NETHERLANDS/EU/CUBA: DUTCH TALK THE TALK, BUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002728

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR AND WHA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2014
TAGS: PREL PHUM CU NL EUN
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/EU/CUBA: DUTCH TALK THE TALK, BUT
STILL LOOK FOR EU UNITY

REF: BRUSSELS 4080

Classified By: POL Counselor Andrew Schofer for Reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary: Cuba's refusal to allow entry to two Dutch
MPs and one Spanish MP on October 15 focused public attention
sharply on Cuba's human rights record and the EU's Cuba's
policies, with many MP's weighing in in favor of a stronger
EU approach. FM Bot called in the Cuban Ambassador to
complain about the incident, and an MFA spokesman called for
a more "effective" EU approach to human rights in Cuba. In
their national capacity, the Dutch position is that the tough
EU restrictions imposed after the March 2003 crackdown should
remain in place; as EU president, however, the Dutch are
limited by their desire to maintain EU unity. If other
states -- e.g. Spain -- build momentum for "softening" the
EU's Cuba policy, the Dutch will not break consensus. End
Summary.

Dutch Furious about MPs Denied Entry to Cuba
--------------


2. (U) FM Bot summoned the Cuban Ambassador on October 18 to
demand an explanation of Cuba's decision to deny entry to
three MPs (two Dutch, one Spanish) on October 15. (The
pre-arranged trip was organized by a local NGO to commemorate
the "Remolcador" tragedy and included meetings with prominent
dissidents.) After the meeting, Bot's spokesman
characterized the Cuban Ambassador's explanation -- that the
MPs had traveled on tourist passports "inappropriately" -- as
"unacceptable" and stressed that the Dutch would seek an EU
policy "most effective in bringing about change in the human
rights situation in Cuba." The story of the
parliamentarians' aborted journey gripped the Dutch media for
days, with Dutch newspapers running op-eds by the MPs
highlighting the plight of dissidents in Cuba and calling for
tougher EU measures to induce Cuba to respect human rights.
Spanish-driven efforts to develop closer relations with the
Cuban government (perceived as being at the expense of Cuban
dissidents) were characterized as "totally unacceptable."


3. (C) In a meeting on October 21 with Poloff, Jan Jaap
Groenemeijer, MFA Cuba policy advisor in the Office of
Western Hemispheric Affairs, said that Cuba clearly wants the
EU to sever contact with dissidents. During his meeting with
Bot, the Cuban Ambassador reportedly referred to dissidents
as "mercenaries" and argued that Europeans should not meet
with them. Recalling the Cuban Ambassador's explanation for
denying entry to the MPs, Groenemeijer commented wryly this
could create the "false impression" that Cuba might ever
issue a visa expressly for the purpose of meeting dissidents.
Groenemeijer added that Spanish MP Maragas had earlier
called for the recall of Spain's ambassador in Havana after
the latter had suggested publicly that the EU should stop
inviting dissidents to national day receptions, and surmised
that this might be one reason for the Cuban decision.
(Groenemeijer noted with concern that the Spanish
Ambassador's statement contradicted EU policy but appeared to
be in line with Spanish efforts to change it.)

Revision of EU Policy?
--------------


4. (C) Groenemeijer confirmed that the Dutch want to maintain
a hard line on Cuba, particularly after the snub from Havana.
Solo Spanish efforts to soften EU policy might not succeed,
he suggested, but he cited a recent EL PAIS article in which
Spanish FM Moratinos claims to have the support of both
London and Paris for a softer approach. Groenemeijer argued
that the Dutch remained resolute that Cuba must improve the
human rights situation before the EU could return to the
pre-2003 "constructive engagement." As EU President,
however, the top priority for the Dutch is to maintain EU
unity. He deplored a split in EU policy as "the best present
to give Cuba," and said the Dutch "would do anything to
prevent it." Groenemeijer stressed that Spain alone could
not turn the EU onto a more lenient course with Cuba, but if
it finds allies it certainly could build momentum in that
direction. Groenemeijer confirmed that Cuba will be on the
agenda November 16 at the EU's next Latin America working
party meeting (COLAT). (It had been on the October agenda
but COLAT referred it back to EU Heads of Mission in Havana
for recommendations.)


5. (C) On October 22, Wouter Plomp, deputy director of the
MFA's Human Rights office, told POLOFF he was "not aware of
any efforts to soften the EU policy on Cuba." Separately,
Aleid Bos, HR officer covering Latin America in the same
office, "noted U.S. concerns" with regard to a possible shift
in the EU's approach to Cuba but said that "that is all I can
say for now." (Note: Both Plomp and Bos confirmed that
Groenemeijer's office has the lead on Cuba policy within the
Dutch MFA, although they frequently provide input with regard
to human rights.)

COMMENT
--------------


6. (C) While the publicity generated by the MP incident has
hardened domestic Dutch opposition against a softer line on
Cuba, the Dutch -- as EU president -- will not stand in the
way of a developing EU consensus driven by a determined
member state. As the Cuba debate within the EU progresses,
it will be important for the Dutch to hear strong voices
opposing a change to enable them to declare that such
consensus does not exist.
SOBEL