C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002261

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2014
TAGS: KNNP PREL IR NL UNSC
SUBJECT: IRAN/IAEA: DUTCH MFA VIEWS ON POSSIBLE UNSC

REFERRAL

REF: A. STATE 191118

B. STATE 188960

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR ANDREW SCHOFER FOR REA
SONS 1.4 (B AND D)


1. (C) Summary: PolMilOff discussed refs A and B with Dutch
MFA Nonproliferation Chief Paul Wilke on September 7. Wilke
does not believe it will be possible to gain support within
the EU for referring Iran's non-compliance to the UNSC in
September. He doubts ElBaradei's November report will be
better than the current one. Wilke does not expect any
significant evolution in EU statements on Iran at the
September 13-14 GAERC meetings. The EU3 continues to provide
limited information to EU partners on its approach. In a
September 6 meeting with PM Balkenende and FM Bot, Iranian
National Security Secretary Rohani outlined Iran's proposed
agreement acknowledging its right to a peaceful nuclear
energy program, include the right to reprocess, in exchange
for a pledge not to develop nuclear weapons. In general,
Wilke expressed concern that the Iranians had seized the
diplomatic initiative and were successfully parrying
questions raised by the IAEA. End Summary.


2. (C) PolMilOff discussed refs A and B with Dutch MFA
Nonproliferation Chief Paul Wilke on September 7. Wilke
appreciated receiving ref A outline of U.S. ideas for
possible UNSC action. He was pessimistic regarding the
prospects of gaining EU support for referring Iran to the
Security Council, however, noting that "minds are not ripe"
for such a step at this time. He saw two obstacles: the EU3
does not believe it will be possible to gain consensus on the
IAEA BOG for a referral, and Director ElBaradei's effort
still needs to be carried forward. Wilke was not certain
ElBaradei would provide a more useful report in November,
calling the trend of his reports "Iran friendly." (That
said, he observed that ElBaradei might be downplaying
concerns deliberately to encourage Iranian cooperation.)
Wilke believes that while taken together, ElBaradei's six
reports paint a picture of non-compliance, it is harder to
make the case on the basis of the latest report. The GONL
agrees with many of the U.S. concerns highlighted in ref B,
but so far the Iranians have been effective in getting their
counter-arguments to every question heard. Looking ahead,
Wilke did not expect a strong statement on Iran to emerge
from the September 13-14 GAERC meetings. Instead, he
predicted the results of those meetings would be similar to
ministerial comments following the September 4-5 Gymnich
meetings, e.g., stressing the need for a "strong signal"
regarding EU concerns about the Iranian program without any
real teeth. Wilke did not have the impression the EU3 had a
clear idea as to next steps, and said they continue to be
very unforthcoming with other EU partners.


3. (C) Wilke provided a brief overview of Iranian National
Security Council Secretary Rohani's September 6 meeting with
PM Balkenende and FM Bot in The Hague. This meeting had been
organized on short notice at Iran's request. Balkenende and
Bot believed the meeting was useful inasmuch as it enabled
them to tell the Dutch parliament that they are continuing to
press the Iranians. Wilke said the Dutch side "made the
usual points" about the need for Iran to cooperate with the
IAEA and resolve the doubts of the international community.
Rohani, who apparently did "ninety percent of the talking,"
raised Iran's proposal for a cooperation package. This would
include reaffirmation of Iran's right to pursue a "peaceful"
nuclear energy program in exchange for an Iranian promise not
to develop nuclear weapons. It would also call for
cooperation in science and technology and would reassert
Iran's right to engage in reprocessing. Rohani also told
Balkenende and Bot that the Majlis might only be willing to
ratify an Additional Protocol after the resumption of Iranian
nuclear activities.


4. (C) Wilke said it was evident from every question raised
in ElBaradei's latest report that the Iranians have been
successful in gaining a hearing for their side of the story.
In this regard, he said, the Iranians were probably justified
in believing that they are gaining the diplomatic initiative.
He expressed concern that the Iranians may successfully
focus the issue on their continued adherence to the NPT in
exchange for acknowledgment of their right to a "peaceful"
nuclear program.


5. (C) Comment: The Dutch have long supported the view that
Iran's actions, viewed objectively, constitute non-compliance
and justify referral to the UNSC. That said, they are
reluctant to support referral to the UNSC without a clear
strategy for managing the issue -- and any potential fallout
-- once it arrives there. In this regard, Wilke said it was
very helpful to have ref A points. It is clear that despite
the current Dutch role as EU president, the EU3 are still
playing their hand close to the vest in determining a way
ahead. End comment.
SOBEL