Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04THEHAGUE2300
2004-09-10 15:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:
DUTCH PREVIEW ASEM
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002300
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM BM NL
SUBJECT: DUTCH PREVIEW ASEM
REF: BRUSSELS 3822
Classified By: POL Counselor Andrew Schofer for Reasons 1.4 (B/D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002300
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM BM NL
SUBJECT: DUTCH PREVIEW ASEM
REF: BRUSSELS 3822
Classified By: POL Counselor Andrew Schofer for Reasons 1.4 (B/D)
1. (C) Summary: The Dutch expect the GAERC to endorse the
compromise solution informally agreed among EU members at the
September 9 Gymnich meeting (reftel),but expect some
"fine-tuning" of technical aspects of the agreement.
According to the Dutch, the French are "catching up" after
their Minister's absence from the Gymnich, but their
"technical concerns" should be resolved shortly. Areas for
fine tuning include the exact targets of an expanded visa ban
and EU financing prohibition. The Dutch also previewed the
agenda for the October ASEM summit in Hanoi. End Summary.
2. (C) Poloff met September 10 with Eric Verwaal, Head of
MFA's Southeast Asia Division and Special Assistant to EU
Presidency Envoy Hans van den Broek, to follow-up on the
Gymnich conclusions and preparations for the Asia-Europe
Meeting (ASEM). Verwaal first apologized that the Dutch had
"ignored" the U.S. and others during the ASEM negotiation
process, explaining that it had been necessary in order to
ensure that a solution to the participation impasse would be
found. He commented that many EU members had "strong
feelings" and "competing views" about participation - on both
sides of the issue - and that a solution could not have been
reached if open discussion had been held throughout
negotiations. He assessed that all EU members were "quite
relieved" that a solution had been found and that
preparations for the meeting - now one month away - could
progress. Verwaal visited Hanoi this week to initiate
preparations.
Compromise Solution
--------------
3. (C) Verwaal stated that the compromise solution allows for
the ten new EU members and three new Asian states to accede
to the ASEM. It calls for the Burmese junta to fulfill the
three conditions outlined at the Tullamore Gymnich - release
Aung San Suu Kyi, cease harassment of the National League for
Democracy, and allow genuine open debate at the National
Convention. If these conditions are not met, the EU will
strengthen its Common Position to expand the visa ban list to
all serving members of the military at the rank of
Brigadier-General or above, prohibit EU-registered companies
from making finance available to named Burmese enterprises,
and provide for EU member states to vote against extending
international finance institution loans to Burma. The
compromise also recognizes that the European Commission will
address the issue of Burmese illegal logging, and that the EU
plans to expand assistance to the people of Burma in the
areas of health and education, managed through the UN system
or non-governmental organizations. Verwaal commented that
the expanded visa ban and finance prohibition would represent
a strengthening of the EU Common Position, that voting
against IFI loans was a continuation of the status quo, and
that addressing Burmese illegal logging operations and
expanding assistance to the people of Burma would have been
necessary in any case.
4. (C) Verwaal expected that any changes to the EU Common
Position would be formalized at the October GAERC meeting
(after ASEM). The EU would allow its Asian partners "until
the last minute" to show results in their efforts to convince
the Burmese government to fulfill the Tullamore conditions.
Some "Fine-Tuning" Expected
--------------
5. (C) Noting that Gymnich results were always "informal" and
subject to "formalization" at the GAERC, Verwaal said that
some "fine tuning" was expected. Verwaal said that the date
of the "deadline" for compliance might be moved back from
October 8 to "mid-October" since the GAERC would be the first
opportunity to formalize a revised EU Common position. He
also said that the exact targets of an expanded visa ban and
list of Burmese corporations to which financing was forbidden
had not been specified. He noted that the French were "a
little behind" since the French FM had missed a planned
briefing on the issue in The Hague because he was traveling
in Iraq, and because the French has not participated at the
FM level in the Gymnich. He argued that French concerns were
"technical" rather than political; for example, the French
argued for naming "military-owned" versus "state-owned"
enterprises for sanctions. Verwaal was optimistic that all
the French issues would be resolved shortly. He also noted
that it would be "difficult to say" whether the Foreign
Ministers would agree to revise the EU Common Position (i.e.
strengthen sanctions) if the Burmese released Aung San Suu
Kyi within the time allotted, since that would be a concrete
positive step -- and the other two conditions were not as
concrete (the National Convention, for example, will not
convene until at least November according to Verwaal).
Expectations of ASEM
--------------
6. (C) Verwaal observed that the Dutch saw the ASEM as a good
opportunity to "remark about the situation in Burma." He
expected that the Dutch EU Presidency would make a comment,
and that some EU partners would wish to build upon that
comment. He noted, however, that the Asian partners did not
wish to make ASEM a "single-issue" forum.
7. (SBU) Verwaal provided the expected agenda for ASEM.
There will be four consecutive sessions: (A) International
and Regional Developments, (B) Closer Economic Partnership,
(C) The Future of ASEM, and (D) Cultures and Civilizations.
Sessions B and D have an advance draft declaration building
on previous meetings, and will each issue final declarations
following the ASEM. Session A and D conclusions will be
included in the final "Chair Statement" which will accompany
the other two declarations. The sessions will be attended at
Head-of-State level and will be "relatively informal."
SOBEL
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM BM NL
SUBJECT: DUTCH PREVIEW ASEM
REF: BRUSSELS 3822
Classified By: POL Counselor Andrew Schofer for Reasons 1.4 (B/D)
1. (C) Summary: The Dutch expect the GAERC to endorse the
compromise solution informally agreed among EU members at the
September 9 Gymnich meeting (reftel),but expect some
"fine-tuning" of technical aspects of the agreement.
According to the Dutch, the French are "catching up" after
their Minister's absence from the Gymnich, but their
"technical concerns" should be resolved shortly. Areas for
fine tuning include the exact targets of an expanded visa ban
and EU financing prohibition. The Dutch also previewed the
agenda for the October ASEM summit in Hanoi. End Summary.
2. (C) Poloff met September 10 with Eric Verwaal, Head of
MFA's Southeast Asia Division and Special Assistant to EU
Presidency Envoy Hans van den Broek, to follow-up on the
Gymnich conclusions and preparations for the Asia-Europe
Meeting (ASEM). Verwaal first apologized that the Dutch had
"ignored" the U.S. and others during the ASEM negotiation
process, explaining that it had been necessary in order to
ensure that a solution to the participation impasse would be
found. He commented that many EU members had "strong
feelings" and "competing views" about participation - on both
sides of the issue - and that a solution could not have been
reached if open discussion had been held throughout
negotiations. He assessed that all EU members were "quite
relieved" that a solution had been found and that
preparations for the meeting - now one month away - could
progress. Verwaal visited Hanoi this week to initiate
preparations.
Compromise Solution
--------------
3. (C) Verwaal stated that the compromise solution allows for
the ten new EU members and three new Asian states to accede
to the ASEM. It calls for the Burmese junta to fulfill the
three conditions outlined at the Tullamore Gymnich - release
Aung San Suu Kyi, cease harassment of the National League for
Democracy, and allow genuine open debate at the National
Convention. If these conditions are not met, the EU will
strengthen its Common Position to expand the visa ban list to
all serving members of the military at the rank of
Brigadier-General or above, prohibit EU-registered companies
from making finance available to named Burmese enterprises,
and provide for EU member states to vote against extending
international finance institution loans to Burma. The
compromise also recognizes that the European Commission will
address the issue of Burmese illegal logging, and that the EU
plans to expand assistance to the people of Burma in the
areas of health and education, managed through the UN system
or non-governmental organizations. Verwaal commented that
the expanded visa ban and finance prohibition would represent
a strengthening of the EU Common Position, that voting
against IFI loans was a continuation of the status quo, and
that addressing Burmese illegal logging operations and
expanding assistance to the people of Burma would have been
necessary in any case.
4. (C) Verwaal expected that any changes to the EU Common
Position would be formalized at the October GAERC meeting
(after ASEM). The EU would allow its Asian partners "until
the last minute" to show results in their efforts to convince
the Burmese government to fulfill the Tullamore conditions.
Some "Fine-Tuning" Expected
--------------
5. (C) Noting that Gymnich results were always "informal" and
subject to "formalization" at the GAERC, Verwaal said that
some "fine tuning" was expected. Verwaal said that the date
of the "deadline" for compliance might be moved back from
October 8 to "mid-October" since the GAERC would be the first
opportunity to formalize a revised EU Common position. He
also said that the exact targets of an expanded visa ban and
list of Burmese corporations to which financing was forbidden
had not been specified. He noted that the French were "a
little behind" since the French FM had missed a planned
briefing on the issue in The Hague because he was traveling
in Iraq, and because the French has not participated at the
FM level in the Gymnich. He argued that French concerns were
"technical" rather than political; for example, the French
argued for naming "military-owned" versus "state-owned"
enterprises for sanctions. Verwaal was optimistic that all
the French issues would be resolved shortly. He also noted
that it would be "difficult to say" whether the Foreign
Ministers would agree to revise the EU Common Position (i.e.
strengthen sanctions) if the Burmese released Aung San Suu
Kyi within the time allotted, since that would be a concrete
positive step -- and the other two conditions were not as
concrete (the National Convention, for example, will not
convene until at least November according to Verwaal).
Expectations of ASEM
--------------
6. (C) Verwaal observed that the Dutch saw the ASEM as a good
opportunity to "remark about the situation in Burma." He
expected that the Dutch EU Presidency would make a comment,
and that some EU partners would wish to build upon that
comment. He noted, however, that the Asian partners did not
wish to make ASEM a "single-issue" forum.
7. (SBU) Verwaal provided the expected agenda for ASEM.
There will be four consecutive sessions: (A) International
and Regional Developments, (B) Closer Economic Partnership,
(C) The Future of ASEM, and (D) Cultures and Civilizations.
Sessions B and D have an advance draft declaration building
on previous meetings, and will each issue final declarations
following the ASEM. Session A and D conclusions will be
included in the final "Chair Statement" which will accompany
the other two declarations. The sessions will be attended at
Head-of-State level and will be "relatively informal."
SOBEL