TURKEY/EU - FM GUL TO EU: GIVE US OUR DATE WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002789

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM TK NL EUN
SUBJECT: TURKEY/EU - FM GUL TO EU: GIVE US OUR DATE WITH
DESTINY

Classified By: Ambassador Sobel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a low-key visit to The Hague on October
25, Turkish FM Gul reportedly complained about provisions of
the EC's October 6 report that highlighted Turkey's "unique"
situation. He worried it was still uncertain that the
European Council would set a date in December to begin
accession negotiations or that negotiations would be left
open-ended rather than designed to anticipate eventual
accession. Dutch POLDIR Hugo Siblesz told Ambassador Sobel
on October 27 that Gul did not appear to understand that
pressing the EU at this point to go beyond the EC report was
a non-starter; if anything, he said, the European Council's
decision would be even "narrower" than anticipated by the
report. Siblesz added that FM Bot also had been up front in
warning Gul to stop complaining about Turkey's "unique"
treatment by the EU -- Turkey is a unique country with a
unique set of circumstances that must be taken into
consideration. Gul might have ultimately agreed to keep
Turkey's worries in private EU channels, but he reminded the
Dutch that Turkish public opinion must also be taken into
account. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Hannie Pollman-Zaal, MFA director for western and
central Europe, told the DCM on October 27 that the Gul
meeting was "good and open" and that he understands the
bottom line answer will be a "yes" reflecting the Commission
report and drawing language from it. The Turks might not
like some of the language, Pollman predicted, adding that in
her estimation they seemed resigned to living with it.
Turkish Ambassador Ildem separately told DCM he understood
that "this is the ballast we need to keep the "yes" from
being swamped by skeptics in the EU." Pollman said Gul came
into the Bot meeting with a list of complaints about the
Commission report and seemed ready to go public with them,
Pollman-Zaal said. Pollman added that the Dutch had
"objectively explained to the Turks that they should abandon
plans for a public push-back campaign" since it would not
play well to the EU 25 decision makers or publics.


3. (C) "Turkey also has a public opinion to take into
account," Gul reportedly warned the Dutch, according to Sule
Gurel (protect),first secretary at the Turkish Embassy and
notetaker at the Gul/Bot meeting who shared her notes with
Poloff on October 27. She confirmed that Gul's EU strategy
was now to express Turkey's concerns "privately," that is,
choosing to share them closely with the EU Presidency (the
Dutch),not more openly with the press or even other member
states at this time. Gul's concerns about the report's
procedures included especially those for "permanent
safeguards" and the "braking mechanism, she said.


4. (C) Gurel reported that Gul asked the Dutch to ensure a
start date for negotiations including "a clear prospect of
membership," signaling that Turkey had problems with the
Commission's formulation for "open ended negotiations."
Pollman predicted to the DCM that "the starting date will be
the very last thing the Council will decide, after the
operative decision language is hammered out." Pollman
indicated that elements of a draft a draft "paragraph" are
making the rounds in the EU and had been discussed --
although not necessarily shared -- with Gul. Pollman allowed
that the paragraph put on the table at the Council meeting in
December "might not be the one that comes out of the
meeting." Pollman concluded that she has wagered with
colleagues that the European heads will need a second Council
(she guesses December 22) because they will be unable to come
to consensus on Turkey at the December 17 EU Summit.


5. (C) Gurel revealed that her Embassy's assessment of the
Council's December decision is that it will include
unpalatable elements for Turkey, including the "open-ended"
negotiations and "permanent safeguards." She confirmed that
Turkey was aware that others (like the USG) believed Turkey
"should take yes for an answer" and be prepared to move on
past December. The packaging of the Council's decision had
to be just right, she cautioned. (Comment: As one Dutch
colleague put it, "It is like an invitation to a meal; Turkey
should be glad to have been invited to the table and not
complain about what is served, even if there are unsavory
bits on the plate.") Gul and Bot concluded the meeting by
agreeing to stay in "regular" contact, aiming for the
November 24 EU Troika with Turkey and the November 29-30
EUROMED meeting, both in The Hague.


6. (C) Speaking with Poloff on October 29, Pollman asked if
the USG would share with the Dutch what we had heard or
learned from other EU member states regarding their feelings
about the accession process, this as a way to help the Dutch
strategize the end game negotiation. At the same time, she
asked if the USG were planning any new diplomatic initiatives
on Turkey before December, gently reminding that U.S.
reticence on the subject would play best to the EU at this
critical time.


7. (C) Finally, on Cyprus, Pollman said the Dutch were
handling the Government of Cyprus very carefully in the weeks
before December's Council. This meant the Dutch would not be
pressuring them on the trade package issue until after the
December 17 Council resolved Turkey accession. "The Turkey
question is very serious for Cyprus," she said, "and they see
the trade issue the same way. We do not want to give them
too much to handle at one time."
SOBEL