EU-CHINA HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE: DISAPPOINTING, BUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 002559 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2014 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KIRF KJUS CH NL SUBJECT: EU-CHINA HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE: DISAPPOINTING, BUT NOT DECISIVE REF: A. USEU TODAY OF 10/5/04 ¶B. THORNTON/TRAUB EMAIL OF 9/28 ¶C. BEIJING 16294 (NOTAL) Classified By: POLCOUNS Andrew Schofer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: While working-level MFA contacts found recent EU-China discussions on human rights disappointing, on balance the October 11 GAERC will almost certainly determine that the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue is worthwhile and should continue. Dutch interlocutors stressed on October 5 and 6 that human rights concerns are just one of four criteria -- along the code of conduct, regional stability, and concerns of non-EU allies -- that will factor in any decision to lift or extend the arms embargo. End Summary. ¶2. (C) On October 5, Gerrie Willems, Dutch MFA China Desk, characterized the EU's September 21-24 visit to China for human rights talks (led by Dutch Special Ambassador for Human Rights Piet de Klerk) as "nothing new" and holding "no surprises." While the MFA will provide a more formal brief on the visit on October 8 (prior to the October 11 GAERC), Willems told POLOFF privately that, in her view, China missed a chance to influence the arms embargo debate positively by taking a more proactive approach to the human rights dialogue with the EU. Instead, the Chinese failed even to respond to the points that the EU had shared with them in advance. Without offering specifics, Willems reported mixed results from the talks themselves: "progress" in the socio-economic field and rule of law, and the opposite with regard to death penalty, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, torture, and related issues. ¶3. (C) Willems recalled that the EU had made clear before the visit that it was looking for concrete actions, not just words, from the human rights dialogue process. The current trip had produced only two concrete results that she could recall: the promise of a visit by the Dalai Lama's representative to Beijing, and the setting of dates (November 15-23) for the oft-delayed visit to China of UNCHR Special Rapporteur on Torture Theo Van Boven (a Dutchman). "There might have been a third item," she added, "but I cannot recall it so it could not have been that important." Willems noted that the October 11 GAERC will consider the history of the human rights dialogue with China with a view to revising it if necessary, but would not comment on the status of this review or likely outcomes. Willems emphasized that, in its national capacity, the Netherlands "shares the USG concerns about China's human rights" and is therefore engaged on human rights issues across the board, with other governments, NGO's, and public opinion. ¶4. (C) With regard to the arms embargo, Willems volunteered that "China did nothing to encourage the EU into lifting the embargo" during the visit. Willems surmised that the Chinese wanted to prove that "they won't be pushed on human rights," and therefore would not link the two issues. She noted, however, that the Chinese had been willing to discuss other "possible EU-China Summit deliverables," although she did not provide details. Willems stressed that the Dutch, as EU president, believe they have an obligation to gather as much information as possible with regard to the arms embargo and human rights dialogue, create an inventory of the state of affairs, and present this neutrally to ministers for evaluation and decision on next steps. The Netherlands is currently concentrating on "getting as much information on the table as possible," she said, noting that the arms embargo is viewed as part of a larger equation including the code of conduct, human rights, relations with non-EU partners, and regional stability. In that context, she rejected the notion that an "arbitrary" December deadline would determine the outcome of the EU debate. ¶5. (C) On October 6, Jaap Werner, Director of the MFA's Political Affairs Department, provided a different slant on the visit. While he acknowledged that the Chinese could have done more, he told POLOFFS that, on the whole, the visit had been seen as "fairly positive." Werner observed that both the visit, and the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue in general, could be seen as glasses half-full or half-empty. On balance, he predicted that the GAERC would most likely decide that the human rights dialogue was worth continuing despite its frustrations. Werner suggested that ongoing (albeit slow) progress on the human rights front would be cited by some to support lifting the embargo, although he stressed -- like Willems -- that human rights was just one of four criteria the EU would look at when considering the arms embargo. SOBEL