NETHERLANDS/IRAQ: DUTCH WITHDRAWAL POSITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002766

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2014
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR IZ NL NATO
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/IRAQ: DUTCH WITHDRAWAL POSITION
HARDENING


Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Dutch government is determined to end
the current deployment of Dutch troops in Al-Muthanna in
mid-March in accordance with assurances provided to
parliament last June. Defense Minister Kamp will send a
letter to parliament in the next two weeks reaffirming that
Dutch forces will leave Al-Muthanna on schedule. Key reasons
include preserving opposition party support for peacekeeping
operations in general, freeing up capacity for other
operations, and the strong conviction that The Netherlands
has already done more than its share in Iraq. The Dutch are
also determined not to repeat the disaster of Srebenica,
which many attribute to the Dutch failure to set a clear exit
strategy and stick to it. The Foreign and Defense ministers
would like a smaller Dutch presence in Iraq to continue under
the auspices of the NATO and EU training missions. The
British and Japanese are pushing the Dutch to remain in
Al-Muthanna in a more limited capacity, but face stiff
opposition. There is little evident support in the Dutch
government, parliament, or public for a further extension
(although a delay in holding elections might also delay the
Dutch departure slightly.) While the Dutch do not want to
disengage entirely from Iraq, there is a deeply-felt need to
close the chapter on the Al-Muthanna mission before even
beginning to consider a possible future deployment outside
the NATO and EU context. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Dutch Defense Minister Kamp and other senior Dutch
officials are increasingly firm in reaffirming that the Dutch
deployment in Al-Muthanna will conclude at the end of its
current extension on March 15. In Iraq, Kamp recently
announced after meeting with IIG MP Allawi that "staying
longer is no option," noting that having 1,400 troops in the
region for 20 months had been a "major effort." On October
27, Kamp told Ambassador Sobel that he intended to send a
letter to parliament in the next two weeks making clear that
the deployment will end on schedule; the letter is expected
to prompt a debate in parliament on Dutch involvement in
Iraq. According to Kamp, the need to maintain solid and
broad support in parliament is a major driving factor in the
government's deliberations. He was adamant that a
significant majority -- including the main opposition party
-- is necessary to endorse military deployments; forcing a
decision on an extension with a small parliamentary majority
("fifty percent plus one") could have serious negative
repercussions in the future deployments. Kamp also stressed
that the Dutch feel overextended with forces in Afghanistan
and Bosnia, and need flexibility to deal with other
contingencies. (A parliamentary contact told us separately
that many members would like to see the Dutch become more
active in Africa. End Note.) Kamp acknowledged that a slip
in the election schedule might justify a slight extension of
the Dutch deployment, but only by a matter of weeks.


3. (C) Dutch MFA POLDIR Hugo Siblesz separately told
Ambassador Sobel on October 27 that Foreign Minister Bot and
Defense Minister Kamp had met the previous evening to discuss
the Dutch presence in Iraq and to agree on the contents of
the government letter to parliament. According to Siblesz,
Bot and Kamp were in agreement that the current Dutch
deployment in Al-Muthanna would end on March 15 barring
extraordinary and unforeseen circumstances. Only a delay in
holding the elections, Siblesz said, might convince the Dutch
to stay in Al-Muthanna longer, and then only for a "very
limited time" (e.g., a few weeks at most.)


4. (C) Siblesz stressed that Kamp and Bot considered the
government bound by its commitment to parliament last June
that the current extension of the Dutch mission would be the
last. There is no discernible interest in parliament or
among the Dutch public for extending the mission beyond
March, and the coalition government is in no position to be
seen going back on its word. In addition, the Dutch are
increasingly worried that an open-ended commitment in a
deteriorating security environment could lead to another
Srebenica-type disaster, which must be avoided at all costs.
Many in The Netherlands blamed the Srebenica disaster on the
Dutch government's failure to set and stick to a clear exit
strategy. Siblesz noted that appeals to the Dutch based on
the fact that no one else is prepared to take on the Dutch
mission were therefore likely to backfire.


5. (C) On the other hand, Siblesz said that Bot and Kamp were
committed to maintaining a Dutch "presence" in Iraq after
March, albeit in a different form. The Dutch decision to end
its current deployment should not be seen as a desire to
distance The Netherlands from the U.S. or a sign of
dissatisfaction with the Iraqi mission. According to
Siblesz, the Dutch are prepared to contribute trainers to the
NATO training mission in Iraq (Siblesz suggested a "few
dozen") and also a security contingent (approximately 130
troops in total). Kamp separately indicated that the Dutch
are also prepared to contribute to a future EU training
mission.


6. (C) According to the British Embassy here, the British are
actively engaged in seeking to convince the Dutch to remain
in Al-Muthanna, but recognize that they face stiff
opposition. British efforts are currently focused on the
possibility of retaining a smaller Dutch contingent in
Al-Muthanna supported by other, non-Dutch forces. According
to the British Ambassador, even such a limited Dutch presence
would depend on "unforeseen" developments occurring to
justify the extension. (FM Bot reportedly told FM Straw that
it will not be possible to claim that events were
"unforeseen" unless they occur closer to the proposed date of
departure, i.e. in January or February.) PM Blair is
expected to approach PM Balkenende on this issue on October
29 on the margins of the signing ceremony for the EU
Constitutional Treaty in Rome. The Japanese have also been
very active (Kamp told us that he has had six different
meetings with the Japanese Ambassador on this issue) but are
pessimistic on the prospects of a continued Dutch presence.
Kamp will travel to Tokyo in the next few weeks, where he
intends to "explain" to the Japanese why the Dutch feel
impelled to end their Al-Muthanna deployment, and why the
task of finding a replacement force (assuming the Iraqis are
not ready to take this task on themselves) is, in Dutch eyes,
primarily a British responsibility.

COMMENT:
--------------


7. (C) Since August, Kamp has been consistent in stating that
the current deployment would end as scheduled on March 15.
Bot also appears to be determined to stick to ending the
deployment on schedule barring extraordinary circumstances.
Given the fact that there is no discernible public or
parliamentary support for a further extension (other than a
few op-ed pieces focusing on the humanitarian costs to the
Iraqi people),it is not surprising that PM Balkenende has so
far shown no willingness to take the political heat of
pressing his cabinet to break the government's "promise" to
parliament by proposing an extension. It is worth noting
that in the Dutch system, the Prime Minister (technically the
"Minister for General Affairs") is expected to build
consensus positions between independent ministers rather than
force decisions on the cabinet. (All ministers -- including
Balkenende -- technically report directly to the crown.)


8. (C) As a mission, we have been extremely active in the
past few weeks canvassing government and parliamentary
contacts (including the floor leaders and foreign policy
spokesmen of all coalition parties and the primary opposition
parties) on the political implications of an additional Dutch
extension in Al-Muthanna. Nearly all assess that such a move
would have serious negative repercussions for the coalition
government and would make it difficult to develop support for
future peacekeeping operations. With the exception of the
parliamentary leadership of the conservative Liberal Party
(Kamp's own party),the mood in parliament is firmly against
an extension. Technically, we cannot rule out the
possibility of the government winning a slim majority for an
extension, but only if Balkenende and perhaps Bot undertake a
major effort to strong-arm their Christian Democrat Party
into advocating an extension. The government, however, is
firmly committed to obtaining a super majority and appears
unlikely to change. The more limited, NATO and EU-linked
missions described by Siblesz would face far fewer hurdles
gaining parliamentary approval as they can be presented as
"new" missions based on "new" realities. Such missions, in
the government's view, would prove that the Dutch remain
actively engaged in supporting Iraqi reconstruction without
breaking faith with parliament or jeopardizing the consensus
on overseas deployments. It is clear, however, that before
the Dutch will consider an additional national mission to
Iraq, they feel they must first decisively close the book on
the Al-Muthanna mission.


9. (C) Baghdad minimize considered.




SOBEL