CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WEEKLY WRAP-UP

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 003197

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR JOECK
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WEEKLY WRAP-UP
FOR DECEMBER 3


This is CWC-145-04.


1. (U) The wrap-up includes items from discussions on the
margins of the November 24 special Executive Council session
and the Nov 29-Dec 2 Conference of States Parties (CSP) which
were informally reported back to Washington.

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TAIWAN
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2. (U) The application by the Taiwan Chemical Industry
Association for observer status at the CSP was denied, on the
recommendation of the conference organizers, on the grounds
that Taiwan is not an entity recognized by the UN or the
OPCW. For that reason, an association from Taiwan could not
be given observer status. The real reason was that the
Chinese delegation had made clear in the run-up to the CSP
that it objected to the application. Despite the message
conveyed by the U.S. and other delegations to working level
officials of the Taipei Representative Office in the
Netherlands on the importance of Taiwan broaching this
subject with the PRC, Taiwan failed to do so, and the
rejection of observer status was inevitable.

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WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT APPLICATION
--------------


3. (U) On Nov. 29, the first day of the CSP, the Asian
Group, at the request of Iran and Pakistan, objected to the
application of the Wassenaar Arrangement as an international
organization, specialized agency or international body
approved to attend the CSP, claiming that it was an
"exclusionary" body. The U.S. objected to the position taken
by the Asian Group. There was no final resolution of this
issue as Sergei Zamyatin, the representative of the Wassenaar
Arrangement, had to depart The Hague early on Dec. 1.


4. (U) Zamyatin informed the Del that the Wassenaar
Arrangement had decided a few months ago that it needed to do
more outreach. After receipt of the OPCW notice regarding
the CSP, the decision was made to seek observer status. The
result leaves open the possibility of the Wassenaar
Arrangement being granted observer status at the next CSP,
and Zamyatin took the point that the prospects of approval
would be improved it the group made an earlier application
and addressed the objections brought by Iran and Pakistan.

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ARTICLE VII
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5. (U) The U.S. and other delegations were informally
notified on the margins of the CSP that the facilitator for
Article VII, Mark Matthews (UK),has asked to relinquish this
portfolio due to the demands of the upcoming UK Presidency of
the EU in the second half of 2005. There is general
agreement that Ronald Munch (FRG) will succeed Matthews in
handling the Article VII facilitation beginning in January.

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IRAQ
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6. (U) Ahmed N. Jewad, the new Minister at the Iraqi Embassy
in The Hague, arrived on December 1 and attended the CSP as
an observer. Ambassador Javits and several members of the
U.S. delegation met with Jewad to welcome him to his new post.

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DROC
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7. (U) During the CSP, Del reps met with the two observers
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Omari Lea
Sisi, Third Vice President of the Defense and Security
Commission of the National Assembly (e-mail:
olsgudi@yahoo.fr, phone: 002 439 891 1076) and Paul Empole
Losoko Efambe (Paul Empole),Director of International
Organizations, MFA (e-mail: pelosef@yahoo.fr, phone 243-9841
1394). Sisi, who spoke almost no English, discussed the
issues facing the DRC's accession effort, which include
contested borders with its neighbors, recent civil wars, and
a government composed of four factions. In spite of this,
Sisi was hopeful that the DRC would accede in the next
several months and informally requested U.S. assistance,
promising to follow up with an e-mail. Del reps noted that
France and others also are willing to assist, but Sisi
emphasized that the DRC wants to work with the U.S. and did
not want to ask France or Belgium for assistance.
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UNIVERSALITY
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8. (U) Del reps attended a December 2 lunch hosted by the
Technical Secretariat and Tunisia for Points of Contact
(POCs). Facilitator Hela Lahmar presented her initiative
regarding creation of an internet-based network for POCs to
exchange information regularly despite their worldwide
locations. A member of the Arab League attended, and made a
long statement regarding the Arab States not Party's
willingness to accede to the CWC, but that this would not be
possible until Israel acceded to the NPT. Del reps noted
Washington's willingness to participate in
Universality-related activities and yet again asked for the
2005 calendar of Universality-related events.


9. (U) Privately, a frustrated Ioan Tudor told del rep that
the External Relations Division had developed its calendar of
events, but that the International Support Branch (ISP) was
dragging its heels and not cooperating, using the just
concluded meeting of the National Authorities as its current
excuse. Furthermore the DG wanted to issue just one list, so
that ERD needed to wait for ISP. Tudor hoped that the
calendar would be available in another few weeks.

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INDUSTRY ISSUES
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10. (U) Del met with facilitator (Steve Wade/UK) for 2A/2A*
Low Concentrations and the German technical representative
(Manfred Ruck/Germany) to evaluate options for bringing this
long-standing industry issue to a close. The facilitator
continues to prefer a .5% concentration for each of the
chemicals and continues to not be receptive to alternative
solutions, despite the opposition of major industrial
players, including the U.S., Germany, France and Japan, to
.5% for all three 2A/2A* chemicals.


11. (U) During the meeting, the Del and German rep offered
the view that the assumptions underlying why these chemicals
appear in the Schedule 2A/2A* special category may be flawed.



12. (U) Amiton appears on 2A/2A* because it was assumed at
the time of treaty negotiation that it could not be placed in
Schedule 1 because of its industrial applications. Del noted
this assumption proved false, as no State Party has declared
any production, processing, consumption or transfer of
Amiton. In addition, Germany offered the view that setting a
low concentration for Amiton is an "empty box" because, from
a technical view, Amiton is produced at a concentration well
above 30% and would, therefore, be captured at the highest
default concentration applied by States Parties on a national
basis. For these reasons, Del reiterated its offer to the
facilitator that Amiton be handled not by setting an
extremely low concentration, but by recommending to the EC
that Amiton be moved to Schedule 1. The facilitator again
indicated that, in his view, recommending a movement of
chemical between the schedules is beyond his mandate for
2A/2A* facilitation, but grudgingly noted he would consider
such a recommendation for EC report language should he not be
able to achieve consensus on a low concentration of .5% for
Amiton.


13. (U) Regarding perfluoroisobutylene (PFIB),Del and the
Germans again informed the facilitator that we do not support
a low concentration for PFIB below 30% based upon the lack of
evidence that such low concentrations of PFIB present a
significant proliferation risk. Again, this may be an
instance where assumptions regarding PFIB forced it into a
special category within the schedules. Although PFIB has an
industrial application as an unwanted by-product of
tetrafluoroethylene (TFE) and hexafluoropropylene (HFP)
production, the generally understood rationale for placing it
on 2A/2A* was due to its potential use as a mask-breaker or
as a chemical weapon. It appears from the evidence collected
nationally as well as the evidence presented by the
facilitator, that neither of these assumptions proved
correct.


14. (U) Several delegations, including the Germans, but
notably, the Japanese have insisted that PFIB presents much
less of a proliferation risk that its toxic kindred of
phosgene and hydrogen cyanide, which proliferators can
arguable more readily find, acquire, and store. PFIB, on the
other hand, is manufactured only in a handful of plants
world-wide and is, in all known cases, produced and destroyed
by continuous, in-line destruction methods (pyrolysis or
methanolysis). Through the discussion, the facilitator
maintained that a low concentration is necessary because PFIB
is highly toxic and manufacturers could, with a few
modifications to the process, produce PFIB in large
quantities at high concentration.


15. (U) Both the Del and German representative pointed out
this was true of nearly every chemical on the schedules and
that declarations are based on activity, not capability.
Furthermore, since the UK position, which is being pushed by
the facilitator, is that a low concentration is desirable so
that all PFIB producers are declared, Del and Germany reps
offered the view that the facilitator focus on making clear
that TFE and HFP producers, which manufacture PFIB as a
by-product, are already required to be declared under the
"other chemical production facility" (OCPF) category.


16. (U) As a solution, Del suggested that we might consider
setting a concentration for declaration in a range, from
.5%-30% to uphold national legislations already in force and
make a concentration applicable to those States Parties who
have yet to set a designation. Second, the suggestion is
that the facilitator emphasize to SP that PFIB producers are
already declarable under the OCPF regime and therefore there
is reason to consider whether creating or designating a
separate product group code category for fluoropolymer
production would be useful for transparency purposes.


17. (U) Third, the suggestion is that the facilitator
consider suspending discussions until after the next Review
Conference to allow for information regarding PFIB's
proliferation risk to be compiled and analyzed, since this is
the primary reason for concern and what distinguishes this
chemical from the rest of the scheduled chemicals. As a
tangent discussion spurred on by the mention of moving Amiton
to Schedule 1, participants also speculated whether a future
move of PFIB from Schedule 2A to Schedule 3 as a toxic
chemical might be another solution. In the end, however, the
facilitator continues to insist that the appropriate way to
handle PFIB is through a low concentration of .5%, and that
he intends to continue discussions in the intersessional
forum to achieve this low concentration goal.


18. (U) Regarding BZ, Germany indicated it is, officially,
not flexible and prefers not to adopt a low concentration for
BZ. The facilitator indicated his interpretation that .5% is
the appropriate low concentration. Del offered that, while
we have not settled on an appropriate number for a low
concentration, we do understand the argument for a low
concentration based on the history of BZ as a weapon, the
technical aspects of its manufacture which appear to justify
a sub-30% threshold, and that BZ is, with regard to
regulatory requirements, different as it is applied as a
disparate quantity threshold and is distinguished by an "*"
from its other Schedule 2A colleagues.


19. (U) Germany informally indicated they might be flexible
given these facts, but that .5% continues to be too low. It
noted that in an earlier EC decision regarding transfers to
non-States Parties, the low concentration agreed to trigger
reporting to the OPCW was 1% and setting a low concentration
must be reconciled with this decision to avoid confusion to
industry. Germany senses that 1% might be a more appropriate
low concentration, therefore, to adopt for production
declarations. The facilitator, again, insisted that .5% is
the appropriate designation for BZ and that he has a near
consensus on this figure.

20. (U) Del spoke briefly with the Canadian delegation
regarding their opposition to a decision on Schedule 1
captive use. Canada has opposed such a decision in the past
on the grounds that a Schedule 1 decision would be
"regulation for regulation's sake", given that there is no
known Schedule 1 production involving captive use situations.
The counter-argument, spearheaded by the FRG, but backed by
the U.S., Japan, and France, is that a decision is necessary
to ensure the definitions in Article II are applied evenly
across the schedules and to dispel any notion SPs might have
that situations exist where industrial production could occur
above concentration and above quantity thresholds that does
not require declaration. The backbone of the Canadian
argument has been that any decision clarifying such
production as declarable would have an adverse effect on
future research and development activities because of the one
ton cap on Schedule 1 production in any SP.


21. (U) During this discussion, the Canadians clarified
their stance and agreed that captive use production should be
declared and verified but that such production should not
count towards the one ton cap. The Canadian admission that
such activities are declarable is a significant deviation
from previous statements made during the industry cluster
sessions. Del offered sympathy for the Canadian desire not
to see medical, pharmaceutical or other legitimate endeavors
not hampered by the one ton cap, but offered that the
decision to clarify the consistent application of definitions
must not be confused with this argument. Instead, Del
offered the comment that what may be necessary is to pursue
to two-step approach.


22. (U) First, all States Parties join in language that
reflects a common agreement that the treaty currently
unequivocally captures all Article VI Schedule 1 production
activities above concentration and quantity thresholds,
regardless of Schedule. Second, States Parties should ask
the question "is this right?" Since a blanket approach
towards every possible scenario is usually never the right
answer, SPs may want to evaluate the merits of potentially
excluding Schedule 1 captive use production for specific,
medical or pharmaceutical purposes from applying towards the
one ton cap. Certainly the intent of the treaty is not to
derail pursuit of or hamper production of the "silver bullet"
for cancer. Del offered what may be needed is further
consideration by the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) or
decision language that indicates the need to address such
situations on a "case-by-case" basis in lieu of the one ton
cap.


23. (U) Javits sends.
RUSSEL