CUBA/NETHERLANDS/EU: NO CONSENSUS (YET) TO CHANGE EU POSITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 003006



SIPDIS



STATE FOR EUR AND WHA



E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2014

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PGOV, CU, NL, EUN

SUBJECT: CUBA/NETHERLANDS/EU: NO CONSENSUS (YET) TO CHANGE

EU POSITION



REF: A. (A) BRUSSELS 4662



B. (B) STATE 228300



Classified By: POL Counselor Andrew Schofer for reasons 1.4 (b/d)



1. (C) Summary: According to Dutch presidency contacts, there

is no immediate prospect of changing the EU's policy toward

Cuba. Discussion of the issue at the November 16 EU COLAT

meeting was inconclusive, preserving the status quo. A

discussion of proposals by EU Heads of Mission on ways to

intensify cooperation with Cuban dissidents, while at the

same time reopening contact with the Government of Cuba, is

on the agenda for the December 14 COLAT. The Dutch are

hoping to avoid making a decision during their presidency.

End Summary.



2. (C) Dutch Cuba policy advisor Jan Jaap Groenemeijer told

POLOFF November 17 that no decision had been reached at the

November 16 COLAT meeting to change the EU position.

Therefore, he confirmed, EU policy - including the June 2003

measures - will remain unchanged for the immediate term. The

next opportunity for further discussion will be the December

14 COLAT. Groenemeijer emphasized that participants at the

COLAT "agreed that the EU should intensify its contact with

Cuban dissidents and civil society" and said EU Heads of

Mission in Havana would submit concrete proposals at the

December 14 meeting. Groenemeijer stressed that this

decision was the result of members states' feelings that

"more could be done" in engaging dissidents and civil

society, and contacts could be "more intensive" and/or "more

effective."



3. (C) Groenemeijer noted that the other objective of a

revised EU policy would be a "reopening of contacts with the

Government of Cuba." Groenemeijer said this was the result

of member states' feelings that "the current situation is not

beneficial to the EU, Cuba, or a transition." Groenemeijer

argued that such a reopening would allow the EU to "bring

human rights to the fore" and "steer the GOC toward better

human rights policies" which he felt it had done "pre-2003."

Noting that the GOC had refused contact with EU member states

following the EU's initiation of its policy to invite

dissidents to national day receptions, however, Groenemeijer

stated that more discussion would be necessary regarding

"conditions under which such a reopening could take place."



4. (C) At a reception on the evening of November 17, Marianne

Kappeyne van de Capello, Head of MFA's Western Hemisphere

Affairs Department (who chaired the November 16 COLAT),

confirmed to POLOFF that the EU was looking at ways to revise

its relations with the Cuba in a positive direction. She

noted, however, that Castro's approach to the opposition and

to dialogue on human rights was so negative that it had

poisoned EU efforts in this regard, making it "nearly

impossible" for the EU to reach out.



5. (C) In a separate meeting with POLCOUNS on November 17,

Jaap Werner (Head of the MFA's Political Affairs Department)

said that the Dutch hoped to avoid having the EU take a

decision on this issue during the Dutch presidency. Since

the next national day event would not take place until March,

Werner felt that it would not be too difficult to avoid

making a decision at the December 14 COLAT, thus effectively

pushing the issue into 2005 (and the Luxembourg presidency.)

Werner emphasized that the Dutch national position -- which

they would feel more comfortable expressing once they no

longer held the presidency -- was strongly opposed to

changing the policy on inviting dissidents to national days.

Werner disparaged Spanish efforts to convince the EU to make

a "unilateral gesture" with no hope of a reciprocal gesture

by the GOC, but noted that within the EU only the Germans

continued to make a strong case for maintaining the current

policy; surprisingly, he said, the Nordics and other

traditional human rights proponents were largely silent or,

as in the case of the UK, supported reevaluating the policy.

Werner noted, however, that the Cuban dissidents themselves

had been "quite helpful" in making clear their own feelings

about the proposed changes..



6. (C) Comment: The Dutch clearly feel pressure within the

EU, driven primarily by Spain, to change the EU's policy

toward Cuba. While the EU may try to couch such a change in

terms of "intensifying" contacts with dissidents, clearly the

intent is to strengthen relations with Havana. The current

Dutch strategy of postponing discussion for as long as

possible may get them through the end of their presidency,

but the issue is likely to come to a head as soon as the next

EU national day appears on the calendar in the spring. End

Comment.

SOBEL