IRAN/IAEA: DUTCH MFA VIEWS ON POSSIBLE UNSC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002261 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2014 TAGS: KNNP PREL IR NL UNSC SUBJECT: IRAN/IAEA: DUTCH MFA VIEWS ON POSSIBLE UNSC REFERRAL REF: A. STATE 191118 ¶B. STATE 188960 Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR ANDREW SCHOFER FOR REA SONS 1.4 (B AND D) ¶1. (C) Summary: PolMilOff discussed refs A and B with Dutch MFA Nonproliferation Chief Paul Wilke on September 7. Wilke does not believe it will be possible to gain support within the EU for referring Iran's non-compliance to the UNSC in September. He doubts ElBaradei's November report will be better than the current one. Wilke does not expect any significant evolution in EU statements on Iran at the September 13-14 GAERC meetings. The EU3 continues to provide limited information to EU partners on its approach. In a September 6 meeting with PM Balkenende and FM Bot, Iranian National Security Secretary Rohani outlined Iran's proposed agreement acknowledging its right to a peaceful nuclear energy program, include the right to reprocess, in exchange for a pledge not to develop nuclear weapons. In general, Wilke expressed concern that the Iranians had seized the diplomatic initiative and were successfully parrying questions raised by the IAEA. End Summary. ¶2. (C) PolMilOff discussed refs A and B with Dutch MFA Nonproliferation Chief Paul Wilke on September 7. Wilke appreciated receiving ref A outline of U.S. ideas for possible UNSC action. He was pessimistic regarding the prospects of gaining EU support for referring Iran to the Security Council, however, noting that "minds are not ripe" for such a step at this time. He saw two obstacles: the EU3 does not believe it will be possible to gain consensus on the IAEA BOG for a referral, and Director ElBaradei's effort still needs to be carried forward. Wilke was not certain ElBaradei would provide a more useful report in November, calling the trend of his reports "Iran friendly." (That said, he observed that ElBaradei might be downplaying concerns deliberately to encourage Iranian cooperation.) Wilke believes that while taken together, ElBaradei's six reports paint a picture of non-compliance, it is harder to make the case on the basis of the latest report. The GONL agrees with many of the U.S. concerns highlighted in ref B, but so far the Iranians have been effective in getting their counter-arguments to every question heard. Looking ahead, Wilke did not expect a strong statement on Iran to emerge from the September 13-14 GAERC meetings. Instead, he predicted the results of those meetings would be similar to ministerial comments following the September 4-5 Gymnich meetings, e.g., stressing the need for a "strong signal" regarding EU concerns about the Iranian program without any real teeth. Wilke did not have the impression the EU3 had a clear idea as to next steps, and said they continue to be very unforthcoming with other EU partners. ¶3. (C) Wilke provided a brief overview of Iranian National Security Council Secretary Rohani's September 6 meeting with PM Balkenende and FM Bot in The Hague. This meeting had been organized on short notice at Iran's request. Balkenende and Bot believed the meeting was useful inasmuch as it enabled them to tell the Dutch parliament that they are continuing to press the Iranians. Wilke said the Dutch side "made the usual points" about the need for Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and resolve the doubts of the international community. Rohani, who apparently did "ninety percent of the talking," raised Iran's proposal for a cooperation package. This would include reaffirmation of Iran's right to pursue a "peaceful" nuclear energy program in exchange for an Iranian promise not to develop nuclear weapons. It would also call for cooperation in science and technology and would reassert Iran's right to engage in reprocessing. Rohani also told Balkenende and Bot that the Majlis might only be willing to ratify an Additional Protocol after the resumption of Iranian nuclear activities. ¶4. (C) Wilke said it was evident from every question raised in ElBaradei's latest report that the Iranians have been successful in gaining a hearing for their side of the story. In this regard, he said, the Iranians were probably justified in believing that they are gaining the diplomatic initiative. He expressed concern that the Iranians may successfully focus the issue on their continued adherence to the NPT in exchange for acknowledgment of their right to a "peaceful" nuclear program. ¶5. (C) Comment: The Dutch have long supported the view that Iran's actions, viewed objectively, constitute non-compliance and justify referral to the UNSC. That said, they are reluctant to support referral to the UNSC without a clear strategy for managing the issue -- and any potential fallout -- once it arrives there. In this regard, Wilke said it was very helpful to have ref A points. It is clear that despite the current Dutch role as EU president, the EU3 are still playing their hand close to the vest in determining a way ahead. End comment. SOBEL