrations" 4 February 04). In this paper, the Italians argue that the U.S. paper on Clidinium Bromide, circulated during the last round of discussions, does not reflect the standard synthesis route for CB, and is incorrect on an important process point. Specifically, the Italian paper notes that "the hypothesis formulated by the USA in which industrial producers (producers of Clidinium Bromide),could react the compounds simultaneously, is not feasible from a technical point of view". If this statement is correct, there are potential implications for the minimum viable concentration of BZ in the process; as a result, this is the core of the Italian argument for a 0.5% threshold. Del, supported by Germany, requested the Italians provide back up data for their assertion. No other SP offered alternative concentrations. -------------- Handbook on Chemicals/Declaration Handbook -------------- ¶14. (U) States Parties appeared to reach consensus on EC report language to request the TS to place an asterisk (*) by Schedule 2/3 chemicals which have been declared since entry into force to the TS in the Handbook on Chemicals. Such a marking could assist non-technical personnel in making declarations for scheduled chemical imports, exports, production, processing and consumption activities. Schedule 1 marking, however, remains undecided. The facilitator (Ruck, Germany) circulated a paper containing proposals on setting a marking threshold for Schedule 1 chemicals that would differentiate between those listed due to small quantity research and analytical purposes and those normally commercially produced and/or traded. ¶15. (U) The facilitator also reviewed his changes (correction and administrative) to the Handbook on Chemicals and requested interested SP to review. The bulk of the changes eliminated duplicate entries and errors in chemical names/structural diagrams. Based upon input, the facilitator anticipates presenting the comments to the TS for incorporation into a revised version of the Handbook. Del requested to be involved in this project and awaits an electronic copy of proposed changes for transmittal. -------------- -- Clarification Requests - Transfer Discrepancies -------------- -- ¶16. (U) Facilitator (Williams, U.S.) focused discussion on instructing the TS to apply logic and clear rationales for pursuing clarification requests and reporting such requests to the EC, in relation to transfer discrepancies. Rather than setting standards and guidelines at present, SP called upon the TS to revise their methodology and report on progress achieved by June 2004, which will allow the TS to accommodate the first submissions of C-7/Dec.14 streamlined data. Should SP continue to have concerns regarding TS clarification requests, SP expressed their intent to provide specific recommendations and/or standards for transfer discrepancy resolution. Germany, Italy and the U.S. were most insistent regarding the need for the TS to revise their process. ¶17. (U) The majority of SP were clear that the TS role is not to pursue a "material balance" for transfer reconciliation and only to pursue clarifications of transfers which appear substantively inconsistent and of compliance concern, deemed reportable under Article VIII, paragraph 40 to the EC. (COMMENT: As in the case of facility agreement discussions, EC report language could be useful both to give general policy direction on this matter to the TS and to provide political "top cover" for changes from current practice. Given the substantial agreement among delegations on key points, such language could probably be agreed in time for the 36th EC session. END COMMENT.) ¶18. (U) Javits sends. SOBEL