Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04THEHAGUE2126
2004-08-25 15:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:
EU/NETHERLANDS/SOUTH OSSETIA: DUTCH SKEPTICAL
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 002126
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG GM NL EUN
SUBJECT: EU/NETHERLANDS/SOUTH OSSETIA: DUTCH SKEPTICAL
ABOUT BADEN PROCESS
REF: STATE 180508
Classified By: POLCOUNS ANDREW J. SCHOFER FOR REASONS 1.5(B) AND (D).
C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 002126
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG GM NL EUN
SUBJECT: EU/NETHERLANDS/SOUTH OSSETIA: DUTCH SKEPTICAL
ABOUT BADEN PROCESS
REF: STATE 180508
Classified By: POLCOUNS ANDREW J. SCHOFER FOR REASONS 1.5(B) AND (D).
1. (C) On August 24, POLCOUNS discussed reftel points with
Tony van der Togt, Head of the Dutch MFA's Eastern Europe and
Central Asia Division, and Frank van Beuningen, Policy
Coordinator for the OSCE within the MFA's Department of
Security Policy. Both interlocutors were well briefed on the
situation on the ground and the state of discussions within
the OSCE and EU. While they spoke positively of the need to
internationalize the South Ossetia issue, both expressed
skepticism that the Baden Process -- even at an elevated
level -- would be the most effective way to accomplish this
objective.
2. (C) Referring to the recent Dutch experience as OSCE CIO,
van Beuningen and van der Togt argued that Baden Process was
"dead or nearly dead." Van Beuningen observed that a
previous Baden Process meeting in the Netherlands had "made
some Dutch shopkeepers happy" but achieved no practical
results. The flaws of the Baden Process, they suggested,
would not be resolved by raising the level of participation
-- although they acknowledged this was a positive step --
especially under a relatively "weak" CIO such as Bulgaria.
3 (C) Van Beuningen and van der Togt made clear that they
were not yet prepared to give up on the possibility of
creating a broader international mechanism, such as the
international conference proposed by Saakashvili. In
response to POLCOUNS' arguments that reinvigorating the Baden
Process could be a useful first step in an expanding process,
van der Togt and van Beuningen questioned whether such a step
was necessary. The Russians, van Beuningen argued, had
agreed in principle to consider broader international
mechanisms when they signed on to the OSCE mission's mandate
in 2000. In addition, van der Togt noted that during
EU-Russian discussions earlier this year, Russian DFM
Loschinin had praised the EU's "balanced" approach to
Georgia, so he did not think the Russians could credibly
argue against a process that included the EU.
4. (C) Regarding next steps, van der Togt and van Beuningen
said that they did not expect the EU or OSCE to take further
action until after special representative Talvitie returns
and reports. The Dutch are, however, currently preparing a
joint EU response to a letter from Saakashvili, in which the
EU would: 1) express support for recent efforts to stabilize
the situation (and warn against aggravating actions); 2)
sound a "positive note" about a possible international
conference; 3) stress the importance of continuing the OSCE
mission; and 4) mention the possibility of humanitarian
assistance in general terms. Van der Togt noted that the
Dutch hoped to get the letter out before the end of the week
-- and before Schroeder and Chirac meet Putin in Sochi August
30-31 -- to ensure a coordinated EU response.
5. (C) Throughout the discussion, van Beuningen and van der
Togt stressed that that they shared USG concerns regarding
the developing situation in South Ossetia and wished to
coordinate closely. Van der Togt said he looked forward to
discussing this issue, and how to keep the EU and U.S.
effectively engaged on it, at the COEST troika meeting on
September 1 in Brussels. With regard to the OSCE, the
suggested that the next OSCE PC where the issue would
logically appear on the agenda would take place the week of
September 6.
RUSSEL
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG GM NL EUN
SUBJECT: EU/NETHERLANDS/SOUTH OSSETIA: DUTCH SKEPTICAL
ABOUT BADEN PROCESS
REF: STATE 180508
Classified By: POLCOUNS ANDREW J. SCHOFER FOR REASONS 1.5(B) AND (D).
1. (C) On August 24, POLCOUNS discussed reftel points with
Tony van der Togt, Head of the Dutch MFA's Eastern Europe and
Central Asia Division, and Frank van Beuningen, Policy
Coordinator for the OSCE within the MFA's Department of
Security Policy. Both interlocutors were well briefed on the
situation on the ground and the state of discussions within
the OSCE and EU. While they spoke positively of the need to
internationalize the South Ossetia issue, both expressed
skepticism that the Baden Process -- even at an elevated
level -- would be the most effective way to accomplish this
objective.
2. (C) Referring to the recent Dutch experience as OSCE CIO,
van Beuningen and van der Togt argued that Baden Process was
"dead or nearly dead." Van Beuningen observed that a
previous Baden Process meeting in the Netherlands had "made
some Dutch shopkeepers happy" but achieved no practical
results. The flaws of the Baden Process, they suggested,
would not be resolved by raising the level of participation
-- although they acknowledged this was a positive step --
especially under a relatively "weak" CIO such as Bulgaria.
3 (C) Van Beuningen and van der Togt made clear that they
were not yet prepared to give up on the possibility of
creating a broader international mechanism, such as the
international conference proposed by Saakashvili. In
response to POLCOUNS' arguments that reinvigorating the Baden
Process could be a useful first step in an expanding process,
van der Togt and van Beuningen questioned whether such a step
was necessary. The Russians, van Beuningen argued, had
agreed in principle to consider broader international
mechanisms when they signed on to the OSCE mission's mandate
in 2000. In addition, van der Togt noted that during
EU-Russian discussions earlier this year, Russian DFM
Loschinin had praised the EU's "balanced" approach to
Georgia, so he did not think the Russians could credibly
argue against a process that included the EU.
4. (C) Regarding next steps, van der Togt and van Beuningen
said that they did not expect the EU or OSCE to take further
action until after special representative Talvitie returns
and reports. The Dutch are, however, currently preparing a
joint EU response to a letter from Saakashvili, in which the
EU would: 1) express support for recent efforts to stabilize
the situation (and warn against aggravating actions); 2)
sound a "positive note" about a possible international
conference; 3) stress the importance of continuing the OSCE
mission; and 4) mention the possibility of humanitarian
assistance in general terms. Van der Togt noted that the
Dutch hoped to get the letter out before the end of the week
-- and before Schroeder and Chirac meet Putin in Sochi August
30-31 -- to ensure a coordinated EU response.
5. (C) Throughout the discussion, van Beuningen and van der
Togt stressed that that they shared USG concerns regarding
the developing situation in South Ossetia and wished to
coordinate closely. Van der Togt said he looked forward to
discussing this issue, and how to keep the EU and U.S.
effectively engaged on it, at the COEST troika meeting on
September 1 in Brussels. With regard to the OSCE, the
suggested that the next OSCE PC where the issue would
logically appear on the agenda would take place the week of
September 6.
RUSSEL